Utah State University

DigitalCommons@USU
All Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate Studies

5-2009

Macromorality and Mormons: A Psychometric Investigation and
Qualitative Evaluation of the Defining Issues Test-2
Daniel R. Winder
Utah State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd
Part of the Education Commons, Psychology Commons, and the Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Winder, Daniel R., "Macromorality and Mormons: A Psychometric Investigation and Qualitative Evaluation
of the Defining Issues Test-2" (2009). All Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 448.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/448

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open
access by the Graduate Studies at
DigitalCommons@USU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in All Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@USU. For
more information, please contact
digitalcommons@usu.edu.

MACROMORALITY AND MORMONS: A PSYCHOMETRIC INVESTIGATION
AND QUALITATIVE EVALUATION OF THE
DEFINING ISSUES TEST-2
by
Daniel R. Winder
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
Instructional Technology
Approved:

J. Nicholls Eastmond, Ph.D.
Major Professor (co-chair)

Joanne P. H. Bentley, Ph.D.
Committee Member

Matthew J. Taylor, Ph.D.
Major Professor (co-chair)

Michael K. Freeman, Ph.D.
Committee Member

Richard P. West, Ph.D.
Committee Member

Byron R. Burnham, Ed.D.
Dean of Graduate Studies
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Logan, Utah
2009

ii

Copyright © Daniel R. Winder 2009
All Rights Reserved

iii
ABSTRACT
Macromorality and Mormons: A Psychometric Investigation and
Qualitative Evaluation of the Defining Issues Test-2
by
Daniel R. Winder, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2009
Major Professors: J. Nicholls Eastmond, Ph.D, Matthew J. Taylor, Ph.D.
Department: Instructional Technology
In 1988, P. Scott Richard’s dissertation research at the University of Minnesota
asserted that the Defining Issues Test (DIT), a widely accepted paper-and-pencil test of
moral reasoning, exhibited item bias against religiously orthodox persons. Since 1988
(when Richard’s data were reported), new methods of differential-item functioning (DIF)
have developed, a new DIT has emerged (the DIT-2), as well as a Neo-Kohlbergian
framework based upon moral schemas derived from Kohlberg’s Piagetian-like six stages.
With new methods, new tests, and unanswered questions, this study’s results imply:
(1) that DIT-2 items exhibit differential item functioning for religiously orthodox persons
in statistically significant but not as practically significant ways as Richards’ earlier
findings, (2) that religious orthodoxy does influence macromoral reasoning as measured
by the DIT-2, (3) that the maintaining norms schema is insufficient to explain the
variables that contribute to why religiously orthodox persons score the way they do. This
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study implies that the maintaining norms schema may be misnamed because it appears to
be measuring a different construct than maintaining norms macromoral reasoning.
(197 pages)
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The measurement of macromoral reasoning 1 has had an extensive history with
copious amounts of research supporting various viewpoints (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003).
The late Lawrence Kohlberg, a Harvard University professor, in an iterative process of
research, became the father of the modern measurement of macromoral reasoning
(Haggbloom et al., 2002). Kohlberg’s measurement of macromoral reasoning ability
(called macromorality) has roots in Jean Piaget’s stage theory of cognitive development
(Kohlberg, 1958). Kohlberg took Piaget’s theories and concepts of a hierarchal stage
development and sought to apply them to the measurement of individual levels of
macromorality. After extensive interview research, Kohlberg built a framework for
measuring macromorality based upon six stages of moral development. He further
developed a set of vignettes involving macromoral reasoning, interview questions, and
extensive scoring guides to operationally discriminate between each stage of
macromorality (see Appendix A for a description of each stage and the rationale in
classifying each stage).
Adherents to Kohlberg’s theory sought to simplify his moral judgment interview
and scoring process by developing an additional pioneering instrument in measuring
macromoral reasoning, the Defining Issues Test (the first edition of this test is commonly

1 To define macromoral reasoning (sometimes called macromorality or moral judgment), moral
philosophers borrow similar terminology from the field of economics. That is, that the field of moral
judgment discriminates between a larger broader level of morality (macromorality) and a smaller, more
personal level of morality (micromorality).
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referred to as the DIT-1). Convergent validity studies performed with Kohlberg’s
interview and the DIT-1 found correlations between the two test’s scores to be in the low
.80s (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999b; see Appendix A for further discussion of
validation of both of the DIT tests). Since Kohlberg’s interview had to be administered
orally and individually, it was very time consuming for both the interviewer and the
interviewee. In addition, scoring the responses was also very time consuming. Thus,
having a paper-and-pencil instrument (the DIT-1) with a high correlation with Kohlberg’s
interview was considered a breakthrough by many moral philosophers.
The DIT-1 quickly established itself as the most respected assessment of
macromoral reasoning. By 1999, over 450 studies had been conducted on the DIT-1 since
its implementation (Rest, 1999). These studies have helped to refine and validate the
scoring of the DIT-1 as well as to help provide the framework for the construct of
macromoral reasoning.
Several convergent validity and reliability studies have also helped to establish
the DIT-1 as a respected instrument for measuring macromorality (see Appendix A). The
DIT-1 also claimed to be universally applicable and, like Kohlberg’s interview, culturally
invariant (Kohlberg, 1967, 1971, 1976, 1981; Rest et al., 1999b).
Although there were advantages to using the DIT-1, research on the validity of the
DIT-1 indicated that religious orthodoxy 2 within a Mormon sample confounded the
assessment of macromoral reasoning (Blackner, 1975; Richards, 1988). Further, several

2 Religious Orthodoxy is defined as one who has “a firm, literal belief in scriptural teachings” and “a belief
that God, and God’s word as revealed in the scriptures, are legitimate sources of moral authority (Richards,
1988, p. 18). In addition, the terminology used to describe religious orthodox persons includes terms such
as: religious conservative, fundamentalism, traditional religious values, and the religious right.
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researchers reported that religiously orthodox patrons from various faiths consistently
scored lower than nonreligiously orthodox patrons when using this instrument (Brown &
Annis, 1978; Clouse, 1979; Ernsberger & Manaster, 1981; Getz, 1985; Harris, 1981; Kay,
1998; Lawrence, 1979; McGeorge, 1976; Radich, 1982; Sanderson, 1974; Volker, 1979;
Wahrman, 1980). Thus, the culturally invariant claim was called into question.
As research evidence showed that there were negative correlations between scores
on the DIT-1 and levels of religious orthodoxy, moral philosophers worked with
measurement experts to perform differential item functioning (DIF) analyses on the DIT1 items. These DIF studies were conducted by comparing national norms of itemresponse patterns with a religiously orthodox group item-response patterns after carefully
matching both groups on their overall ability to macromorally reason. The logic followed
that if certain items were performing differently for religiously orthodox groups, then the
overall claims of the DIT-1 as a measure of macromoral reasoning ability would be
suspect due to a confounding variable.
Reacting to these and other research claims, the makers of the DIT-1 revised their
theoretical framework and instrument to formulate a less culturally sensitive instrument,
the Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2; Rest et al., 1999b). The Center for the Study of
Ethical Development (2007), has called for replication studies, but there has been no
differential item functioning analysis examining the use of the DIT-2 on a sample of
religiously orthodox persons. Consequently, there are no data currently available to
determine if the confound is still affecting DIT-2 scores.
This study proposes to collect data from a new Mormon sample to systematically
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replicate the earlier research (Richards, 1988) on the new version of the DIT. The
implications of this study are that if the Mormon sample’s item-response patterns do not
vary from a national item-response pattern on the DIT-2, then the DIT-2 items may be a
more valid measure of macromoral reasoning for religiously orthodox groups in general
than the DIT-1. More specifically, the goal of this study was to examine whether the
items on the DIT-2 performed similarly to the DIT-1 items for a religiously orthodox
group when compared to a group that more closely adhered to U.S. national norms for
DIT-2 scores and attempted to answer the following research questions.
1. Does religious orthodoxy confound the measurement of macromoral
reasoning as measured by the DIT-2?
2. What other variables predict both macromoral reasoning and religious
orthodoxy and thus could be potential confounds?
As a final point of introduction, this study is important to the field of Instructional
Technology and Learning Sciences (ITLS), because many instructional models for
character education and moral education use the DIT-2 to measure the differences
between treatment and control groups based upon an instructional treatment or use it in a
gain study fashion (Rest et al., 1999b). Thus, ensuring that the DIT-2 instrument is
correctly measuring the learning outcomes and gains in ethical reasoning that it purports
to measure, relates to the field of ITLS. Finally, studying the construct validity of the
DIT-2 test is important to the ITLS field, because of the way the DIT-2 and its derivative
tests have been and are being proposed to be used in fields of education, business,
government, and other practices (see Chapter II, Uses of the DIT-2).
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This review of literature will point out the DIT concept and measurement of
macromoral reasoning (MMR) as well as how DIT-2 scores are used. I will then point
out variables that are thought to confound the measurement of MMR on the DIT,
specifically pointing out pertinent studies relating to the measurement of MMR for
religiously orthodox groups. Various explanations of religiously orthodox person’s
MMR scores will be reviewed followed by new theories and rationales for the variables
used in this study. The justification for inclusion of findings in this review of literature
was based upon three criteria: (a) whether the findings were from refereed journals or
referenced by the Center For The Study of Ethical Development (CSED), (b) whether the
writing pertained to the measurement methodologies for identifying item bias or a
potential confounding variable, and (c) whether the literature led up to the current
research in the fields of MMR or current religiously orthodox views on MMR.
Much of the literature in this review was found from the CSED’s DIT-2 scoring
guide (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003), which gives an extensive bibliography of research
involving both versions of the DIT tests. In addition, many references to religiously
orthodox studies in the book Postconventional Moral Thinking: A Neo-Kohlbergian
Approach (Rest et al., 1999b) were used as starting points for the literature review. To
obtain some of the most pertinent literature on the DIT-2 tests, the Brigham Young
University library services were used such as: Journal Finder, EBSCO, JSTOR, and the
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Database. Finally, several face to face meetings as
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well as phone and e-mail conversations were used to acquire articles and additional
information from DIT researchers and experts in the field of macromoral reasoning.
The Concept of MMR in the DIT
To define macromorality, moral philosophers borrow similar terminology from
the field of economics. That is, that the field of moral judgment discriminates between a
larger broader level of morality (macromorality) and a smaller, more personal level of
morality (micromorality). Rest and colleagues (1999b) explained these concepts.
It is useful to see Kohlberg’s theory as primarily addressed to the formal
structures of society (laws, roles, institutions, general practices) instead of the
personal, face-to-face relationships in particular, everyday dealings with
people…that are involved in making cooperation possible at a society level (in
which not just kin, friends, and long-known acquaintances are interrelated, but
strangers, competitors, and diverse clans, ethnic groups, and religions are as well).
Examples of the special concerns of macromorality include the rights and
responsibilities of free speech, due-process rights of the accused,
nondiscriminatory work practices, freedom of religion, and equity in economic
and educational opportunity. (p. 2)
On the other hand, micromorality concerns the “particular face-to-face relations that
people have in everyday life” such as courtesy, caring, punctuality, and empathy (Rest et
al., 1999b, p. 291).
The Measurement of MMR in the DIT
The DIT framework has been used as a measure of MMR for nearly 30 years. It
was designed based upon Lawrence Kohlberg’s Piagetian-like stages of moral
development. Briefly, Kohlberg’s theory of moral development included three levels and
six hierarchal stages of moral reasoning. His levels and stages are described as:
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Level One: Preconventional
1. The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of
action determine its goodness or badness.
2. The instrumental-relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which
instrumentally satisfies one’s own needs and occasionally the needs of others.
Level Two: Conventional
3. The interpersonal concordance or “good boy-nice girl” orientation. Good
behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them.
4. The “law and order” orientation. Right behavior consists of doing one’s duty,
showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its
own sake.
Level Three: Postconventional
5. The social-contract legalistic orientation. Right actions tend to be defined in
terms of individual rights and standards which have been critically examined
and agreed upon by society.
6. The universal-ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of
conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical
comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. (Kohlberg, 1973, pp. 631632)
Kohlberg eventually came to view his stages of moral reasoning analogously to
cognitive development in that he proposed that a person of lower moral development
would not have the necessary skills to function at a higher stage of moral reasoning
(Kohlberg, 1984).
Kohlberg’s followers developed a Neo-Kohlbergian framework based upon moral
schemas that are tapped into by presenting hypothetical ethical scenarios (Rest, Narvaez,
Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999a). However, the new framework still uses the stage scores to
determine the schemas and claim that as higher moral schemas gain use, the lower ones
diminish in use (for a more detailed description of MMR as measured by the DIT see
Appendix A). It was as if these new schema scores were merely a changing of names and
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collapsing of stages into Kohlberg’s former three levels. For example, stages 2-3 are the
Personal Interest Schema (PI-stages 2-3), stage 4 is the Maintaining Norms Schema
(MN-stage 4), and stages 5-6 are the Postconventional Schema (PC-stages 5-6). These
three levels have almost identical descriptions as Kohlberg’s original three levels.
The overall concept of measurement of MMR can be explained via the framework
for the DIT-2 items. These items propose to be measuring how people interrelate to each
other through laws, rules, roles, and institutions to form the system of society (Rest et al.,
1999b). If a person’s moral schema is based upon abstract, impartial, non-partisan
principles of justice to establish principles of society-wide cooperation, then the person
highly endorses items that tap into the highest of the DIT-2 schemas. It is presumed that
the stories and items “activate moral schemas to the extent that person has developed
them” (Rest, 1999, p. 6). As the person reads an item that makes sense to their moral
schema, they rate that item as being more important to their decisions.
In addition, the “just community” is a common concept in the DIT-2 framework.
The just community is based upon the concept of “right rather than the concept of good”
(Rest, 1999, p. 14). In the DIT-2 framework, the maintaining norms schema (MN-stage
4) justifies a decision based upon rules, formal institutions, customs, or religious codes
based upon established ways of knowing. These are seen as duty-based decisions that
contain these specific elements. A person who is primed to be thinking in a MN-stage 4
schema appeals to “what is” as “what ought to be.” Contrast that with a postconventional schema (PC-stages 5-6) which rather than appealing to laws, customs, and
so forth, they argue that what is right is right for the sake of the entire society. To further
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clarify, while the MN-stage 4 schema appeals to the current social order, the PC-stages 56 schema appeals to sharable impartial ideals that are argued on the basis that the act
would “respect other people,” serve the common shared values or goals, and “optimize
the welfare of all participants,” while still being open to scrutiny and debate (Rest, p. 54).
This higher schema realizes that laws are debatable social contracts and can be changed
to suit an ideally organized society’s needs. In a DIT-2 just society, all insights are
appreciated but scrutinized by the participants affected. Because of a belief in full
reciprocity, it is believed that the laws and rules will not favor one member at the expense
of another. Therefore, if a person feels the laws are not favoring their rights due to some
sort of injustice, they can and should demand their rights. As emphasized, Kohlberg’s
justice-based MMR framework somewhat lends itself to a social rights-based philosophy.
Uses of the DIT-2
Some DIT-2 proponents strongly advocate its use for discriminatory decisions.
Thus, the practical significance of this study is validated by the proposed use of the DIT2. Because religious orthodoxy transcends many of the boundaries in academia,
professional life, and because MMR is valued in our society, this study has significance
to many fields other than MMR and religion. For example, proponents suggest that the
DIT-2 test scores can be used to predict success in the following areas: military and
governmental leadership (Atwater, 1998; Olsen, 2006; Stephenson & Staal, 2007; Wang
et al., 2008), organizational leadership (Sims & Keon, 1997), businesses (O’Fallon &
Butterfield, 2005), sales jobs (Verbeke, 1996), law firms (Bebeau, 2002), accounting
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(Abdolmohammadi, Read, & Scarbrough, 2003), general ethical decision training
(Bebeau, Rodriguez, & Maeda, 2002; Rest, 1999; Yeap, 1999), and medical/dental school
selection as well as practicing medical clinicians (Beabeau; Benor, Notzer, Sheehan, &
Norman, 1982; Latif & Dunn, 2000; Self, 2000). Most of the proposals to use the DIT-2
outcomes for these selection and evaluative purposes rely on research of predictor
variables of successful persons in the various fields or training. The assumptions rest on
a notion that since the successful experts in a particular field show patterns in DIT-2
scores, that individuals who also show similar patterns prior to some sort of selection
process, will also have higher success rates in that field. In addition, several researchers
have used the DIT-2 in measures of convergent validity for later tests of moral reasoning
(Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thomas, 1999c; Stewart, 2001; White, 1997).
However, if the DIT-2 items are somehow tainted by a systematic confounding
variable, then one of the most fundamental assumptions for studying individual
differences and instructional outcomes is not being satisfied (Niell, 2007; Osterlind,
2007; Reigeluth, 1999). That fundamental assumption is that the construct of interest (in
this study MMR), can and is being appropriately measured for different individuals.
Consequently, if the DIT-2 scores are systematically biased against religiously orthodox
persons due to confounding variables other than MMR, then there are legal ramifications
if it is used as selection or evaluative criteria.
Confounding Variables of the DIT MMR Scores
Some researchers argue there is much more to MMR than Kohlberg’s cognitive
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stages. In fact, the result of several research studies is that MMR, as measured by the
DIT, is confounded by other variables. For example, De Casterle (1998) suggested that
the Kohlberg’s justice-based principles are lacking an element of caring responsibility for
those one is responsible for. Other studies have found that the framework’s focus on cold
cognition and rational thought does not consider the impact on the environment (Nokes,
1989). In addition, Triandis and Hui (1986) showed that cultural views of collectivism
and individualism affect one’s MMR. Shweder, Mahapatra, and Miller’s (1987) research
showed that one’s view of the nature of moral realities (ontology) lead to one’s moral
epistemologies (the nature of knowledge)—a similar point that several prominent
educational researchers reiterate within educational research domains (Mertens, 2005;
Schwandt, 2000). Several other research studies agree that the Kohlberg and his
follower’s framework (the Neo-Kohlbergian framework) favors those who focus on
societal individual rights over societal collective responsibilities (De Casterle; Nokes;
Shweder, 1991; Shweder et al.; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997; Triandis &
Hui). Finally, religious orthodoxy has also been purported to be a confounding variable to
MMR on the DIT (Richards, 1988).
Unyielding to these research studies findings, the Center for the Study of Ethical
Development (CSED-the makers of the DIT) still claimed that the DIT MMR scores are
validly measuring a trait that is culturally invariant. They maintained that “no variable
accounts for the trends in the validity criteria better than” the DIT outcome scores
themselves (Rest, 1999, p. 108).
To explain these proposed confounding variables, the makers of the DIT tests
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claimed that individual MMR development and a discussion of an orthodox versus
progressive view of societal roles, are being reflected on the DIT scores (Rest et al.,
1999b). Further, their explanation stopped just short of referring to those with an
orthodox or traditional view of society as macromorally handicapped (Rest, 1999;
Richards, 1988, Shweder et al., 1987). In the DIT framework, orthodox views of society,
whether they come from religion or elsewhere, are seen as inhibitors to MMR
development (Rest).
This response of orthodox views of society inhibiting MMR development was too
simplistic and somewhat offensive for many who valued MMR, especially religiously
orthodox persons. Most of this abrasion occurred because religiously orthodox persons
felt that their religious values were valid and moral tools that could be implored to judge
the “rightness” or “wrongness” of a given macromoral situation (Lloyd, 2008; Nelson,
2004; Neuhaus, 1992; Oaks, 1992, 2001; Scott, 2007a, 2007b). In stark contrast to Rest
(1999), these religious values are seen as catalysts, rather than inhibitors, to high moral
judgment.
Religious Orthodox Variables Confound DIT Scores
The DIT-1 framework, items, and resulting scores have had a long tradition of
being suspect to a systematic favoring of nonreligious participants when compared to
religious participants (Blackner, 1975; Brown & Annis, 1978; Clouse, 1979; Ernsberger
& Manaster, 1981; Getz, 1985; Harris, 1981; Kay, 1998; McGeorge, 1976; Radich, 1982;
Richards, 1988; Richards & Davison, 1992; Sanderson, 1974; Volker, 1979; Wahrman,
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1980).
Most of this suspicion of favoring non-religious persons is due to the fact that
religiously orthodox persons consistently score lower on PC-stages 5-6 levels of MMR
and higher on MN-stage 4 levels of MMR. In the DIT framework, this would indicate
that religiously orthodox persons defer to societal norms, rules, and laws of society over
carefully scrutinizing what is best for society as a whole. Further, it also indicates that
they are less developed in their MMR abilities.
These provocative findings led to further research to discover why religiously
orthodox persons scored lower on MMR outcomes. Early qualitative studies called
Kohlberg’s cultural invariance claim into question. Blackner was the first researcher to
use Mormon or Latter-day Saint (LDS) subjects to suggest that the DIT items and scores
may perform differently for religiously orthodox subjects: “The DIT may be designed in
such a manner that those involved in religious education may respond to certain items as
most important without first considering other alternatives. In other words, a person may
be able to think in higher terms but have a cultural set in responding to certain stimuli”
(Blackner, 1975, p. 64). In 1979, Lawrence found that Protestant seminarians strongly
endorsed stage 4 items and showed a lack of endorsement of post-conventional items.
From her follow-up interviews, she concluded that the endorsement of stage 4 items was
not due to a deficit in moral reasoning abilities, but rather a loyalty to their religious
beliefs over their own moral reasoning. These two early studies were especially
controversial because Kohlberg claimed that religious orientation was independent of
moral development (1967, 1971, 1976, 1981).
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Follow-up studies in the 1980s focused on empirically proving whether a
religious and cultural bias existed in the DIT-1 scores and why. For example, Getz
(1984) and Richards (1988) both claimed that religiously orthodox people tended to score
lower than average on the principled moral reasoning score (P score, stages 5-6
proportion of items endorsed). Most all of these studies empirically showed a systematic
bias against religiously orthodox groups when compared to nonreligious orthodox
groups.
However, researcher’s reviews of these studies disagreed in their separate
explanations of why these differences existed. Getz proposed that the negative
correlation between religious orthodoxy and P scores was due to stifled development of
moral judgment (1984) while Richards proposed the correlation existed due to test bias
(1988). This disagreement evolved into research on the DIT scores to see if these lower
scores for religiously orthodox persons was a true effect or if it was due to poor reliability
and validity of the DIT scores. Richards reviewed Getz’ studies and proposed that poor
research methodology of the studies in her review led Getz to faulty conclusions.
Richards cited: (a) sampling problems (e.g., only 2 of the 10 were randomly sampled), (b)
failure to control for extraneous variables (e.g., not matching subjects education level—
the highest predictor of DIT scores), (c) unreliable and invalid measures (many of the
studies did not report reliability nor validity measures), and (d) lack of clear definitions
(failure to define “conservative religiosity” or “religious orthodoxy”). Richards’
conclusion was that due to “the methodological shortcomings of the studies reviewed…,
Getz’s conclusion should be viewed tentatively” (Richards, p. 21; also see Table 1).
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Table 1
Findings and Methodological Characteristics of Studies That Examined the Relation
Between Principled Moral Reasoning (P-score) and Religiously Orthodox Ideology (RO)
Methodology
────────────────────────

RO & P-score correlations
─────────────────

Study

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Negative

No relation

Positive

Brown & Annis (1978)

N

?

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

1

0

0

Clouse (1979)

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

1

0

0

Ernsberger & Manaster
(1981)

Y

N

N

NA

NA

Y

Y

1

0

0

Getz (1985)

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

1

0

0

Harris (1981)

N

N

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

0

2

0

McGeorge (1976)

N

?

N

N

N

Y

Y

0

1

0

Radich (1982)

N

?

Y

N

N

Y

Y

0

1

0

Sanderson (1974)

N

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

NA

3

0

0

Volker (1979)

N

N

N

N

N

Y

?

1

1

0

Wahrman (1981)

N

?

N

N

N

Y

?

0

2

0

Totals
8
7
0
Note. 1 = randomly selected from population, 2 = response rate adequate (> 80%), 3 = extraneous variables
controlled, 4 = reliability reported for religious measure, 5 = evidence of validity reported for religious
measure, 6 = adequate sample size for methodology used, 7 = long form DIT used, N = No, Y = Yes,
? = Unknown/not reported, NA = Not applicable. (Richards, 1988, p. 13).

On the other hand, Richards’ research conducted a carefully matched differential
item functioning (DIF) analysis and sought to control for several extraneous variables
(such as college education). In addition, Richards clearly defined the term religious
conservatives 3 by reviewing several religious research reports and concluding that these
reports had two common themes for their definitions of a religious conservative: (a) “a
firm, literal belief in Biblical/scriptural teachings” and (b) “a belief that God, and God’s

3 Richards and many others use the terms “religious conservative” and “religious orthodox”
interchangeably. For this study, I have chosen to use the term “religiously orthodox” to describe the same
type of trait.
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word as revealed in the scriptures are legitimate sources of moral authority” (Richards,
1988, p. 18). Several researchers have included similar definitions to define a religious
conservative (Ammerman, 1982; Beatty & Walter, 1988; Dobson, 1987; Hunter, 1981;
Kellstedt, 1989; Knuckey, 1999; Leege, 1989; Moore, 1995; Smidt, 1989; Smidt &
Kellstedt, 1987; Wilcox, 1986).
Richards’ sample consisted of 677 undergraduates at BYU who were members of
the LDS church and were taking psychology and counseling courses. His findings
showed that with the various methods he used, 16 to 25 items systematically performed
differently for LDS college students when using various methods of DIF. These
systematic differences were all in a negative direction (i.e., all these items contributed to
scoring LDS college subjects with a lower moral reasoning score).
Richards and others findings spurred some religious orthodox researchers to label
the Kohlberg framework as “secularism that rejects divine authority” (Rest et al., 1999b,
p. 173). Most of this criticism arose because the Kohlberg model of macromorality
places conformity to transcendent religious laws into the fourth stage of morality or midlevel. This stage is referred to as the “maintaining norms stage” (MN-stage 4) of moral
reasoning and is akin to one who obeys the laws because they are “the rules,” not because
they are moral. Shweder went as far to accuse Kohlberg of having an antireligious agenda
as he assigned religious expressions to MN-stage 4 rather than higher stages because
“Kohlberg does not believe in superior beings who have privileged access to truths about
natural laws” (as cited in Rest, 1999, p. 173).
Rest’s (1999) reply to this criticism was to point out that religious thinking can be
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scored at every stage in Kohlberg’s framework.
At Stage 1, God is awesomely powerful as creator and miracle worker and
commands obedience. At Stage 2, you offer sacrifices to God and abide by His
commandments so that God will be good to you. At Stage 3, God is a friend and
benefactor who is interested in you and knows your every thought and deed;
therefore, you want to be your best because you don’t want to disappoint God. At
stage 4, religious law supersedes civil law and is also the law of nature. At stage
5, God is seen as the “energizer” of a just society and a force for autonomous
personhood. After Stage 5, religious faith becomes Kohlberg’s “stage 7”
(skipping stage 6), answering the question “Why be moral?” At Stage 7, the
person is affirmed in leading the moral life, and religious faith confirms moral
thinking. (Rest, 1999, p. 173)
In theory, Kohlberg’s reply (which Rest also advocates) is soothing to the religiously
orthodox ideology. In practice today, the Stage 7 concept is lacking because neither of
the DIT tests refer to, score Stage 7 ideologies, nor ask questions regarding how one’s
understanding of God and one’s intricate relationship with God affects one’s decisions
(Walker & Frimer, in press).
Since it is impossible to score a Stage 7 response on either of the DIT tests,
Kohlberg and Rest’s response is considered a moot point when it comes to DIT scores for
religiously orthodox persons. It is as though they had designed a special solution to an
underlying problem but then prohibited access to that solution. Thus, the bottom line
remains—religiously orthodox persons score systematically lower on MMR as measured
by the first Defining Issues Test.
Theories of Why Religiously Orthodox Persons Score
Differently on the DIT
Richards theorized three reasons why religiously orthodox people appear morally
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less adequate from DIT scores—the framework, the items, and doctrinal beliefs. First,
the Kohlberg MMR framework was seen as insufficient because it failed to differentiate
between man’s laws/authority and God’s laws/authority. This lack of differentiation
between God and man’s laws was seen as a serious drawback, which confounded a
person’s principal moral judgment score by measuring a theological construct rather than
a social justice construct (macromorality). Second, the items were assumed to be devoid
of ideological or theological content and therefore assumed to uniformly measure the
same construct across all cultures. Richards and Davison (1992) as well as Lawrence
(1979), cited two items that were clearly not devoid of theological connotations.
a. “Whether the Christian commandment to love your fellow man applies in this
case” is coded as a stage 4 item.
b. “Isn’t God the ultimate source for who should live and who should die?” is
also coded as a stage 4 item.
The third reason why the DIT was viewed as systematically biased against an LDS
sample was because Mormons deferred to law based on one of their 13 basic tenets of
their faith—“We believe in honoring, obeying, and sustaining the law” (Richards, 1988).
Richards’ research pioneered a differential item function method of analysis in
MMR. He concluded that the MMR scores for the BYU group were systematically in the
MN-stage 4 (middle level) of Kohlberg’s MMR framework due to the 16 to 25
supposedly biased items (statistical bias was dependent upon the method of analysis
used). He further concluded that the BYU sample participants could reason at a the
theoretical higher level but chose to respond based upon their religious understandings
and principles and therefore achieved lower moral reasoning scores. Therefore, the
overall DIT test scores, which had then been used in moral education to measure ability
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to reason morally, were concluded to be systematically biased against BYU students.
In 1998, Kay further generalized Richards’ biased item claim in a study involving
a Protestant sample. Kay also pointed out three main theories for these systematic biases
against religious conservatives for MMR scores on the DIT-1. First, the developmental
theory suggests that conservative religiosity and ideology blocks moral development so
that conservatively religious persons are developmentally less able to morally reason at
post conventional levels. Second, the bias theory states that theological biases exist in
both Kohlberg’s theory and in the instruments used by Neo-Kohlbergians. Third, the
preemption theory suggests that conservatively religious individuals purposely obstruct
processing needed for principled moral reasoning because it is seen as less morally
adequate than conventional items on moral reasoning measures. Most of this blocking is
due to a belief that transcendent beings who have access to privileged truths about
morality are the ultimate source of what is moral, and religiously orthodox persons seek
to remain consistent in belief and actions with this religious ideology (Kay).
Kay found evidence that the preemptive theory and bias theory were supported.
However, in Kay’s study, the Protestant sample did not show as much item bias as
reported by Richards and Davison’s religiously orthodox group (i.e., LDS).
Rest’s reply to these studies can be seen as a matter of crossing domains—using
one domain to answer the questions of another. To summarize his argument, he claimed
that simply because someone draws upon a rationale from a particular domain to answer
a question from an entirely separate domain, does not mean that the domains overlap. For
example, if a multiple choice science question is asked to someone who does not have the
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enough knowledge/ability to correctly answer the question, they may draw upon another
domain to answer it (such as counting the number of A, B, C, or D options and then
guessing). Rest’s argument continued by citing the danger in logic of crossing domains in
science to answer questions in religion. For example, using a theory from the field of
Geology to determine the spiritual laws of mankind would be fallacious logic—
geological theories are best left to determine the history of the geological formations.
Similarly, Rest proclaimed, “When religion defines how we in this world are to relate to
each other, then religion serves to define morality. In other words, the questions of one
domain (e.g., how can people organize cooperation?) are answered by another domain
(be faithful to the transcendent being’s will!)” (Rest et al., 1999b, p. 163). Further,
persons who are “primed to be thinking in terms of transcendent matters may answer the
moral questions in terms of thinking from the religious domain” (Rest et al, p. 163-164).
Thus, persons who use religion to answer social justice questions on the DIT-2 are
crossing domains: “morality deals with this world; religion deals with the
transcendent…a person who is primed to be thinking in terms of transcendent matters
(the religious domain is activated) may answer the moral questions in terms of thinking
from the religious domain… [however] the domain of the DIT is social justice even if
some people respond as if a religious question had been asked” (Rest et al., p. 163-164).
Rest and colleagues do acknowledge that many religious teachings do prescribe
moral relationships and seem to cut across both domains and also claim that the DIT tests
are not anti-religious. Further, they claim that all religious thinking is not automatically
scored as maintaining norms MMR. However, they assert that the DIT test’s items are
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designed to stay in the domain of social justice, and thus religious thinking on the DIT-2
items is a matter of crossing domains.
The implication of Rest’s argument is that religion and social justice should not
overlap within the DIT-2 test. Domains that are mutually exclusive in MMR research are
referred to as hard domains. Conversely, those that do overlap are referred to as soft
domains.
Some research suggests that Rest’s reply of separate domains on the DIT test’s
items is not seen in everyday morality. Turiel suggested that religion and social justice
are not hard domains but rather soft domains that overlap (Turiel, 1978; see Figure 1).
Walker researched this claim and found that when interviewing 80 persons about
morality and real-life moral problems that a significant number of people referred to God
or religion when making moral decisions (Walker, Pitts, Hennig, & Matsuba, 1995).
Spurred by his findings, Walker studied the intertwinement of religion, spirituality, and
morality (Walker, 2002). His findings suggest that many attributes of moral, religious,
and spiritual domains cross all three domains while some are unique.

Turiel’s Domains on the DIT

Religion

Moral
Judgment

Rest’s Domains on the DIT

Religion

Moral
Judgment

Figure 1. Turiel suggests that religion and moral judgment domains will overlap while
Rest claims that they are separate domains on the DIT tests. Walker’s findings (Walker et
al., 1995; Walker & Pitts, 1998) support Turiel’s claims.
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For example, “devout” is shared between the religious and the spiritual domains
while the concept of “just” is unique to the moral domain and “traditional” is unique to
the religious domain (Walker & Pitts, 1998). Walker concluded that Kohlberg and his
follower’s model are insufficient for handling notions of religion, spiritually, and faith
when dealing with real-life moral problems (Walker & Pitts; Walker et al., 1995).
A Call for Replication Studies on a New Defining Issues Test
Reacting to several research findings, Rest and colleagues at the Center for the
Study of Ethical Development (CSED) at the University of Minnesota, 4 revised the DIT1 and its underlying framework to introduce the DIT-2 and Neo-Kolbergian framework
(see Appendix A). The CSED is the developers of both DIT tests and has invited new
research using the revised and less culturally sensitive DIT-2 test (Rest et al., 1999b).
No research has replicated the DIF study that Richards performed in 1988 with
the DIT-2 to examine if the previous bias still exists against religiously orthodox persons.
The finding that there is a .83 correlation between the DIT-1 and DIT-2 scores suggests
that 90% of the variance on one of the tests can account for the other.
Thus if the old test contained a cultural bias, the new, highly correlating DIT-2
test may contain the same bias. In addition, a new generation of BYU students, 20 years
removed from Richard’s study, also invites this replication study.
A further need for this study relates to advancements in the methodology of
conducting a DIF study. While Richards and Kay cited several measurement researchers
4 The CSED moved in 2008 to the University of Alabama. At the time of this writing it was still located at
the University of Minnesota.
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who give credence to the alternative chi-square methods used in his study, which were
based upon group means and were acceptable in the 1980s (Murray & Mishra, 1983),
there are more powerful methods of performing a DIF study using more appropriate
polytomous IRT methods and new computer programs for more powerful item analysis
today (Embretson & Reise, 2000).
Further, Richard’s post-doctoral research confirmed that the DIT-1 scores only
underestimated moral reasoning for “some but not all conservative religious individuals”
(Richards, 1991, p. 364). His demonstration consisted of removing the proposed biased
items from the DIT-1 scores in his BYU sample and then showing that only about half of
the BYU subjects’ moral reasoning scores changed. Therefore, if the majority of the
participants saw religious content in the DIT-1 proposed biased items, but only half of his
sample scores were affected by the removal of the proposed biased items, something
other than religious content of the item could have been affecting the responses.
Put another way, the proposed theological confounding variable that was
producing the item bias may be something other than group ideology or doctrinal beliefs.
If there are confounding variables with certain types of BYU students (and hence certain
types of religiously orthodox persons) this study may yield important information about
which confounding variables produce an item bias within a religiously orthodox sample.
The confounding variables of interest in this study include: whether a person had
served an LDS mission, whether they have children, marital status, association with
criminals, views on the purpose of suffering, mother’s education level, life experiences,
doctrinal influences, personal philosophies, and other relevant issues not mentioned in the
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DIT-2 items (see Table 2 for a rationale for including each of these proposed
confounding variables). These demographics of interest and survey questions that will
augment this administration of the DIT-2 and have been derived from interviews with
BYU students, think-aloud protocols, and previous research (see Appendix B for the
interview notes, Appendix C for the derived interview questions, and Appendix E for the
usability instructions).
Conclusion and Transition to Study
In conclusion, many persons, corporations, agencies, educational institutions,
government organizations, and religions consider MMR as a desirable trait
(Abdolmohammadi et al., 2003; Bebeau, 2002; Benor et al., 1982; Latif & Dunn, 2000;
O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005; Self, 2000; Sims & Keon, 1997; Verbeke, 1996). Because
of its desirability in society, many organizations provide instruction and application of
ideologies to MMR under the broader umbrella of character education, ethics training,
and teachings of morality (Bebeau).
The makers of the DIT-2 claim that the domain of moral judgment for
macromoral issues is similar enough across different individuals and cultures that the
DIT-2 can effectively measure this domain. However, there is ample evidence that the
DIT-1 items were not performing equally for religious conservative groups when
compared to national norms.
Since 1986 (when Richards’ data were collected), new methods and computer
software for DIF have developed for polytomous items (such as Likert scales), which are
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Table 2
Rationale for the Choice of Variables for Testing
Independent
variable

Dependent
variable

Rationale

Missionary service

Deemer reported a .68 correlation between rich social life experiences
and DIT-2 scores (Deemer, 1986, 1989). Nelson (2004) reported that
scores on the Standardized Bible Content Test had a strong positive
correlation with the stage 6 moral reasoning scores on the DIT-1 (0.57,
p < .001) as well as a positive correlation with Principled Moral
Reasoning scores (0.38, p < .05). In a small pilot study by Winder (see
Appendix B), returned missionaries scored higher on post-conventional
moral judgment scores (the highest stage of moral judgment) than nonreturned missionaries.

DIT-2 scores and
item-response
patterns.

Marriage status

Deemer’s study about the richness of social experiences (1989).
Story #1 on the DIT-2 asks if a man should steal food for his family,
almost like the dilemma faced by Jean Valjean in Victor Hugo’s Les
Miserables. Qualitative interviews lead me to believe that student’s
decisions on the DIT-2 change for this scenario dependent upon whether
they feel a need to provide for a spouse or children (Appendix B). BYU
is unique among US institutions of higher education in the percentage of
married undergraduate student with 22% of them being married (Hall,
2005).

DIT-2 scores &
item-response
patterns.

Association w/
criminals

In story #2, a person’s view about a person who was caught shoplifting
but has since changed may be influenced by the person’s having had a
life experience that correlates with response patterns on the items
associated with story #2.

DIT-2 scores &
item-response
patterns.

Purpose of suffering

Story #4 and qualitative interviews (Appendix B) warrant a question
about an examinee’s view of whether or not there are positive benefits
from suffering. In a pilot study, a .60 correlation was reported on the
euthanasia decision of story #4 with the person’s response to a survey
question about whether or not a patient can have a doctor “pull the plug”
for a suffering patient. More BYU students advocated a doctor “pulling
the plug” over not “pulling the plug” when death was inevitable. In
qualitative interviews the factor in this decision seems to be whether or
not a person views suffering as having a purpose. Therefore, an openended question about whether there is purpose in suffering was designed
and inserted on the survey.

DIT-2 scores &
item-response
patterns.

Mother’s education
level

Mother’s education level has been shown to predict educational
performance for the mother’s posterity (Eagle, 1989). Since studies
show that education is a large contributor to the DIT scores, explaining
some 30 to 50% of the variance (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003, p. 30), and
mother’s education level is a high predictor of a child’s education level,
perhaps this demographic (and the previously mentioned ones) will
reveal important trends for future research in the BYU sample.

DIT-2 scores &
item-response
patterns.

Life experiences
influence

In qualitative think-aloud protocols, BYU students would frequently
refer to a specific life-experience when making a decision for what
should be done on the DIT-2 (see Appendix B). Life experiences
included academic training, work-related experience, social experiences,
and family experiences (see Appendix G).

DIT-2 scores &
item-response
patterns.

(Table continues)
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Independent
variable

Rationale

Dependent
variable

Doctrinal influence

In qualitative think-aloud protocols, BYU students would frequently
refer to a scriptural teaching when making a decision for what should be
done on the DIT-2 (see Appendix B). Doctrinal influence including
referencing teachings that were clearly scriptural in nature (see
Appendix G).

DIT-2 scores &
item-response
patterns.

Personal philosophy

In qualitative think-aloud protocols, BYU students would frequently
refer to a personal philosophy when making a decision for what should
be done on the DIT-2 (see Appendix B). These included personal values
that define what is moral for an individual (see Appendix G).

DIT-2 scores &
item-response
patterns.

Identifying more
relevant issues than
what the DIT-2
scenario allows

In qualitative think-aloud protocols, BYU students would frequently
refer to what they thought was a more relevant issue when making a
decision for what should be done on the DIT-2. For example, in story
#5, college students take over the administration building in a protest
and halt university operations. Most students mentioned that
demonstrating the way these students were was “a waste of time.” So
time-management was more of an issue to them than to protest in this
manner (see Appendix B and Appendix G).

DIT-2 scores &
item-response
patterns.

more powerful for performing DIF than the original methods used by Richards. In
addition, this study will seek to account for variables that covary with MMR and
religious orthodoxy by using partial correlations—an overlooked method of analysis in
the previous studies. A new version of the DIT has emerged (the DIT-2—see Appendix
A) as well as a Neo-Kohlbergian framework based upon moral schemas rather than
Kohlberg’s Piagetian-like six stages (Rest et al., 1999a). New methods and computerized
tools for analyzing differential item functioning have also been introduced which are
more reliable than Richard’s methods used in the 1980s. Thus the scholarly significance
of this study is justified by the new definitions of the DIT-2 framework, the new findings
and tools to incorporate more advanced methodology, and also suggested potential
confounds that have surfaced in the literature since 1988 when the initial replicable
research was conducted. In addition, the CSED, the developers of both DIT tests, has
also called for replication studies as well as invited new research using the revised and
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less culturally sensitive DIT-2 test and analysis methods (Rest et al., 1999b). With the
call for replication studies as well as new tests, new scoring methods, new frameworks,
new DIF methods for polytomous items, new research pointing out other potential
confounds to MMR, and a new generation of BYU students, a new DIF study is needed
to examine if the previously identified bias still exists.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS
Purpose of Study and Research Questions
The purpose of this study was to explore whether the DIT-2 solved a problem of
item bias against religiously orthodox persons and to explore if other variables affect the
measured relationships between religious orthodoxy and macromoral reasoning (MMR).
Specifically, the research questions were as follows.
1. Does religious orthodoxy confound the measurement of macromoral
reasoning as measured by the DIT-2?
2. What other variables predict both macromoral reasoning and religious
orthodoxy and thus could be potential confounds?
Independent, Dependent, and Moderating Variables
The independent variable was religious orthodoxy. As emphasized in Chapter II,
the general consensus among DIT and social researchers is that religious orthodoxy is a
measure of how literally one adheres to scriptural teachings and believes they are
legitimate sources for moral reasoning (Richards, 1988). Several research reports use the
term “religious orthodoxy” interchangeably with the term “religious conservative”
(Ammerman, 1982; Beatty & Walter, 1988; Knuckey, 1999; Moore, 1995; Wilcox,
1986). The DIT-2 has an internal measure of religious orthodoxy that will be described
later in this chapter (see instrumentation section).
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The dependent variable was macromoral reasoning (MMR) as measured by the
DIT-2 items. To briefly describe macromorality, it is how people interrelate to each other
through laws, rules, roles, and institutions to form the system of a just society (Rest et al.,
1999b). This is different from micromorality, which consists of the correctness of actions
at a personal level such as being loyal, caring, and considerate. Contrastingly, the
overall concept of measurement of MMR pertains to the “formal structures of society
(laws, roles, institutions, general practices)…that are involved in making cooperation
possible at a society level” (Rest et al., p. 2). In the DIT-2, as the person reads an item
that makes sense to their MMR schema, they rate this item as being more important to
their overall decisions they made involving a MMR case study (e.g., should Mustaq steal
during a time of famine?). Thus, the DIT-2 presumes that the stories and items “activate
moral schemas to the extent that person has developed them” (Rest, 1999, p. 6).
There were several moderating variables that this study explored. Essentially
these variables were chosen based on previous theories and research, pilot study
interviews, and a review of literature. The moderating variables of interest included:
returned missionary status, marital status, association with criminals, views on the
purpose of suffering, mother’s education level, life experiences, doctrinal influences,
personal philosophies, and other relevant issues not mentioned in the DIT-2 items (see
Chapter II, Table 2 for a rationale for each of these proposed moderating variables).
Previous research has pointed out that the following variables were not
confounding DIT-2 scores: gender (Rest et al., 1999b; Thoma, 1986), GPA (Rest, 1999),
or any other cognitive ability (Rest, 1999; Rest et al., 1999b). In addition, from a pilot
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study I ruled out “several religiosity-based problem-solving styles or orientations” based
on Pargament’s Religious Problem Solving Styles instrument (Pargament et al., 1988,
1999, p. 347).
Research Design
This study was a replication of Richard’s (1988) study of religious orthodoxy and
DIT-1 scores. However, this study sought to validate the second edition of the DIT, the
DIT-2, for religiously orthodox persons. The research design was a cross-sectional
correlational study used in conjunction with a reference group for comparison purposes.
The reference group was employed to check for DIF between a group known to be
religiously orthodox (BYU students) and a reference group that adhered more to national
norms of religious orthodoxy. This DIF comparison with a reference group showed
whether the DIT-2 items were measuring a unidimensional trait across cultures and gave
evidence as to whether the DIT-2 claim of cultural invariance was valid for a religiously
orthodox group by exposing any confounding items to overall DIT-2 MMR scores. In
addition, I analyzed correlations of DIT-2 scores with additional moderating variables
that Richards did not account for.
Population and Sample
The target population to which the study sought to generalize was U.S. religiously
orthodox persons. BYU students were an appropriate sample to represent religiously
orthodox persons because in past studies they consistently scored very high on measures
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of religious orthodoxy (see Bergin, Masters, & Richards, 1987; Bergin, Stinchfield,
Gaskin, Masters, & Sullivan, 1988; Cornwall, Albrecht, Cunningham, & Pitcher, 1986;
Shepherd & Shepherd, 1984; Shupe & Heinerman, 1985). This higher than average
measure of religious orthodoxy was verified again in this study as BYU DIT-2 mean
religious orthodoxy score was 1.26 points higher than a national average (BYU sample
mean was 6.23, 4.97 is the national average—scores range from 1-9). In the DIT-2
framework, this higher than average score means that the typical BYU student is more
likely to defer their MMR based on their religious ideology.
Another reason why BYU students were an appropriate sample was because
Richards’ original claim of DIT item-bias against religiously orthodox persons consisted
entirely of a BYU student sample (Richards, 1988). Since this was a replication study I
sought to use a similar sample. Doubtless, the BYU Mormon culture has somewhat
changed in the last 20 years. However, pilot study measures of religious orthodoxy show
they are still a very religiously orthodox sample (see Appendix B).
To briefly describe this sample of BYU students (i.e., the focal group), they had
much variation in educational level (38 freshmen, 112 sophmores, 108 juniors, 71
seniors, 2 MS, 6 missing). Because BYU requires religion credit, there was also a variety
of academic majors enrolled in these courses.
An analysis of variance found that DIT-2 overall scores did not statistically vary
between educational level groups. Levene’s test of equality of error variance indicated
that DIT-2 score’s variance were equal across freshmen-senior educational levels. Thus,
it was deemed appropriate not to parse out educational level further than undergraduate
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college students for many of the analyses’. Therefore both reference and focal groups
consisted of entirely undergraduate students in the DIF study.
The reference group came from the research of Dr. Steve Thoma, CSED director
of research and the University of Alabama (UA) professor of educational psychology. He
offered 888 individual undergraduate student DIT-2 response files for a reference group.
No additional demographics of interest were included in this sample as it was solely used
a reference group for the differential item functioning analysis.
Instrumentation
The instruments used in this study were two questionnaires. They consisted of the
DIT-2 and an additional demographic questionnaire.
The DIT-2 is a 65-item form where students make decisions based on five
macromoral dilemma case studies and then rate and rank, which items are of most
importance to their decision (5-point Likert-like scale ranging from great importance to
no importance). For example, the cancer story asks a person to decide if a doctor should
administer an overdose of painkiller to an insisting cancer patient who wants to “end her
suffering even if it means ending her life. Should the doctor give her an increased
dosage?” (see Appendix F for a complete description of all five moral dilemmas). Test
participants then rate how important 12 items are to their overall decision (e.g., Item 10“Shouldn’t only God decide when a person’s life should end?”). 5
Cronbach’s reliability coefficients for DIT-2 research range from the upper .70s to
5 The cancer story and item 10 are used as examples because these items are also used in determining one’s
DIT-2 religious orthodoxy scores. Very few of the items are so overt in regards to religiosity issues.
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the lower .80s. Test-retest reliability is about the same. The correlation of DIT-1 scores
with DIT-2 scores is .79, nearly the same as the test-retest reliability of the DIT-1 scores
with itself (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003; Rest et al., 1999c). The DIT tests have undergone 8
validation criteria ranging from correlational studies with moral comprehension scales to
10-year longitudinal studies (see Appendix A for a more detailed description of DIT
validity).
Scores on the DIT-2 are similar to scores on the DIT-1. The major difference is
that the stage scores have been grouped and changed to schema scores. Notice, however,
that in the schema descriptions the stage scores are still used to describe the schemas:
Personal Interest Schema Score (PI-stages 2-3) represents the proportion of items
selected that appeal to Stage 2 and Stage 3 considerations. Stage 2 considerations
focus on the direct advantages to the actor and on the fairness of simple
exchanges of favor for favor. Stage 3 considerations focus on the good or evil
intentions of the parties, on the party’s concern for maintaining friendships and
good relationships, and maintaining approval.
Maintaining Norms Schema Score (MN-stage 4) represents the proportion of
items selected that appeal to Stage 4 considerations. Stage 4 considerations focus
on maintaining the existing legal system, maintaining existing roles and formal
organization’s structure.
Postconventional Schema Score (PC-stages 5-6) represents the proportion of
items selected that appeal to Stage 5 and 6 considerations…[These stages] focus
on organizing a society by appealing to consensus-producing procedures (such as
abiding by majority vote), insisting on due process (giving everyone his day in
court), and safeguarding minimal basic rights, …organizing social arrangements
and relationships in terms of intuitively appealing ideals. (Bebeau & Thoma,
2003, pp. 18-19; see Chapter II measurement of MMR section for a more detailed
description of what each schema score means)
Each of these schema scores is the proportional rating of how each type of item was
endorsed compared to the other items. As a proportion, these scores range from 0 to 1.
However, they are converted to a whole number by multiplying by 100. Consequently,
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each score ranges from 0-99 points. In addition, an overall MMR score that considers all
responses on the DIT-2 ranges from 0-95 and is named the N2 score (Bebeau & Thoma,
2003).
The DIT-2 also collects information regarding how religiously orthodox a person
is. The religious orthodoxy score ranges from 1-9 and has an estimated national average
of 4.97 (Bailey, Phillips, & Scofield, 2005, C. Bailey personal communication, March
2008). This score is collected by assessing how much locus of control God has given to
man in regards to life and death matters and by asking participants to rank how important
God’s locus of control of life and death is to their overall decision about euthanizing a
suffering cancer patient. The DIT-2 scoring guide reports that this score correlates highly
with Brown and Lowe’s Religious Inventory of Belief Scale (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003;
Brown & Lowe, 1951). The CSED makers claim this score also is an indicator of how
religiously orthodox a person is.
In addition, other scores of interest on the DIT-2 are the NUMCD, HumLib, and
ConLib scores. The NUMCD score indicates the degree to which one cannot decide what
to do on the DIT-2 moral dilemmas and ranges from 1-5. Higher scores indicate that
participants are more decisive on the DIT-2 story choices and thus are more consolidated
in their macromoral reasoning (i.e., more “set” in their macromoral reasoning). The
HumLib score is a reflection of the number of times a choice on the DIT-2 matches
academic moral philosopher’s choices from the fields of political science and philosophy.
Scores range from 1-5 and high scores indicate agreement with moral philosopher’s
choices on the DIT-2. The HumLib score is inversely related to the RO index (i.e., RO
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persons generally do not agree with the moral philosophers in some macromoral issues).
The ConLib score indicates how politically conservative or liberal a person rates
themselves on a scale of 1-5 (1 = very liberal, 5 = very conservative).
The second instrument used in this study was a demographic questionnaire that
augmented the DIT-2. These questions were derived from interviews with BYU students,
think-aloud protocols, and previous research (see Appendix B for the interview notes,
Appendix C for the demographic questionnaire, and Appendix E for the usability
instructions). To briefly describe the creation of the demographic questionnaire, in a
pilot study, think-aloud protocol responses were coded into four general categories that
influenced BYU student’s decisions on the DIT-2: (a) life experiences, (b) doctrinal
influences, (c) personal philosophies, and (d) other relevant issues perceived (see
Appendices B and C). In the final data collection phase for this study, a fictional vignette
with several examples of the four categories was provided (see Appendix E). In addition,
comparing LDS returned missionary status, marital status, as well as the demographic of
mother’s education level revealed some interesting findings due to the nature of the
macromoral reasoning vignettes (see Chapter II, Table 2 for a rationale for including
these demographics). The CSED scoring and interpretation guide mentions that
additional instructions, items, and instruments do not affect the reliability of DIT-2 scores
(Bebeau & Thoma, 2003).
Data Collection Procedures
BYU students were given the DIT-2 test and were asked to respond to the test and
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questionnaire as individuals outside of class during the second to fourth weeks of the
Winter 2008 semester (see Appendix C). After having the purposes of the study
explained, students could choose to participate for a small amount of extra credit or not.
Those students who chose not to participate were given the option to complete a different
extra credit assignment as outlined in my IRB proposal (see Appendix D). DIT-2 tests
were ordered from the CSED, administered as a paper and pencil scantron, collected by
myself, and sent to the CSED for scoring. The CSED returned all tests and an SPSS
spreadsheet of the data.
The demographic questionnaire was administered online during the same weeks
as the DIT-2 test. Students were e-mailed and given a printed copy of the website link to
take the online questionnaire. Three reminder e-mails were sent out during this time. All
these data collection procedures were in-line with the DIT-2 scoring guide guidelines
(Bebeau & Thoma, 2003). The online questionnaire data were exported into Microsoft
excel. The data was then coded into categories using Microsoft excel. SPSS and
Winsteps were used for statistical analysis.
The reference group had already been collected by Dr. Steve Thoma, CSED
director at the University of Alabama. He also followed the DIT-2 scoring guidelines to
ensure reliability and validity. To ensure that the reference group was similar to the
national average of RO, persons with scores between 4-6 on the DIT-2 religious
orthodoxy variable were selected. The group mean for this group was 4.96 (n = 272), a
very comparable religious orthodoxy mean to Bailey’s national estimate of 4.97 (Bailey,
2005; C. Bailey, personal communication, March 2008).
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Pilot Studies
I completed three unpublished pilot studies in 2007 with a 30-person BYU
sample, a 0-person BYU sample, and a 135-person BYU sample. The first study looked
at the correlations between styles of religious problem solving and DIT-2 scores among
BYU students. The second study was a think-aloud interview as students took the DIT-2.
The third study looked at religious orthodoxy measures of current BYU students. These
studies are described in greater detail in Appendix B. However, only the findings that
pertain to my research questions, methods, and analysis are reported here.
Pilot Study 1—Many Religiously Orthodox
Persons Self-Direct Rather than Defer
to Religion
The first pilot study looked at a claim by the Center for the Study of Ethical
Development (CSED). Specifically, the CSED had claimed that religiously orthodox
persons defer their MMR based upon a maintaining norms schema (MN-stage 4) that is
related to religious laws and customs (Rest et al., 1999b). Therefore, I administered the
DIT-2 along with a test that measures “several religiosity-based problem-solving styles or
orientations” (Pargament et al., 1988, 1999, p. 347) to discover if religious orthodoxy
scores correlated with Pargament’s scores. Specifically, Pargament’s test measures
whether someone defers their decision making to their God or their religion, or is a selfdirector.
This pilot study showed that the 15 LDS returned missionaries (those with higher
than average Stage 4 scores and religious orthodoxy scores) were considerably more self-
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directing in their views towards solving life’s problems than 15 non-returned
missionaries (5 points difference on a 15-75 point scale, p < .05). Pargament suggested
that strong self-directing scores are typical of persons that “emphasize the freedom God
gives people to direct their own lives” (Pargament et al., 1988, p. 91).
Since a subgroup that was scoring higher on Stage 4 scores and religious
orthodoxy scores was more self-directing as well as lower in deferring scores involving
their religious problem-solving styles, it seemed that something other than deferring to
God and religion seemed to be accounting for LDS returned missionaries’ higher MNStage 4 scores. Rest (1999) and Richards (1991) proposed that this other confound was a
propensity to defer their MMR to the laws of the land, which led to pilot study #2.
Pilot Study 2—Religiously Orthodox Person’s
Justifications for DIT-2 Responses
The purpose of this study was to discover what types internal thinking and
external experiences religiously orthodox persons referred to as they reasoned through
the DIT-2 moral dilemmas. Pilot study #2 involved interviews, discussions, and thinkaloud protocols with nine BYU students. Four of these were conducted individually while
two of them were conducted in focus groups of two and three. The students very
infrequently mentioned the law or a societal norm as a reason to justify their decisions, a
contrary finding from Richards’ (1988) research and Rest and colleagues claims (1999c).
However, this study found that students referred to life experiences, personal
interpretations of doctrinal teachings, and philosophies of life as they made their DIT-2
decisions. In addition, some felt that the test limited their responses as they thought of
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other relevant issues. This study was the basis for the demographic questionnaire. The
goal of this questionnaire was to seek to find other variables that account for MMR or
religious orthodoxy.
An additional finding from the first and second pilot studies also led to additional
data collection and analysis. The first pilot study showed that the BYU mean DIT-2
religious orthodoxy scores were 6.23. The UA mean religious orthodox scores were 6.64
(these had already been collected by Dr. Thoma). Both group scores were normally
distributed. Independent samples t tests led me to conclude that these differences were
not statistically significant (see Table 3). Therefore, the UA and BYU samples did not
differ in aggregate measures of religious orthodoxy on the DIT-2 RO scale and possibly
in other aggregate matters of religious conservatism. This lack of contrast led to data
collection to find an estimated national norm for the DIT-2 religious orthodoxy variable
from previous study’s data (Bailey et al., 2005).
Pilot Study 3—BYU and UA Measures
of Religious Orthodoxy
The third pilot study further validated the assumption that BYU and UA students
did not differ much in religious orthodoxy. As two measures of religious orthodoxy
Table 3
A Comparison of a Measure of Religious Orthodoxy by School (Brown and Low
Inventory of Religious Belief)
School

N

Mean

SD

Std. error mean

UA

423

58.8180

10.20605

.49624

BYU

135

59.3481

3.96688

.34141

Sig. (2-tailed)
0.379
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(Brown and Lowe, and the internal DIT measure) were not statistically significant
between UA and BYU samples, it was therefore determined that as a group, BYU and
UA students did not significantly differ in measures of religious orthodoxy.
This finding posed a problem in my original data collection plan because I was
seeking to compare a group that was very religious orthodox to a reference group that
was closer to a national average of religious orthodoxy. A bright spot was that the
variance of the reference group was much greater than the BYU sample. The increased
variance of the reference group led to the filtered sampling approach from the UA sample
based upon national averages of religious orthodoxy described in Chapter IV of my
study. It also was the basis of using partial correlations as a method of data analysis.
Data Analysis
This study consisted of six analyses. These six analyses sought to answer the
research questions: (1) Does religious orthodoxy confound the measurement of
macromoral reasoning as measured by the DIT-2? (2) What other variables predict both
macromoral reasoning and religious orthodoxy and thus could be potential confounds?
Analysis #1 Descriptive Statistics
These statistics were provided to summarize the characteristics of BYU sample
participants and to provide evidence that this group represented the religiously orthodox,
BYU students, LDS members, and provided a reasonable sample for replication.
Specific descriptive analysis included information on demographics of the BYU
sample in the terms of frequency counts and percentages, means, and standard deviations
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for the demographics such as: age, gender, U.S. citizenship, primary language, political
leanings, whether a person had served an LDS mission, mother’s education level, marital
status, whether they had children, association with persons who shoplifted or were
convicted of other crimes, and opinions of whether there is a purpose in suffering. These
descriptive statistics helped to determine the appropriate methods of analysis based on the
amount, distribution, and type of data collected.
Descriptive statistics also pointed out some differences between a religiously
orthodox group’s DIT-2 scores (BYU) and a reference group’s DIT-2 scores (National
Norms). In addition, DIT-2 scores were separated by educational level and compared.
Analysis #2 Correlations between Religious
Orthodoxy and Macromoral Reasoning
These statistics provided initial evidence concerning the degree to which religious
orthodoxy (RO) was associated with the measurement of macromoral reasoning (MMR).
These associations provided evidence to answer research question 1: Does religious
orthodoxy confound the measurement of macromoral reasoning as measured by the DIT2? Statistically significant correlations here provided evidence that RO and DIT-2 MMR
scores are related to each other and thus, RO is a potential confound to the measurement
of MMR for an LDS population.
Because many DIT-2 scores were normally distributed, Pearson’s r could be
employed. These associations informed me on how strong religious orthodoxy is related
to MMR and whether these variables had positive or negative associations. In addition,
these correlations were squared to find the coefficient of determination (Kachigan, 1986)
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on variables with high correlations. This coefficient explains the proportion of the
variance in one variable that can be accounted for in the other (Kachigan). One caution to
be noted is that when interpreting correlation coefficients, Cohen (1988) pointed out that
it is important to remember that the practical significance of the coefficient is somewhat
relative to our own values. In addition, there were no specific DIT-2 guidelines given to
determine large or small DIT-2 correlations. In fact, some DIT studies even report
correlation coefficients as small as r = -.16 (Olsen, 2006). Therefore, much of the
interpretation of practical significance will be based on judgment from the observer and
by using multiple approaches (t tests, qualitative data, literature reviews) to determine
practical significance. If there was not a statistically significant positive or negative
correlation between RO and DIT-2 scores (independent and dependent variables), then I
concluded RO was not a likely confound.
Analysis #3 Differential Item Functioning
These statistics provided additional information about how MMR measurement
might be effected by RO for both the BYU sample, and a representative subpopulation
that score similarly on DIT-2 to the BYU sample but are not as high scoring on the DIT-2
RO score. The results of these analyses were also used to address research question one.
A DIF analysis’ falls under the item-response theory (IRT) methods of analysis.
To more clearly explain IRT, I borrow a high-jumping analogy from Bond and Fox
(2007). In high jumping, there are two main factors that determine the probability of
success (jumping over the bar)—a person’s ability (how high they can jump), and the
difficulty of the task (how high the bar is raised). For example, a person with an ability to
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jump 6 feet has a high probability of clearing a bar that is only at 5 feet. The probability
of success is intuitively calculated by subtracting their ability from the difficulty (how
high they can jump—how high the bar is = probability of success). However, this same
person with a 6-foot leaping ability would have a lower probability of clearing the bar as
it nears and even surpasses the 6 foot height.
Similarly, IRT extends the concept of success, or endorsement of an item, based
upon person ability and item difficulty. IRT places both of these aspects (person ability
and item difficulty) on the same equal interval scale via a log odds transformation of the
probability of success on an item. Therefore, by subtracting the item difficulty from the
person ability one can obtain the probability of success (or endorsement) of an item (or
category) according to an item response model. How accurate the model is (called the
likelihood response model) also factors into the predictability of the item endorsement
equation.
One of the benefits of IRT over classical test theory analysis is that the concept of
reliability is based upon the person ability and the accuracy of the likelihood response
model for each person. Thus, IRT “extends the concept of reliability by including the
person ability factor. In IRT, reliability refers to the degree of precision at different
values of person ability” rather than assuming that reliability (as based on the standard
error of measurement in classical test theory) is a constant across all persons and all
abilities (Xu, Iran-Nejad, & Thoma, 2008, p. 16).
In IRT, each item also has an item-fit statistic. The log odds transformation allows
IRT to give the item location on an equal interval scale of item difficulty. Thus, an item
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with a difficulty of 4 is twice as difficult to endorse as an item with a difficulty of 2.
Item difficulties are in terms of logits that usually range from -6 to +6 with a mean of 0.
A negative logit indicates that the item was easy to endorse (or easier) while a positive
logit indicates that the item was harder to endorse (or more difficult).
In addition, in IRT each item also has a residual score which is the difference
between the observed response and the model’s expected response. Items with high
residuals indicate a misfit. A misfiting item on a unidimensional latent trait scale
indicates that the item does not fit within the assumptions of the IRT model’s
measurement for a unidimensional trait (i.e., for this study, something other than the
latent trait of MMR is confounding the item). This is an important aspect for a DIF study.
Essentially, a DIF study involves “deciding whether the items on a particular
instrument provide invariant measurement across these two groups” (Embretson & Reise,
2000, p. 252). After the two groups have been carefully matched on overall ability for
the construct that the items measure, item endorsement patterns are analyzed to detect if
an item performs differently for a focal and a reference group. To get an accurate IRT
model, Bond and Fox (2007) recommended using large sample sizes (above 200) to have
high internal consistency to make the inferences.
Another aspect of the concept of a DIF study is the application of one of
measurement theorists fundamental claims—the claim that the measurement of a latent
trait or construct (in this case, moral judgment) is the true value of the person trait +
error (Osterlind, 2006). Error may be random or systematic. Item bias exists when a test
exhibits systematic error, not random error.
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To more concretely define item bias in a DIF study, an item bias exists when an
item on a test “unfairly favors one group over another” (Clauser & Mazor, 1998, p. 31).
For example, if a math reasoning question on the ACT is easier for males than for
females who have been equally matched in their overall math reasoning ability, then the
item functions differentially. If the test is unidimensional (i.e., truly measuring one trait
or ability), then the items should perform relatively the same for the two groups when
matched on overall ability. If they perform differently on certain items after being
carefully matched on ability, then there is evidence that there is another ability that may
be producing the difference in responses. “The question then becomes whether that
second ability is relevant to the purpose of the testing” (i.e., is this ability part of the
construct we are measuring?) (Clauser and Mazor, p. 31).
Person reliability. DIF studies yield a statistic similar to Cronbach’s coefficient
alpha as it ranges from 0-1 and higher scores indicate greater reliability. This is the
person reliability statistic. The person reliability statistic also relates the reproducibility
of person ordering in a DIF study (i.e., whether those who score highest on the logit scale
would remain there and those that score lowest would remain the lowest). This statistic
also gives an estimate of how well a test separates persons into levels of ability (called
person separation index). Higher reliabilities and separation indexes indicate that the test
can discriminate between more levels of the trait.
Graphed IRT item DIF contrasts. The most precise way to analyze whether an
item exhibits DIF is to view the projected item response models for each item and person
and compare the amount of difference between the observed examinee trait level and
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expected value response rates based upon the item response maximum likelihood model
(Kim, Cohen, Alagoz, & Kim, 2007; Potenza & Dorans, 1995). Presumably, if the latent
trait that the test proposes to measure is reliable by each item, these statistical model
measures should perform similarly for persons who have been matched on overall ability.
When a significant number of individuals within a particular group have similar unlikely
response patterns for an item, this finding reflects that the item performs differentially for
that group (Embretson & Reise, 2000). These differences are shown quite well in a DIF
contrast plot (see Figure 2). In this graph, one line represents the focal group while the
other represents the reference group. Because IRT uses a log-linear transformation of
item endorsement probabilities, the item difficulty levels for each group are on equal
intervals. This means that a 2.0 item difficulty is twice as difficult as a 1.0 item
difficulty. The general concept of IRT rests upon the assumption that a test score
represents a score of unidimensional trait. Therefore, if persons are matched on the
overall test score, and the test indeed measures a unidimensional trait, then persons of the
same ability (as measured by the overall test score) will respond in probabilistic manners
to the same items. If there is a significant contrast in group’s response patterns as shown
by the contrast on the graph, then there may be an ancillary confound in that item—in
other words, the item is exhibiting differential item functioning or DIF.
DIF statistical significance. In addition to graphing the contrast of the reference
and focal group, the contrast of performance between groups is computed by the
computer analysis program used. The statistical significance of the DIF for each item is
computed to give a DIF contrast statistic.
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Figure 2. Differential item functioning graph. The y-axis is the overall endorsability of
the item. Items higher up on the y axis are harder to endorse (agree to) while items lower
on the y axis are easier to endorse. The two group’s item endorsability patterns are
graphed in an overlay showing differences in their individual likelihood response patterns
when matched on overall ability. If the test is truly measuring a unidimensional latent
trait, the DIF contrast should be relatively small between groups.
Once the DIF analysis was conducted in this study, the types of items that were
exhibiting DIF were viewed for any noticeable patterns. For example, if there was more
of a particular level of DIT-2 item (e.g., maintaining norms-stage 4) that consistently
exhibited DIF this would indicate that these items or the definition of the trait was
creating an item bias. The DIF contrast statistic is also used to interpret the statistical as
well as practical significance of the DIF item.
DIF practical significance. One caution in interpreting DIF is that because
statistical power to detect DIF is dependent upon sample size, large samples will
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sometimes yield statistically significant but not practically significant DIF (Kim et al.,
2007; Zwick, Thayer, & Mazzeo, 1997). Educational Testing Services (ETS) cautions
that in DIF studies one ought to view DIF analysis in view of the degree of DIF
according to three categories—negligible, moderate, and large. These categories are
based on the absolute value of the DIF contrast between a reference group and a focal
group. For example, suppose that on item 1 of the DIT-2 the focal group (BYU students)
has a difficulty level of 1.0 and the reference group has a difficulty of 2.0. The DIF
contrast absolute value would be 1.0 and this would be classified as an item that exhibits
large DIF. Some authors view these DIF contrasts analogously to effect size statistics
(Young & Sudweeks, 2005; see also Sudweeks & Tolman, 1993). Large DIF items are
the only items that are classified as functioning differentially and are recommended for
removal or revision (Sudweeks & Tolman). Although there are differing classifications
of magnitude of DIF contrasts depending upon the methods used (Wright & Douglas,
1975, 1976), ETS and Linacre’s Rasch guidelines (which are the same) are commonly
used in literature (Zwick, Thayer, & Lewis, 1999; see Table 4).
Table 4
Linacre (Winsteps) and ETS Guidelines for Interpreting DIF Contrast
ETS DIF Category

DIF Effect Size (Logits)

C = moderate to large

|DIF| >= 0.64

B = slight to moderate

|DIF| >=0.43<=.64

A = negligible

|DIF| <= 0.43
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Analysis #4 t Tests and Correlations for
Other Potential Confounds with MMR
These statistics provided evidence concerning the degree to which other variables
might affect the measured relationships between MMR and RO, specifically to answer
research question 2—what other variables predict both macromoral reasoning and
religious orthodoxy and thus could be potential confounds? Statistically significant
results here provided evidence that another variable is a potential confound to the DIT-2
MMR scores.
This analysis consisted of two main sections. The first consists of correlations and
t tests of the other demographic variables, specifically: returned missionary status, marital
status, parent status (have children), association with criminals, mother’s education level.
This pointed out which of these variables should be studied more in depth (such as using
partial correlation analysis) to determine if the variable is confounding MMR
measurement.
The second analysis consisted of correlations and t tests based on DIT-2 story
choices. For example, t tests of DIT-2 scores were conducted based on whether persons
endorsed a doctor assisted overdose or not. These scores were used to show evidence of
a pattern of rating the stories a certain way could predict DIT-2 scores. Thus, this
analysis showed whether the content of the stories could be a potential confound to
MMR. This also pointed out which of the story choices should be studied more in depth
(such as partial correlation analysis) to determine if the variable is confounding MMR
measurement.
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Analysis #5 Partial Correlations Between RO and
MMR Accounting for Other Potential Confounds
These statistics provided evidence concerning the relationship between RO and
MMR after the variance of other confounds were removed. Statistically significant
results may indicate that RO was still a confound to DIT-2 scores, but that the true effect
was masked by other moderating variables that correlated with MMR and RO. Results
here provided evidence to answer both research questions in concert.
A methodology that takes into account the relationships among the concomitant
variables [variables that effect both dependent and independent variables] is partial
correlations (Kachigan, 1986). Essentially, partial correlation analyses’ were used to
factor out existing variables that effect the relationship between RO and MMR so as to
measure RO’s sole effect on MMR. Therefore, I sought to account for these potential
confounds and then measure the relationship between RO and MMR after the effects of
these moderating variables were removed.
Analysis #6 Qualitative Analysis of
Open-Ended Survey Responses
The qualitative data provided a more detailed examination of how RO and MMR
were perceived by the BYU sample. Exploring these data provided more evidence to
answer research question 1 by showing patterns of how experiences, philosophies, and
religious teachings influence DIT-2 responses. In addition, the open-ended items
collected data which provided evidence for other variables that might have confounded
the measurement of MMR, yet were not specifically measured by the DIT-2 or
demographic questionnaire.
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The qualitative comments were collected based on the four open-ended questions
(i.e., what life experiences, doctrinal teachings, philosophies or life, or other relevant
issues influenced your DIT-2 decision—see Appendix B and G for a detailed description
of each of these four categories). These comments were read several times. Categories
of types of responses were then created. The comments were then coded by these
categories (see Analysis #3 and Appendix G). This coding was done independent of any
decision made and independent of any of their other comments made by the participant.
These coded comments were then placed in relative frequency tables based on the four
categories that elicited these responses to determine if life experiences, doctrinal
teachings, philosophies of life, or other relevant issues influenced their DIT-2 story
decision.
After the comments were coded, they were organized by frequency of the type of
response (i.e., life experiences, doctrinal teachings, philosophies of life, other relevant
experiences). They then were sorted based on DIT-2 story decisions. For example, if a
participant chose the “should give overdose” option on the cancer story (see Appendix
E), their qualitative comments were coded and contrasted with those who chose the
“should not give overdose” option to explore patterns to see what variables, if any, were
influencing the decision they made for the story. These were compared based on relative
frequency of the type of coded comments. The reason that DIT-2 story decisions were
used in this reporting is because research has shown that these are reliable estimates of
overall DIT-2 scores and they had relatively high correlations with DIT-2 overall scores
in this study and others (Xu et al., 2007).
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Differences were reported as frequency counts if chi-square significance tests
showed significant differences between the relative percentages of types of comments
made when viewed by DIT-2 decision made. Since the chi-square statistic does not point
out magnitude of a difference but only significance, relative percentages of types of
responses that were graphed next to each other for visual contrasts. Descriptions were
briefly described with a few illustrative examples to demonstrate the types of comments
and how they were coded (see Appendix B and Appendix G for more detailed
descriptions). By looking at patterns in all of the DIT-2 stories I was able to see general
trends. I used the qualitative responses, the general trends noticed, and reviewed
additional literature to determine why any contrasting relationships existed and discussed
these in greater detail in Chapter V.
Conclusion
In summary, these methods of analysis shed light on whether religious orthodoxy
had an effect on MMR as measured by the DIT-2 and if other variables also had an effect
on either of these variables. Additionally, the implications of the DIF portion of this
study are that if BYU student’s individual item-response patterns do not vary from the
UA filtered national item-response pattern on the DIT-2, then the DIT-2 items may be a
valid measure of macromoral judgment for religiously orthodox persons in general.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Research on the validity of the Defining Issues Test-1 (DIT-1) indicated that
religious orthodoxy confounded the DIT-1 measurement of macromoral reasoning
(MMR). The DIT-1 has since undergone a revision and now uses the less culturally
sensitive version, the DIT-2. Since there are no data currently available to determine if
the religious orthodoxy confounds are still in play, the aim of this chapter is to show an
analysis of data collected from a religiously orthodox sample to answer the following two
research questions: (1) does religious orthodoxy confound the measurement of
macromoral reasoning as measured by the DIT-2? and (2) What other variables predict
both macromoral reasoning and religious orthodoxy and thus could be potential
confounds?
The analyses’ in this chapter showed that, similar to Richards’ study, BYU
students are more religiously orthodox and politically conservative when compared to
national scores. The analyses’ mirrored what Richards’ (1988) study found on lower and
middle levels of MMR but contrasted what he found on upper levels of MMR. New
methods of DIF analysis were employed as well as recognized standards for interpreting
DIF contrast statistics and practical significance. Correlations were studied in more
depth than previous studies by examining relationships between religious orthodoxy and
DIT-2 scores when the effects of potential confounds were removed from this
relationship. In addition, qualitative analyses’ illuminated understanding of many of the
patterns of religiously orthodox student responses and decisions made on the DIT-2.
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Analysis #1 Descriptive Statistics Description of Sample
The descriptive statistics showed that the BYU sample was a good representation
of U.S. college students who were religiously orthodox (RO) and that the BYU sample
had a similar distribution of age, gender, and political viewpoints as Richards’ 1988
sample. For example, Richards’ average student age was 21.8 years while the average
age of this sample was 21.4 years (99% were between the ages of 17-29). 138 of the 336
participants were male. Three hundred twenty-one of participants were U.S. citizens with
over 96% of them reporting English as their primary language. As a group the sample
was politically conservative as manifest by an average score of 4 (standard deviation, .71)
on a scale of 1-5 (1 = very liberal political viewpoints, 5 = very conservative political
viewpoints, see Table 5).
Table 5
Descriptive Variable Frequencies
Descriptive variable

Frequency (n = 336)

Age

99% between 17-29 years old (21.4 mean)

Gender

41% male, 59% female

U.S. citizen

96% U.S. citizen, 4% other

Primary language

96% English primary language, 4% other

Political leanings

83% conservative, 12% liberal, 5% neutral

Returned missionary

37% returned missionary, 63% not returned missionary

Mother’s education level

92% had some college, 65% had bachelor’s degree or more

Marital status

17% married, 1% separated, 82% single

Have children

Less than 2% have children

Shoplifting

7% close to someone arrested for shoplifting

Convicted of a crime

18% close to someone convicted of a crime

Purpose in suffering

90% yes—there is a purpose in suffering, 10% no purpose

55
Additional demographics showed that this sample consisted of 125 persons who
served one and a half to 2-year missions for the LDS church (90% of these 125 persons
were male). In addition, participant’s mothers were highly educated (92% had some
college, 65% had a 4-year degree or more), most participants were single (only 56 were
married, four divorced/separated, while the rest were single or did not respond), and very
few had children (only six reported that they had children). Twenty-four of the
participants reported that they were close to someone who had been convicted of
shoplifting while 61 reported that they were close to someone who had been convicted of
a crime. Ninety percent of respondents said they felt there is a purpose in human
suffering (see Table 5). These additional demographics were used to analyze
subpopulations of this religiously orthodox sample.
To aid in understanding the interpretation of DIT-2 scores in this chapter, I have
included a table here that describes the score, the acronym, range, calculation, and an
interpretation of a several DIT-2 scores used in this chapter (see Table 6).
In this analysis I will show that my sample mirrored what Richards’ (1988) study
found on lower and middle levels of MMR but contrasted what he found on upper levels
of MMR. In addition, similar to Richards’ study, BYU students continue to be more
religiously orthodox and politically conservative when compared to the national score.
These statistics were similar to Richards’ (1988) comparisons with a national
reference group for personal interest scores (PI-stages 2-3). For example, BYU students
scored lower on PI-stages 2-3 levels of macromoral reasoning (MMR) as shown in Table
7, row 2 and Table 8, column 2. This finding indicates that BYU students are less likely

Table 6
DIT-2 Score Descriptions Used in Chapter IV
Full name

Acronym

Range and calculation of scores

Personal Interest Schema
Score
A.k.a Stage 2-3 score. The
lowest of the DIT-2 levels
of macromoral reasoning.

PI-stages 2-3

0-99. This score is a proportion of
how much these items are endorsed
over the other types of items. The
score is multiplied by 100 to get a
whole number.

Interpretation
High scores indicate that a person is likely to:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Allow direct advantages to themselves influence their
macromoral reasoning.
View justice in regards of the fairness of exchanging favors
for favors.
Allow the good or evil intentions of the others influence
their macromoral reasoning.
Allow a desire to maintain approval or good relationships
affect their macromoral reasoning.

Maintaining Norms
Schema Score.
A.k.a. Stage 4 score or
conventional. The middle
of the DIT-2 levels of
macromoral reasoning.

MN- stage 4

0-99. This score is a proportion of
how much these items are endorsed
over the other types of items. The
score is multiplied by 100 to get a
whole number.

High scores indicate that a person is likely to focus on
maintaining existing laws, rules, and formal structures of society
to define their macromoral reasoning. These persons think that
what is, is what should be. High scores also indicate that a
person defers their macromoral reasoning to formal rules
(secular or spiritual or otherwise).

Post-conventional Schema
Score.
A.k.a. Stage 5-6 schema
scores. The highest level of
macromoral reasoning.

PC-stages 5-6

0-99. This score is a proportion of
how much these items are endorsed
over the other types of items. The
score is multiplied by 100 to get a
whole number.

High scores indicate that a person is likely to macromorally
reason with sharable, impartial, reciprocal, and debatable
principles of justice. Persons macromorally reasoning focuses
on organizing a society based on: consensus-producing
(majority vote), due process of law (court), safeguarding rights,
& socially reciprocal ideals. This score is a proportion of how
much these items are endorsed over the other types of items.

N2

0-95. The degree to which stage 5-6
items are ranked higher relative to
stage 2-3 items.

Higher scores indicate that a person has a higher ability to
macromorally reason and uses higher stages of macromoral
reasoning.

N2 score.
A.k.a DIT-2 overall
macromoral score.
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Table 7
Descriptive Statistics Comparing a BYU Average Scores to National Norms
DIT score

Sample

Mean

SD

1. Overall DIT-2 Score
(N2)

BYU

34.63

12.85

Norm

33.43

15.23

2. Personal interest
(Stages 2-3)

BYU

24.69

12.16

Norm

27.09

12.49

3. Maintaining norms
(Stage 4)

BYU

37.42

12.48

Norm

32.73

14.00

4. Principled moral reasoning
(Stages 5-6)

BYU

33.92

12.51

Norm

34.72

14.67

5. DIT-2 Religious orthodoxy

BYU

6.19

2.67

Norm

4.97

2.93

BYU

64.63

3.96

Norm

47.16

12.33

6. Inventory of religious
belief

BYU = Brigham Young University Undergraduates.
Norm = Average for English-speaking college students (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003).

to allow direct advantages to themselves influence their MMR when compared to the
average college student (see Table 6 for more interpretation of PI-stages 2-3 scores).
However, these PI-stages 2-3 score differences were not as stark when comparing upper
classmen. For example, BYU Freshmen scores were 4 points lower than the national PIstages 2-3 average while BYU Senior’s scores were nearly the same.
Another similar finding to Richards’ (1988) study was that the BYU student’s
maintaining norms (MN-stage 4) scores were much higher for BYU students when
compared to the current national averages (see Table 7, row 3 and Table 8, column 3).
The DIT-2 framework indicates that persons with higher MN-stage 4 scores defer to
laws, customs, rules, and formal structures of society to define their MMR.
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Table 8
Descriptive Statistics by Educational Level
Measure 1
N2 score
────────

Measure 2
PI stages2-3
────────

Measure 3
MN stage 4
────────

Measure 4
PC stages 5-6
────────

Measure 5
sample size
────────

Educational level

BYU

Norm

BYU

Norm

BYU

Norm

BYU

Norm

BYU

Norm

Senior

34.27

36.85

24.07

24.8

38.23

32.4

33.43

37.84

71

572

Junior

36.29

32.65

23.83

27.36

37.58

32.93

34.7

34.45

108

362

Sophomore

33.75

31.24

26.34

29.27

36.44

32.36

33.44

32.62

112

249

Freshmen

34.51

31.05

24.45

28.53

37.27

33.57

34.27

32.32

39

645

Measure 1 = Overall DIT-2 Score (N2)—degree to which stage 5-6 items are ranked higher relative to
stages 2-3 items.
Measure 2 = Personal Interest (Stages 2-3)—proportion of items selected that appeal to direct advantages
to the participant, focuses on good or evil intentions of the parties, or focuses on desires to maintain
friendships or approval.
Measure 3 = Maintaining Norms (Stage 4)—proportion of items selected that focus on maintaining the
existing system, existing roles, and/or formal organization structure.
Measure 4 = Post-Conventional (PC) or Principled Moral Reasoning (Stages 5-6)—proportion of items
selected that focus on organizing a society based on: consensus-producing (majority vote), due process of
law (court), safeguarding rights, & socially reciprocal ideals.
Measure 5 = Sample size (n).
BYU = Brigham Young University Undergraduates.
Norm = Average Norms for English speaking college students based on DIT-2 Scoring Guide (Bebeau &
Thoma, 2003).

The descriptive statistics diverged from Richards’ findings when comparing upper
levels of moral reasoning. In Richards’ studies, BYU students were 8 points lower on
post-conventional (PC-stages 5-6) scores. This score indicates that one’s MMR is built
upon sharable, impartial, reciprocal, and debatable principles of justice (see Table 6 for
more detailed interpretation of these scores). Although BYU students PC-stages 5-6
scores were lower, they were less than a one-point difference from a national norm
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average (see Table 7, row 4 and Table 8, column 4).
As a final point of the descriptive statistics analysis, the DIT-2 has an internal
measure of religious orthodoxy (RO), a measure that claims to correlate highly with RO
measures (Navarez, Getz, Thoma, & Rest, 1999). This measure is referred to as the RO
index and ranges from a score of 1 to 9, with 1 being low and 9 high. The descriptive
statistics also showed that the BYU sample was more religiously orthodox than national
averages (see Table 7 rows 5 and 6). This higher RO score indicates that BYU students
were more likely to refer to scriptural teachings as a legitimate source for their MMR.
In summary, this analysis showed that BYU students were similar to Richards’
1988 sample in regards to demographics and lower to middle levels of MMR. It also
showed evidence that BYU students are more religiously orthodox when compared to a
national average.
Analysis #2 Correlations Between RO and MMR
This analysis showed evidence that RO scores correlated with some DIT-2 scores
(see Table 9). The first column depicts a negative relationship with the humanitarian
liberalism (HumLib) measure. The HumLib measure indicates the amount of agreement
one’s answers have with moral philosopher’s and political scientists, which BYU.
students slightly disagree with as a whole—emphasized by the negative correlation.
However, this finding is not new as the DIT-2 RO and HUMLIB scores have been known
to yield strong inverse relationships (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003).
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Table 9
Pearson Correlation—Religious Orthodoxy and DIT-2 Scores
3-MN
stage 4

4ConLib

5-Cancer
story

6-Famine
story

7-PC
stages 56

8-N2
overall
score

Measure

1-HumLib

2-PI
stages 2-3

Religious
Orthodoxy

-0.18

-0.19

0.26

0.11

0.26

0.15

-0.08

0.01

Significance
(two-tailed)

p < 0.05

p < 0.05

p < 0.05

p < 0.05

p < 0.05

p < 0.05

0.158

0.918

Coefficient of
determination

.03

.04

.07

.01

.07

.02

Note. The coefficient of determination of all of these scores is relatively low and therefore the proportion
of variance in these variables doesn’t account for too much of the proportion of variance in RO.
1 = Humanitarian Liberalism (humlib)
2 = Personal Interest (stages 2-3)
3 = Maintaining Norms (Stage 4)
4 = ConLib Scale
5 = Cancer story choice
6 = Famine story choice
7 = Post Conventional (stages 5-6 or p-score)
8 = Overall DIT-2 score (N2 score).

The second column in Table 9 shows that, overall, BYU student scores were
negatively correlated with PI-stages 2-3 scores. This overall negative correlation coupled
with the high RO scores of BYU students gives evidence that RO persons, in general, are
less likely to focus on their own self-interests and how a macromoral decision effects
only them. For example, in the famine story a person must decide if a rich man “deserves
to be robbed” because he is hoarding food to make a profit during a time of severe
famine. A person who has a high PI-stages 2-3 score has a higher probability of
endorsing this item because their MMR framework justifies this line of thought on the
basis that if someone is unfair to me, I can treat them unfairly. The negative correlation
gives evidence that this schema of MMR does not appeal to RO persons.
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The third column in Table 9 was the strongest correlation and reflected the
correlation between RO and MN-stage 4 scores. The positive correlation indicates that
the more RO a person is, the more likely they are to endorse stage 4 items as having great
importance to the decision they made on the DIT-2. For example, in the cancer story, the
question is raised as to whether the doctor is obligated by the same laws as anyone else
even if he knows that giving an overdose would kill her? A person who has a high MNstage 4 score is more likely to endorse this item as being important to their overall
decision.
The fourth column displays a positive correlation with RO and the ConLib score.
The ConLib score indicates how politically conservative or liberal a person rates
themselves on a scale of 1-5 (1 = very liberal, 5= very conservative). The positive
correlation shows that the higher RO score, the more likely a person is to rate themselves
as politically conservative.
Columns 5 and 6 indicate that the more RO a person is, the more likely they are to
endorse not stealing food in a famine and not euthanizing a suffering cancer patient. Thus
far, all of these findings are similar to previous studies involving the DIT-2 and RO.
However, this study diverges on the final two correlations in Table 9. In previous
DIT-1 studies, PC-stages 5-6 levels of MMR and N2 (overall) scores were significantly
correlated for RO persons. Contrastingly, this study found there was not a statistically
significant correlation or mean difference between these scores and RO scores. The lack
of any correlation with RO scores and upper levels and overall DIT-2 scores suggests that
the makers of the DIT-2 may have corrected this issue on the DIT-2. However, when the
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BYU and UA total samples were combined (n = 1,224), Pearson correlations showed that
RO scores had statistically significant negative correlations with PC-stages 5-6 scores
and N2 scores. However, when viewed in practical terms, these larger sample
correlations were still very small (all less than .09) and have very small coefficients of
determination.
Analysis #3 Differential Item Functioning Person Reliability
Item-response theory (IRT) yields a statistic similar to Cronbach’s coefficient
alpha as it ranges from 0-1 and higher scores indicate greater reliability. When the focal
and reference groups were combined (BYU & UA) the person reliability was .84, a score
which indicates a high level of consistency in person responses and that the test can
separate into 2-3 levels of proficiency.
Graphed IRT Item DIF Contrasts
Several iterative analyses’ were examined within Winsteps. The first of these
analyses’ included a filtered UA sample matched with a BYU sample on total DIT-2
scores (N2). For example a 40 N2 score on the BYU sample was matched with a 40 N2
sample in the UA RO filtered sample. Item response patterns were compared on a logit
scale and placed on an equal interval scale for comparison. Other than items 17-18 (from
the reporter story), item response patterns for the BYU sample did not drastically differ
from the UA sample (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Person DIF plot of total BYU (B) and UA (U) samples. Notice that the relative
sizes of the differences are not very large. In a DIF study, when items are easier to
endorse for one group we ask if this discrepancy is due to a greater ability of that group
or a systematic bias. This figure does not show any large difference patterns between the
groups.
DIF Statistical Significance
In addition to viewing the item response patterns graphically, the following table
summarizes the DIF statistics of this study (see Table 10). Notice that 30 of the 65 items
exhibited statistically significant DIF.
Some patterns are worth noticing from the statistically significant DIF items. For
example, seven of the 13 items which are easier for BYU students to endorse over UA
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Table 10
DIF Contrast Charts with Statistical and Practical Significance
Item
#

DIF contrast
in terms of
BYU

Joint
standard
error

Statistical
probability of
true difference

FC

-.49

.11

<.05

Slight/moderate

F1

-.51

.08

<.05

F3

.48

.09

<.05

R4

.87

.09

<.05

Practical
significance

Item easier for __ to
endorse (i.e., rated greater
MMR importance for__)

Probable
MMR stage
of item

UA

DIT-2 choice

Slight/moderate

UA

PI (2-3)

Slight/moderate

BYU

MN (4)

Moderate/large

BYU

Anti

R5

.75

.14

<.05

Moderate/large

BYU

P (5-6)

R12

-.34

.08

<.05

Small/negligible

UA

MN (4)

S5

.42

.1

<.05

Small/negligible

BYU

MN (4)

S8

.42

.09

<.05

Small/negligible

BYU

MN (4)

S11

.38

.09

<.05

Small/negligible

BYU

P (5-6)

C5

-.42

.1

<.05

Small/negligible

UA

Meaningless

D1

.37

.09

<.05

Small/negligible

BYU

MN (4)

R1

-.32

.08

<.05

Small/negligible

UA

P (5-6)

D12

.35

.09

<.05

Small/negligible

BYU

MN (4)

R3

-.28

.09

<.05

Small/negligible

UA

PI (2-3)

F5

.27

.08

<.05

Small/negligible

BYU

MN (4)

F7

.27

.08

<.05

Small/negligible

BYU

P (5-6)

D3

-.23

.08

<.05

Small/negligible

UA

P (5-6)

R10

-.22

.08

<.05

Small/negligible

UA

MN (4)

C1

.24

.09

<.05

Small/negligible

BYU

MN (4)

CC

-.25

.1

<.05

Small/negligible

UA

DIT-2 choice

DC

-.21

.09

<.05

Small/negligible

UA

DIT-2 choice

F10

-.22

.1

<.05

Small/negligible

UA

Anti

D2

-.19

.08

<.05

Small/negligible

UA

PI (2-3)

C2

-.21

.09

<.05

Small/negligible

UA

P (5-6)

F2

-.21

.09

<.05

Small/negligible

UA

PI (2-3)

D11

.18

.08

<.05

Small/negligible

BYU

P (5-6)

S12

.19

.09

<.05

Small/negligible

BYU

P (5-6)

D5

-.18

.08

<.05

Small/negligible

UA

PI (2-3)

R7

-.17

.08

<.05

Small/negligible

UA

MN (4)

R9

-.17

.09

<.05

Small/negligible

UA

Meaningless

PI (2-3) =
MN (4) =
P (5-6) =
Anti =

Personal Interest Schema which is the lowest stages of MMR.
Maintaining Norms Schema which is mid-level stages of MMR.
Post-conventional Schema which is the highest stages of MMR.
Anti-establishment item which measures a DIT-2 index of whether someone has anti-establishment
attitudes towards society’s systems of justice.
Meaningless = measures whether someone is just filling in the bubbles—does not pertain to MMR.
DIT-2 Choice = What choice did a person make on the DIT-2 moral dilemma (1-3 scale).
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students appear 6 to be MN-stage 4 items. What the IRT model tells us is that these items
are easier for BYU students to mark as important to their overall MMR when compared
with UA students with the same overall MMR score. Thus, if the overall DIT-2 score
reflects a unidimensional latent trait (MMR), and BYU and UA students are correctly
matched on an overall ability of that trait, then something other than that trait appears to
be confounding response patterns. The presence of DIF would suggest that there is
something misaligned with the items or the definition of the trait.
A second pattern worth noticing is that five of the items that are easier for a UA
student to endorse appear to be PI-stages 2-3 items. These items are statistically easier
for UA students to mark as important when matched with BYU students who have the
same overall MMR score.
These two patterns are worth noticing because PI-stages 2-3 and MN-stage 4
items appeared to be performing differently via descriptive and correlational analyses’.
The DIF analysis may shed light on why that is the case (i.e., these items were
systematically easier for one group to endorse).
Other noticeable findings showed that two of the five meaningless items were
easier for the UA student to endorse. Rating these items as important to one’s MMR
indicates that students do not understand or are not thoughtful about the moral dilemma.
This trend is important because DIT-2 designers have asserted that RO persons are not as
capable of reasoning through the complex MMR dilemmas. The fact that the meaningless
items are statistically easier to endorse for the reference group (UA students), may be

6 The CSED does not release their item coding nor their scoring methods.
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evidence that this sample of RO persons are more cognitively capable of reasoning
through the DIT-2 items.
A final pattern worth noticing is that 3 of the 5 story decisions performed
differently for the UA students when compared to a BYU matched sample. Specifically,
this shows that it was statistically easier for UA students to advocate stealing during a
famine, euthanizing a suffering cancer patient, and protesting to a war by taking over a
college administration building.
Two additional Winsteps analyses’ were run using a random sample from both
groups (BYU and UA) as well the full 1,224 sample of both groups and found the same
results. The reason for these similar results is due to item-response theory’s robust
assumption of yielding sample-independent measures of item difficulty.
DIF Practical Significance
While the statistical significance of a DIF analysis can show important response
patterns, DIF researchers caution to not place an overemphasis on statistical significance.
This caution is because DIF studies require large samples and statistical significance is a
function of sample size (Gall, 2001). From a practical standpoint, very few of these DIF
items have a large magnitude of DIF contrast (analogous to effect size). In other words,
30 of the items did exhibit statistically significant DIF contrasts in some interesting
patterns. However, there was not an overly excessive amount of it due to the large
sample sizes.
In this study, the current ETS guidelines showed only two items were worth
noting as large to heavy in practical significance (DIF Rasch analysis contrast > .64). In
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addition, the direction of the DIF (+ or -) is not uniform across items (i.e., 13 were easier
to endorse for BYU students compared to 17 for UA students). Wright and Douglas
(1976) claim that when DIF is not consistently in one direction, when most DIF item
contrasts are below +/- 0.50, and when the test has more than 20 items, the impact of DIF
on person measurement is generally small. However, moderate and small DIF contrasts
on the remaining 28 items could yield a cumulative effect on test scores. This cumulative
effect may be why BYU PI-stages 2-3 and MN-stage 4 scores differ—because something
other than the trait of MMR is confounding response patterns, even when comparing
equally matched groups.
In applying Mantel-Hanzael ETS DIF contrasts to previous research data
(Richards, 1988), only one of the 25 reported biased items appeared to be practically
significant in how it performed. However, the items in Richards DIT-1 studies were all
uniform in the direction of DIF (more difficult for BYU students to endorse).
Analysis #4 t Tests and Correlations for Other Potential
Confounds with MMR
This analysis focused on finding potential confounds to MMR DIT-2 scores.
Distributions of DIT-2 N2 scores were normally distributed. This distribution allowed
many parametric statistical analysis methods to be employed. However, other DIT-2
scores were skewed in their distributions, so nonparametric tests, specifically the MannWhitney test and chi-square methods, were also used secondarily to verify that the
violation of true random sampling assumptions of t tests were not producing any of the
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effects (Boneau, 1960; Gall, 1996).
The reporting of this analysis consists of two main sections. The first consists of
correlations and t tests of the other demographic variables such as returned missionary
and marital status (see Table 11) while the second section consists of correlations and t
tests based on DIT-2 story choices.
Returned missionaries. Dummy variables were used for this analysis (returned
missionary = 1, others = 0). There was a slight tendency for returned missionaries to
endorse MN-stage 4 over stage 5 items on all the stories. The combined differences
produced a significant difference on the total MN-stage 4 and 5 scores. Specifically, a
-0.13 correlation (p < .05) was observed between returned missionaries and stage 5 moral
reasoning scores. The t tests also showed that returned missionaries stage 5 means scores
were nearly 2 points lower when compared with non-returned missionaries (p < .05). In
Table 11
DIT-2 Scores Relationships with Demographic Variables

Variable
Returned
missionary

Marital status
Have children
Association
w/criminals
Mother’s
education

t test statistical
significance on
DIT-2 scores
Yes

Significant r
with DIT-2
scores
Yes

No
No
No

No
No
No

No

No

Description
1.9 points higher on stage 4 scores (p < .05), 1.5
points lower on stage 5 scores (p < .05), more
frequently reported a purpose in suffering (.015
Pearson chi Square). Positive r w/stage 4 scores (.12,
p < .05) and negative correlation w/stage 5 scores
(-.13, p < .05). However, there was no significant r
when stages 5-6 were combined.
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other words, returned missionaries, as a group, were scoring lower on upper levels of
MMR than nonreturned missionaries. However, when stages PC-stages 5-6 were
combined, there was no statistically significant difference.
Returned missionaries also exhibited a statistically significant positive correlation
with MN-stage 4 responses (r = 0.11, p < .05) and a 1.5 point greater mean score on stage
4 scores (p < .05). Returned missionaries also tended to respond that there is a purpose in
suffering more than the rest of the BYU sample (mean difference .134, p < .05). The
single returned missionary response patterns did not statistically differ from the married
returned missionary’s response patterns.
Marital Status and Children
The previous findings of slightly higher MN-stage 4 and lower stage 5 scores
were also manifest when viewed by marital status. However, none of these were
statistically significant. The higher descriptive MN-stage 4 and lower stage 5 scores may
be due to a secondary effect of the returned missionary variables because it came as no
surprise that returned missionaries significantly differed from non-returned missionaries
in marital status at BYU. In the LDS faith, young men are taught that their lives will be
blessed by serving a mission prior to marriage (Hinckley, 1998; Kimball, 1979).
Analyses were also conducted to study whether having children would impact
DIT-2 scores. However, only six of the participants reported having children in their
home. Chi-square categorical tests showed that participants who had children said that it
would be best to call off the riotous and violence-threatened school board meeting and
advocated not to steal food during a famine. These findings are suspect because of the
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scarcity of data or variance (n = 6) to run further tests with the parenting variable.
Association with Criminals
The next survey response that was analyzed showed that those BYU students who
knew someone who had been caught shoplifting seemed to be more sympathetic towards
the person with a history of shoplifting in the reporter story #2. In this moral dilemma, a
reporter needs to decide whether to report a story about a man running for political office
who had shoplifted 20 years ago but had since changed his life. Those who reported that
someone close to them had shoplifted tended to endorse not to report the story more than
those who endorsed to report the story because the DIF analysis showed statistically
significant likelihood response patterns between those who were close to someone who
had shoplifted and those who were not. The following comment from the qualitative data
illustrates the reason for the different response patterns.
My brother shop lifted for a long time when he was a child, minor things like
candy bars and lighters from drug stores, but has since grown up since then. He is
one of the most incredible people, extremely honest and good. His actions as a
young boy, if anything, have kept him from making poor decisions now because
of the guilt and pain he felt for stealing all those years ago.
In so many words, this DIT-2 decision performs in a systematically unexpected
manner for persons who are close to someone who has been convicted of shoplifting (i.e.,
it was easier for them to endorse not to report the story). However, an association with
criminals had no other effect on overall DIT-2 stage or RO scores.
Mother’s Education Level
To determine the combined predictive strength of the demographics, nominal
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logistic regression analyses were used with Minitab software. Although no strong least
squares regression formulas were discovered, there was an association with mother’s
education level that surfaced as the only statistically significant variable of the regression
model. However, this variable was weak in practical significance (less than 1% of
variance explained). In addition, Chi-square and correlational analyses did not find any
statistical significance that mother’s education level had on DIT-2 scores or RO scores.
DIT-2 Story Choices
This section consists of an analysis of DIT-2 story choice correlations followed up
by a t test based on the cancer story decision (groups who did or did not endorse doctorassisted overdose). The cancer story decision shows the most contrast between groups
and is appropriate to use as the items pertaining to this story are used to compute the
religious orthodoxy variable.
To begin this analysis, all DIT-2 story choices were dummy coded. (Do you
favor the action of taking the food? Do you favor the action of reporting the story? Do
you favor calling off the next open meeting? Do you favor the action of giving more
medicine? Do you favor the action of demonstrating this way?) (see Appendix F for a full
description of DIT-2 stories). The number 1 was used for those who advocated a DIT-2
decision such as: should steal in a famine, report a story, keep having the unruly open
meetings, euthanize a patient, and demonstrate by taking over the administration
building. The number 2 was used for “can’t decide.” The number 3 was used for those
who did not advocate: stealing in a famine, reporting the story, holding the unruly open
meetings, and so forth.
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When missing responses were deleted, correlation and chi-square statistics for category
responses showed that the cancer story and famine story choices were positively
correlated (see Table 12). This correlation means that a person’s decision on whether or
not to euthanize a suffering cancer patient could be used to predict their response to
whether a person should steal during a famine. In addition, group statistics indicated that
persons who advocated stealing food in a time of famine and euthanizing a suffering
patient were likely to have higher PI-stages 2-3 scores, lower MN-stage 4 scores, and
lower RO scores. Many of the other story choices correlated with these scores also. In
addition, only the Cancer story choice correlated with PC-stages 5-6 scores (r = -0.17,
p < .01). This means that persons who advocated euthanizing the patient had higher PCstages 5-6 scores. None of the other story choices correlated with PC-stages 5-6 scores
nor N2 scores.
These correlations with the RO, PI-stages 2-3, and MN-stage 4 scores show
Table 12
BYU Sample DIT-2 Story Choice Correlations (n = 291)
DIT-2 story choice

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

1. Famine
2. Reporter

0.11

3. School board

0.06

0.09

4. Cancer

0.22*

-0.03

0.05

5. Demonstration

-0.07

0.07

-0.06

0.12*

6. Personal interest (Stage 2/3)

-0.32*

0.17*

0.02

-0.22*

-0.06

7. Maintain norms (Stage 4)

0.32*

-0.23*

0.03

0.35*

0.05

-0.50*

0.15*

0.19

-0.13

0.26*

0.10

-0.19*

8. RO
*p < .01

0.26*
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evidence of a consistent pattern of the way people rate the stories. These consistent
correlation patterns are evidence some of the DIT-2 story decision choices are predictors
of whether someone’s MMR focuses on a PI-stage 2-3 or a MN-stage 4 framework for
their MMR as well as whether a person is more or less RO. These correlations add to the
evidence that there is an underlying construct being measured by the DIT-2 stories that
may be confounded by RO or another confounding variable.
DIT-2 Story Decisions Correlations and t Tests
Since the DIT-2 story decisions were correlated with PI-stages 2-3, MN-stage 4,
and RO scores, further analysis was performed based upon the DIT-2 story decisions.
The cancer story gives the strongest illustration of a general pattern discovered (see Table
13). In addition, the cancer story ranking items are used to help determine the RO score
so it was appropriate to separate persons based on this story decision for analysis in this
study.
Key statistically significant findings of this analysis are summarized in Table 13.
For example, those within the BYU who advocated not giving an overdose (non-OD) to a
suffering cancer patient (non-OD group) scored 5 points higher on stage four reasoning
when compared to those who advocated giving an overdose (OD group). The non-OD
group was also 2 points higher on the average religious orthodoxy score (1-9 scale). The
non-OD group’s scores were also lower on the NUMCD variable, a variable that
indicates the degree to which one cannot decide what to do on the DIT-2 moral dilemmas
(1-5 scale). This score indicates that non-OD BYU students were more decisive on the
DIT-2 stories and is related to the amount of consolidation in one’s macromoral
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Table 13
Statistically Significant DIT-2 Mean Differences of Those Who Endorsed a DoctorAssisted Overdose Compared to Those Who Did Not (p < .01)
Should
give OD

Score

Score description

RO

-2.11

RO is a measure of religious orthodoxy and ranges from 1-9.

HumLib

1.11

Humlib is a reflection of the number of times a choice on the DIT-2
matches academic moral philosopher’s choices in political science and
philosophy. Scores range from 1-5.

PI schema
(stages 2-3)

2.63

PI Schema represents the proportion of items that represent lower levels of
moral reasoning and focus on the direct advantages to the actor and the
fairness of simple exchanges of favor for favor. This is converted to a
whole number and ranges from 1-99.

MN schema
(stage 4)

-5.15

MN Schema represents the proportion of items selected that appeal to a
stage four, maintaining norms consideration. These focus on maintaining
the existing legal system, maintaining existing roles and formal
organizational structures. This is converted to a whole numbers and ranges
from 1-99.

Postconventional
schema
(stages 5-6)

2.34

Post-conventional Schema score represents the postconventional schema
score. This score reflects the proportion of items selected that appeal to the
two highest stages of moral reasoning, stages 5-6, which were selected over
the two lowest stages (2-3). This is converted to whole numbers and ranges
from 1-99.

reasoning. In other words, the non-OD BYU students are a little more “set” in their
macromoral reasoning. The HumLib variable is the degree to which one’s DIT-2 scores
conform with content experts (moral philosophers) in the field of moral reasoning. This
score is usually inversely related to the RO index so it is no surprise that the non-OD
BYU students do not score as high on this measure (i.e., RO persons tend to not agree
with the moral philosophers in some macromoral issues).
Overall, these scores reflect that as a group, those who do not advocate
euthanizing a suffering cancer patient tend to give high endorsements to MN-stage 4
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items. Conversely, those who advocate euthanizing a suffering cancer patient also tend
to give low endorsements to MN-stage 4 items. The DIT-2 story advocacy and item
endorsement patterns were consistent across all stories (e.g., those who advocated
stealing in a famine, reporting a story, etc., had lower MN-stage 4 item scores). These
patterns suggests that the actual content of the story and initial story decision, not the
DIT-2 items (which the test purports to derive its scores from), may also be producing a
confound to MMR scores.
Analysis #5 Partial Correlations Between RO and MMR Accounting for
Other Potential Confounds
The goal of this study was to analyze the effects that RO has on DIT-2 scores.
The purpose of this analysis was to verify that extraneous variables were not confounding
MMR scores. Recall that RO scores were correlating with PI-stages 2-3 and MN-stage 4
scores. In addition, this study has shown that whether or not someone has served an LDS
mission, the cancer and famine story choice, political adherence (ConLib), marriage
status, how well a person agrees with moral philosopher choices (HumLib), whether they
feel there is a purpose in human suffering, and how consolidated they are in the DIT-2
story decisions (NUMCD), all affect RO, PI stage 2-3, and MN stage 4 DIT-2 scores.
Therefore, each of these variables was viewed in partial correlation analyses’ to view the
effects of RO on DIT-2 stages 2-4 scores.
When missionary status, marriage status, purpose in human suffering, famine
choice, NUMCD, ConLib, and HumLib scores were individually partialed out of the
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correlation between RO and PI-stages 2-3 and MN stage-4 scores, none of the adjusted
correlations between RO and stages 2-4 changed more than three hundredths. The
consistency in RO and DIT-2 score relationships is evidence that these variables are not
significantly confounding variables in the RO and stages 2-4 relationship. However, the
cancer story decision slightly affected the RO and stages 2-4 relationship more than the
rest of these extraneous variables. Specifically, the RO—MN-stage 4 correlations
decreased from 0.26 to 0.21. In addition, the RO–PI-stages 2-3 correlations decreased
from -0.19 to -0.15. This decrease is to be expected because the cancer story decision is
actually used to calculate the RO score. In other words, DIT-2 researchers assume this
relationship already exists. In essence, the partial correlations showed that religious
orthodoxy can predict PI stages 2-3 and MN stage-4 scores regardless of the extraneous
variables that this study sought to control for. Thus we can rule out the effects of these
other measured variables upon the DIT-2 MMR and RO relationship.
Analysis #6 Qualitative Analysis of Open-Ended Survey Responses
The final analysis involved viewing open-ended survey responses. The purpose of
this analysis was to discover any uncontrolled variables as well as to verify the DIT-2
framework. For example, to verify the DIT-2 framework, persons with high PI-stages 23 scores should have qualitative comments that focus on direct advantages to themselves
and conversely, persons with low scores should not focus on direct advantages to justify
their MMR decisions. The findings reflected that BYU students had very few PI-stages
2-3 justifications. In addition, persons with high MN-stage 4 scores should have
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qualitative comments reflecting that they are unreflectively deferring to societal or
religious norms. However, the MN-stage 4 framework was not verified in qualitative
data. Contrastingly, student comments were very reflective of personal values which
happen to be religious.
To briefly describe how qualitative comments were exported, coded, and analyzed
I describe two phases: an interpretation of qualitative responses and a frequency
description of total relative responses (see Appendix G for a complete description of the
interpretation of qualitative responses and frequencies of responses). The data
illuminated understanding of many of the patterns of BYU student responses and
decisions made on the DIT-2.
Relative Percent of Response Rates
As noted earlier, the decisions made for the DIT-2 stories had significant
correlations with DIT-2 scores. Therefore, it was anticipated that examining the
qualitative data by decisions made on the DIT-2 story decisions would illuminate
significant patterns that would illustrate how BYU students differed in their macromoral
judgment as well as discover any additional potential confounds to MMR.
After student responses were interpreted and coded, the results were reported as
frequency counts and descriptive narratives to look for differences between the relative
amounts of different types of responses on the macromoral dilemmas. For example, on
the cancer story, persons who did and did not endorse euthanizing the suffering patient
both wrote that mercy was a relevant issue in this story. However, patterns of statistical
significance emerged as relative frequencies of expected and observed responses by DIT-
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2 decision made were compared. For example, by looking at the relative frequency
amount of responses involving mercy as an issue that influenced a person’s cancer story
decision, those who endorsed a doctor-assisted overdose mentioned this factor of mercy
much more frequently than those who did not endorse a doctor-assisted overdose. It was
interesting to graph the differences in the relative percent of coded qualitative data by the
decision made for the DIT-2 stories (see Figures 4-7 shown and described separately
below). These showed some remarkably insightful contrasts for what these individuals
reported was influencing their macromoral decisions.
Cancer Story
The cancer story was of most interest to this study because the internal RO
measure is derived from an item pertaining to this moral dilemma. As comments were
coded and graphed, it was clear that as one type of comment increased for those who
endorsed a story decision, they decreased for a group who did not endorse a story
decision. For example, it was quite clear that those who endorsed the doctor-assisted
overdose mentioned the following influences on their decision more often than those who
did not endorse this action: the right to the avoidance of suffering, that individual rights
are greater than family rights, and the God-given right to chose or agency. 7 Contrastingly,
those who did not endorse the doctor assisted overdose mentioned the following
influences on their decisions more often than those who did endorse this action: God’s
dominion over life (God has not given the locus of control in life/death matters to man),
Agency is an LDS doctrine that involves the right to individual choice. Agency was
coded as a locus of control issue in this story as participants indicated that God gives man
control to decide for himself.

7
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life is a sacred gift—therefore, one has a responsibility to fight for it, the doctor’s actions
are an irresponsible act of killing, and that there is purpose/ benefits in suffering so one
has a responsibility to endure it (Figure 4).
In analyzing these contrasting findings in the relative percent of qualitative
responses by DIT-2 story choice, there appeared to be two dominating factors influencing
the cancer decision: a person’s view of macromoral rights versus macromoral
responsibilities, and God versus Man’s locus of control in matters of life and death.
However, after an additional reflection of the qualitative comments, the God versus
Man’s locus of control may also be related to a person’s view of macromoral rights and
macromoral responsibilities (i.e., does God give man a right to chose or is there a
responsibility to Him in matters of life and death?). A few illustrative examples of

Relative percent of persons who mentioned...
Should Give OD

Should Not Give OD

46%
38%
32%

31%

8%

24%

20%

19%

17%

14%
7%

4%

4%

0%

…there is a
…the doctor's
Life is sacred-…Locus of
…Locus of
…individual
...the right to the
control--God's therefore one has actions are an purpose/benefit in
rights are greater control--God
avoidance of
suffering (mercy). than family rights. gives man agency dominion over a responsibility to irresponsible act suffering/enduring
pain and one has a
of killing.
fight for it.
life/death.
to choose.
repsonsibility to
find it.

Figure 4. Relative percent of coded qualitative comments by DIT-2 cancer story choice.
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macromoral rights-based comments included the right of a patient and the right to the
avoidance of suffering. For example:
“The patient has every right to declare the comfort of her death before it actually
happens in practical means.”
“No one should have to suffer more than they can handle.”
“If we can help others avoid suffering we should do that.”
Many of the above macromoral rights-based rationales seemed to exist within a vacuum
that focused on individual macromoral rights with very little expressions of reciprocity of
the macrormoral code.
Contrastingly, the individuals who did not endorse the doctor assisted overdose
frequently focused on an individual, family, and societal macromoral responsibilities and
reciprocity of their macrormoral code. A few illustrative examples of the
responsibilities-based comments included a focus on the macromoral responsibility to
loved ones, to life itself, and to find meaning through experiences. For example:
“My friend’s father had a brain tumor that caused him pain and suffering,
however, he suffered with it until the end so he could spend more time with her.”
“The situation above is tough one, however, my thoughts on it is that we
shouldn’t help others destroy their life.”
“I believe Victor Frankl was right when he said that if there is any meaning in life
there must be meaning in suffering.”
Famine Story
The relative percentage of qualitative comments in the Famine Story 8 followed
8 It should be pointed out that this story may have been confounded by LDS teachings regarding self-reliance. LDS leaders teach that
one way to be more self-reliant is to have at least a 3 month supply of food storage in case of emergencies, job loss, or other
extenuating circumstances. Thus, a rich man hoarding food may not be seen as inherently immoral if it was viewed as an act of selfreliance. The findings of this study did not confirm nor rule out the impact of the LDS teachings on self-reliance and food storage.
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similar patterns as the cancer story—that is, as one type of comment increased for those
who endorsed a “should steal” decision, they decreased for a “should not steal” decision
(see Figure 5).
Again, the most common theme for the “should not steal” patrons was a theme of
macromoral responsibility/accountability for one’s actions while the “should steal”
patrons focused on their comments on the macromoral right to life. There was also a
differential prescribed locus of control between God and Man in the “should not steal”
patron’s comments as evidenced by the relative percent of “choose the right” comments
and that some of the laws we are accountable to are the 10 commandments, specifically
“Thou shalt not steal.” Illustrative examples focused on a macromoral weighting of the
right to life versus the responsibility to respect others rights to own property. For
example, the focus on macromoral responsibilities and reciprocity of the moral code to

Relative % of persons who mentioned…
Should steal

23.5%

Should not steal
42.3%
25.8%

23.0%
10.0%
0.0%

…stealing is
justified by the
right to live.

1.5%

0.7%

12.0%
5.0%

1.5%

0.0%

…motive to
…the needy … responsibility …choose the … responsibility
provide for
have a right to to laws so one
right
is to work for
family makes take from those man's rights do (commanded food or look for
stealing okay. with abundance not infringe on not to steal) and another honest
to survive.
anothers.
things will work option to earn
out.
it.

Figure 5. Relative percent counts of coded comments by DIT-2 famine story decision.
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protect both party’s rights to property are reflected in the following illustrative
comments.
“The person who is rich still has a right to his property regardless of what his
intentions are.”
“If all of Mustaq Singh’s neighbors had the same idea he did and thought that the
food they took wouldn’t be missed, then a significant amount of the rich man’s
food would be taken… I think it is human nature to think that we are the
exception and that we are justified in what we do.”
“Although it is unfair the rich man is hoarding food and being greedy does not
mean Mustaq should also sink to his level to steal.”
Contrastingly, the focus on macromoral rights comments, were similar to the following:
“I place a higher priority on human life than money. Sometimes laws are not
moral.”
“The right to life [influenced my decision].”
“It is far more important to keep someone alive than to worry about stealing.”
“This was confusing because it’s an obvious commandment that we shouldn’t
steal, but then again, I look at it as being the letter of the law vs. the spirit of the
law. If you are doing it to save your family and you aren’t doing anyone much
harm I feel that I would still be able to justify it, even though it may not be right.”
Reporter Story
The third qualitative data analyzed came from the reporter story. In this story, a
young reporter (Molly) has to decide if she will report a story about a candidate whom
she supports that shoplifted when he was young but has since changed his life. The data
from this story also showed similar inverse relationships among comments as the first
two (i.e., those who endorsed reporting the story and those who did not tended to have
opposite frequencies of coded qualitative data). For example, 85% of the relative amount
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of comments of those who endorsed not reporting the story mentioned a macromoral
responsibility towards the subject while only 31% of those who said to report the story
mentioned this similar theme (see Figure 6). The following comments illustrate the crux
of the macromoral rights of the public to get the full story contrasted with the
macromoral responsibility to the subject:
“Her job is to report the news to the public…. She gives the community the
information/story and they decide for themselves.”
“I learned one time of President Truman falling down one time and a young
reporter tried taking a picture of him and another reporter hit his camera out of his
hand and broke it because of the ideal that reporters then had of respecting their
subjects.”
A second major factor of a differential prescribed locus of control between God
and man was manifest in the disproportionate number of references to the assumed

Relative percent of persons who mentioned…
Should report

38.3%
27.7%
4.2%

31.9%

23.4%
2.6%

Should not report
85.2%

2.8%

0.0%

7.5%

0.0%

7.3%

…people have a
…it is the
…that's the way …responsibility
…I have a
…it's none of the
right to know reporter's public it is in media‐the to the subject‐‐
negative
public's business
the truth‐‐it's duty to report
community
the past is
impression of because it is his
the honest thing unbiasedly.
decides on a
irrelevant
the press.
private life.
to report it.
public figures
because the
morality.
person repented
/ changed.

Figure 6. Relative percent of coded comments by DIT-2 reporter story decision.
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“repentance” of the politician mentioned in “should not report” comments (see Figure 6).
School Board Story
The fourth story analyzed was the school board story. The macromoral issue was
whether or not to continue to hold a public school board meeting, despite the unruly
attendees and threats made to the board members. BYU students responded in a more
diverse way to this story than they did with the others as shown in the balanced amount
of respondents to each extreme (102 comments “should call off the next open meeting”
and 114 comments “should not call of the next open meeting”). Perhaps this more
diverse response pattern is due to the lack of religious content in the story (i.e., scriptures
do not speak much on the morality of holding unruly public school board meetings).
However, similar inverse relationships were also found in this story in the coded
comments (see Figure 7). For example, comments from those who advocated holding the

Relative percent who mentioned…
Should call of next open meeting

Should have the next open meeting
43.3%

32.4%
12.8%

32.4%
15.0%

16.2%
0.0%

…the concept of
…a few
…leaders are
a republic‐
contentious
responsible /
elected leaders people are the
liable for
should decide. problem and people's safety
they should be
first.
removed.

20.0%

19.9%
6.6%

…to be fair to …promises to
the community
the public
he must hear should be kept.
the people who
have the right of
free speech.

16.7%
5.1%
…the problem is
with the
moderator and
the inability to
manage group
dynamics.

Figure 7. Relative percent of coded comments by DIT-2 school board story decision.
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next meeting focused more on the macromoral right to be heard (free speech), that the
problem was with the leadership more than the unruly people, and the right to expect a
leader to keep their word. For example, “We all have the freedom of speech” and “I
think people opinions are important in a democracy. If possible they should be able to
express their opinions.”
Those who advocated calling off the next meeting focused on the macromoral
responsibility of the leaders to make decisions (the notion of a republic), the
responsibility of leaders to keep the board members and others safe, and the
irresponsibility of the unruly people as a reason for forfeiting their rights to be heard
(thus hinting that the macromoral right of free speech is attached to a macromoral
responsibility). One student reported, “If the people cannot conduct themselves properly,
they should not be allowed in the meetings.” Another reported, “If the community can’t
discuss the school closure with open-minds and respect to all, then they should not have
the opportunity to.”
Demonstration Story
The demonstration story raises the issue of whether it is right for college students
to take over their administration building in protest of a war. This DIT-2 story was seen
as irrelevant and unappealing to the vast majority of BYU students. Qualitative
comments related a sentiment that most of them thought it was not worth their time and
energy to cognitively reason much about it. Comments also reflected a cost/benefit
analysis in terms of student’s time management, student’s responsibility to other’s rights
in society, and the ineffectiveness of results of protesting in this way—all reflective of a
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pragmatic philosophical approach to life. For example:
“We cannot transcend the agency of others, like the School.”
“Responsibilities over rights.”
“There are usually more progressive resolutions to problems but many are just too
lazy to look or wait for those solutions.”
There was also little variance in the comments and decisions on this story. Only
seven persons said the students should keep demonstrating in these ways, 17 were
undecided, 281 were against it and the rest of the sample did not respond to this item. The
lack of interest and lack of a perceived macromoral issue made this story irrelevant in
analysis.
Overall Qualitative Analysis of the Differences Between
BYU Sample Participants
Recall that the purpose of this analysis was to identify if other variables could be
potential confounds that were influencing MMR and RO on the DIT-2 stories and to
verify if the DIT-2 framework was appropriately describing MMR for a RO person. This
analysis consisted of viewing what life experiences, doctrinal teachings, personal
philosophies, and other relevant issues were influencing respondent’s decisions on the
DIT-2 stories (see Appendix G for a more detailed description of these four components).
When groups were compared based on the DIT-2 story decisions made (e.g.,
should or should not give an overdose), the groups of students did not differ in the
amount or depth of life experiences that related to any of the stories—relatively the same
percentage of comments were made about family experiences, work-related experience,
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educational related experiences, and general life experiences for both groups. For
example, on the Cancer story, 33% of the comments of those who endorsed a doctor
assisted overdose focused on family or close friends who had cancer. Similarly, 31% of
the comments of those who did not endorse a doctor assisted overdose focused on family
or close friends who had cancer. The “other relevant issues” responses were either
common to both parties or unique to individual comments. Thus, the influences of
external experiences (in the form of life experiences) appeared to be quite balanced for
the two groups. However, the extent to which doctrinal teaching or which philosophy of
life a person felt applied to the macromoral issue were very imbalanced when viewed by
which story decision a person endorsed (see Figures 4-7). Both the doctrinal teachings
and philosophy of life comments appeared to be related more to internal reasoning rather
than external events in the person’s life. These findings led the researcher to conjecture
that the internal interpretation of external life experiences may be what influences DIT-2
responses rather than an external experience alone. However, it should be pointed out that
the mere balanced amount of external life experiences in the qualitative data is not
sufficient grounds for assuming that all external life experiences do not influence one’s
macromoral schema. Nor is the balanced amount of external life experiences sufficient
grounds for assuming that all internal views of macromorality are the sole basis for the
DIT-2 scoring. In addition, this study did not fully verify that doctrinal teachings and
philosophy of life comments were based solely on internal reasoning. Nonetheless, the
balanced quantity of references to life experiences is a relevant finding in seeking to
discover patterns of what other variables influence DIT-2 responses.
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Another relevant finding that the qualitative data showed was that two variables
that appeared to be influencing the RO sample’s MMR responses and that a third variable
was not. The first variable that was influencing the RO sample’s MMR responses was
actually a verification of the DIT-2 schema scores. That is, the vast majority of the BYU
students did not appeal to personal interests (PI-stages 2-3) to justify their MMR story
decisions. In other words, there was a lack of personal interest comments justifying why
RO persons chose the way they did on the DIT-2 stories. This scarcity of personal interest
comments may be why BYU student mean PI-stages 2-3 scores were significantly lower.
The second variable influencing decisions made on the stories was dependent
upon differing doctrinal interpretations of God versus man’s locus of control and a
general weighting of whether one focused on macromoral rights versus macromoral
responsibilities. In one way, God versus man’s locus of control could be couched into a
view of macromoral rights and macromoral responsibilities. For example, a man who
believes that he has a God-given right to dictate his own macromorality, may respond in
this way in order to emphasize his preference for an individual right over a responsibility
to a Transcendent Truth or Being. This unexpected variable of weighting macromoral
rights and macromoral responsibilities appeared to be stronger than any other quantified
demographic variable of this study and should be considered in future studies.
The third variable that did not seem to be influencing the RO sample’s MMR
responses was that they were not overly deferring to laws, customs, cultural or religious
norms, or societal norms for the reasons behind their MMR. This lack of deferring to law
was also shown in focus group interviews as students would say things such as,
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“Euthenasia is against the law but that’s not what makes it wrong.” These types of
comments contrasted with what the DIT-2 framework suggests is the reasons that RO
persons have higher MN-stage 4 scores.
In essence, the qualitative analysis showed that within a BYU sample there are
differing philosophies that influence a student’s views on Kohlberg’s justice based
concepts that form the basis of his view of macromorality (what is right for society).
Specifically, a minority and majority group emerged. These groups of students had
differing philosophies on macromoral rights and macromoral responsibilities when it
comes to macromoral choices, differ in opinions on whether a macromoral right and a
macromoral responsibility exist separately or are conjoined, and appeal to differing
doctrines as influencing their macromoral choices (such as agency and mercy). In
addition, the framework for rating PI-stages 2-3 items appears to be valid for RO persons
while the MN-stage 4 framework appears to be misaligned when the qualitative data are
viewed. These findings will be elaborated upon in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Purpose of Study and Research Questions
The purpose of this study was to explore whether the DIT-2 solved a problem of
item bias against religiously orthodox persons and to explore if other variables were
related to the measurement of religious orthodoxy and macromoral reasoning (MMR).
Specifically, the research questions were as follows.
1. Does religious orthodoxy confound the measurement of macromoral
reasoning as measured by the DIT-2?
2. What other variables predict both macromoral reasoning and religious
orthodoxy and thus could be potential confounds?
The short answer to these questions is that this study presented evidence that RO
does confound MMR as measured by the DIT-2. However, the type of DIT-2 scores
affected by RO and the reasons for why RO confounds DIT-2 scores differed from
previous DIT-1 research. The following is a summary of major findings. These are
followed by three major discussion points that will explain: first, which DIT-2 scores
were confounded by RO; second, what previous theories for why RO persons score the
way they do were supported or not supported; and third, propose that the DIT-2
maintaining norms (MN-stage 4) schema is insufficient to explain the variables that
contribute to why RO persons score the way they do. These discussion points are
followed by delimitations in this study and suggestions for further study.
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Summary of Major Findings
1. The BYU Sample Was an Appropriate
Sample to Generalize to RO Persons
There were four reasons that led me to conclude that a BYU student sample was
an appropriate sample to represent RO college students in the United States (US). First,
the BYU sample had a DIT-2 RO mean score that was 1.22 points higher than the
national averages (1-9 scale). Previous research has pointed out that the DIT-2 RO score
strongly correlates with other measures of RO (Rest, 1999). Second, on Brown and
Lowe’s Inventory of religious belief (1-75 scale), the BYU sample mean scores were
almost 15 points higher than the national averages. In addition, the BYU sample standard
deviations were significantly smaller on both RO scales, indicating that the BYU sample
was a more homogeneous group in their RO ideology. Third, qualitative data showed that
BYU students frequently used religious vernacular as they explained their MMR on a
questionnaire (e.g., the doctrine of agency, mercy, compassion, forgiveness, repentance,
etc—see also Appendix G). Fourth, recall that RO is defined by how one uses scriptural
teachings. As ancillary evidence that Mormons are more religiously orthodox, recent
research has pointed out that Mormons study what they consider the word of God far
more often than most U.S. religions (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2008). Thus,
a BYU student sample is an effective one for generalizing to RO college students in the
US.
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2. RO Persons’ Scores Differ When Compared
to a National Reference Group
The first evidence that RO person’s scores differ when compared to a national
reference group was found in the descriptive data. Specifically, RO persons mean scores
were lower on PI-stages 2-3 scores, higher on MN-stage 4 scores, and lower on PC-stages
5-6 scores. Second, t tests verified that PI-stages 2-3 scores and MN-stage 4 scores were
significantly different (p < .05), while PC-stages 5-6 were not. Third, RO scores for the
BYU sample correlated with PI-stages 2-3 and MN-stage 4 scores but not with PC-stages
5-6. Fourth, when the effects of other potential confounds were removed via partial
correlation analyses, the RO-DIT-2 correlations still remained intact. In essence, the
partial correlations showed that religious orthodoxy can predict PI stages 2-3 and MN
stage-4 scores regardless of the extraneous variables that this study sought to control for.
Thus, we can rule out the effects of these other measured variables upon the DIT-2 MMR
scores (e.g., mother’s education level, association with criminals, etc.). However, as we
view these correlations, it is important to point out that correlation is not causation. Thus,
I concluded that either RO does predict DIT-2 scores or it is being masked by other
variables not quantifiably measured in this study. Qualitative data showed evidence of the
latter and will be elaborated on in the discussion section.
3. DIT-2 Items Appear to Measure Internal
Schemas of Macromoral Reasoning
The DIT-2 claims it is measuring internal schemas of MMR (Rest et al., 1999a).
Findings from this study lend support that the DIT-2 is measuring internal schemas of
MMR. Specifically, the high person reliability and item reliability scores of the RO group
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shows that RO persons responded quite consistently to the items. Thus, I conclude there
was not a reliability measurement issue confounding the relationships between RO
persons and DIT-2 scores.
A second point of support for the claim that the DIT-2 measures internal schemas
of MMR, is that BYU students IRT response patterns were not showing a consistently
strong pattern of item bias. Although there were 30 of the 65 items that showed
statistically significant DIF, the DIF contrast statistics only showed that there were two
items that exhibited a practically significant amount of DIF contrast levels against the RO
group. The remaining 28 items exhibited only moderate or small amounts of DIF
contrast. Further, the moderate and small amounts of DIF contrasts were not consistently
in one direction (thus, there was no favoring or unfavoring either the RO or reference
group). Thus, item bias theory does not appear to be having a strong influence on DIT-2
scores. Since item bias is the only existing theory that focuses on external measurement
issues, and since this study did not strongly support an item-bias theory, the reasons that
RO persons have differing DIT-2 scores may be more due to internal reasoning, as the
developers of the DIT-2 suggest.
A third point of support that the DIT-2 is measuring internal schemas of MMR,
comes from the amount of qualitative comments regarding external events (life
experiences) that were influencing person’s DIT-2 choices. Specifically, the relative
amount of qualitative comments about life experiences, that influenced persons DIT-2
decisions were mostly equal when contrasted by DIT-2 story choice. For example, in the
cancer story, 33% of the relative comments from persons who endorsed a doctor-assisted
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overdose mentioned that someone close to them had been diagnosed with cancer. Thirtyone percent of the relative comments from persons who did not endorse a doctor-assisted
overdose mentioned that someone close to them had been diagnosed with cancer. As
anecdotal evidence of the balanced amount of life experience comments, an interesting
experience happened in pilot study focus group interview. Two persons, who had
coincidentally both had cancer treatment, used their experiences to justify or denounce
euthanasia and respectfully disagreed with each other’s conclusions drawn from their life
experience. This similar pattern of life experiences being balanced when viewed by DIT2 choices was in all of the DIT-2 stories (see Appendix G). The balancing of external
experiences lends support that there are internal schemas for how people macromorally
reason and it may be the internal interpretation of life experiences that determine how life
experiences are used to support or oppose a macromoral choice. However, the mere
balancing of life experiences that influenced DIT-2 story decisions is not sufficient
evidence to conclude that the DIT-2 stories are completely independent from life
experiences and only measure internal schemas. Literature on moral development also
shows that there are internal rationales in moral development (Emsberger & Manaster,
1981).
A fourth point of support that the DIT-2 is measuring internal schemas of MMR
also comes from the qualitative data. In contrast to the finding of equal amounts of
external life-experiences rationales for their decisions, persons who chose differently on
the DIT-2 stories cited differing internal rationales to justify their decisions (see Chapter
IV, Figures 4-7). The patterns of relatively equal amounts of external rationales (life

95
experiences) to justify DIT-2 story decisions, while noticing differing amounts of internal
rationales (such as doctrinal teachings and philosophies of life) that were used to justify
DIT-2 story decisions, led me to conjecture that the DIT-2 stories may tap into internal
schemas of MMR. However, the MN-stage 4 schema does not appear to be sufficient to
explain RO persons’ internal schema of MMR, which seems to be masked by other
confounding variables. This possible masking will be my third discussion point.
To summarize, the three major findings of this study I found that first, a BYU
sample was an appropriate representation of RO persons, second, that RO persons’ scores
differed in predictable ways, and third, that there is support that the DIT-2 is consistently
measuring an internal schema. However, this study also found evidence that even though
the DIT-2 may be consistently measuring MMR in predictable ways for RO persons, the
validity of the MN-stage 4 framework is brought into question. These findings will be
elaborated on in the following discussion points.
Discussion Points
Discussion Point #1-RO and DIT-2 Scores RO
and PI-stages 2-3 Negative Correlations
The analyses of Chapter IV showed that the BYU sample was similar to Richards’
1988 sample in regards to lower levels of personal interest (PI-stages 2-3) scores when
compared to a national norm-referenced group (BYU score = 24.7, UA score = 27.0). In
addition, RO scores were negatively correlated with PI-stages 2-3 scores.
In the DIT-2 framework the lower PI-stages 2-3 scores indicate that BYU students
are less likely to allow direct advantages and their own interests to influence their MMR
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when compared to the average college student. Qualitative comments also verified that
most BYU students were not focusing on their own interests in their MMR. Thus, I
conclude, as earlier researchers conclude, that RO persons in general are less likely to
focus on their own self-interests and how a macromoral decision effects only them. The
tendency to not focus on their own self-interests appears to be a valid variable, which
explains why RO persons score lower on the PI-stages 2-3 score. Thus, I also conclude
that the PI-stages 2-3 schema is a valid framework for explaining RO person’s DIT-2
scores.
The finding that RO persons are less likely to focus on direct advantages to
themselves may also be why the DIF analysis of the DIT-2 story decisions on famine and
cancer stories were moderately easier for the UA students to endorse—the very nature of
these stories is self-serving. For example, in the famine story a person must decide if it is
appropriate to steal from a rich man who is hoarding food to make a profit during a time
of severe famine. In fact, one of the PI-stages 2-3 items asks if this rich man “deserves to
be robbed” because he is doing hoarding food. 9 Someone with a high PI-stages 2-3 score
has a higher probability of endorsing this item as important to their decision because their
MMR schema justifies this line of reasoning (i.e., if someone is unfair to me, I can treat
them unfairly). Not surprisingly, the DIF study showed that this item was moderately
easier for the reference group to endorse over the BYU sample. This is just one example
9 Again, it should be pointed out that this story may have been confounded by LDS teachings regarding
self-reliance. LDS leaders teach that one way to be more self-reliant is to have at least a 3-month supply of
food storage in case of natural disaster emergencies, job loss, or other extenuating circumstances (which
could include a famine). Thus, a rich man hoarding food may not be seen as inherently immoral if it was
viewed as an act of self-reliance. The findings of this study did not confirm nor rule out the impact of the
LDS teachings on self-reliance and food storage.
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that RO persons are less likely to allow their personal interests to interfere with their
MMR. This expected finding mirrors what earlier research studies have found (Richards,
1988).
RO and MN-stage 4 scores positive correlations. The analyses’ also showed that
the BYU sample was similar to Richards’ 1988 sample in regards to higher levels of
maintaining norms (MN-stage 4) scores when compared to a national norm-referenced
group (BYU score = 37.4, UA score = 32.7). In addition, RO scores were positively
correlated with MN-stage 4 scores indicating that the more RO a person is, the more
likely they are to endorse stage 4 items as having great importance to the decision they
made on the DIT-2.
RO persons have a more complex MMR schema than rest suggests. The DIT-2
framework suggests that persons with higher MN-stage 4 scores defer to laws, customs,
rules, and formal structures of society to define their MMR. For example, in the cancer
story, the question is raised as to whether the doctor is obligated by the same laws as
anyone else even if he knows that giving an overdose would kill his patient. A person
who has a high MN-stage 4 score is more likely to endorse this item as being important to
their overall decision.
No quantified variable in this study accounted for higher MN-stage 4 scores in the
BYU sample so I turned to the qualitative data to verify that the DIT-2 framework was
correctly identifying the reasons for why a RO person would have higher MN-stage 4
scores (i.e., were they indeed deferring their MMR to laws, rules, customs, etc.).
However, qualitative data did not show that RO persons were excessively deferring to
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societal roles, customs, formal structures, nor laws in their MMR. In fact, the law was
only cited as a reason for their MMR decision in 8% of the relative comments on the
cancer story and was practically nonexistent in the other stories (less than 2%).
In addition, I should point out that the mere correlation of personal values to U.S.
legislature values (laws) or religious laws does not mean one is deferring to law. For
some RO persons, in an Aristotle-like manner, they view U.S. laws and the end of
politics as inherently moral (Barnes, 1984; Clayton, 2006) but only when the laws align
with their own values. This Aristotle-like view of laws was reflected in interviews as
students would report, “Well, the law says… but that’s not what makes it right.” By
Kohlberg’s own reasoning, rights derived from laws alone are insufficient (Rest, 1999)
because laws can be manipulated to support any end (Denvir, 1999).
Therefore, RO persons agree with Kohlberg on this point—rights and what is just
is not derived from U.S., state, or city legislature laws alone. An item, such as “should the
community’s laws be upheld,” is not discriminating enough to determine whether
someone is deferring their MMR to the law, or if the law just happens to align with their
own MMR schema or values. Thus, a positive correlation on the MN-stage 4 score with
RO, may not truly be measuring what it claims to be measuring.
Similarly, rights derived from an isolated doctrinal teaching alone can also be
used to support any end. In addition, religious laws were mentioned more frequently in
the qualitative data because I asked if religious teachings applied. However, students
who scored high and low on MN-stage 4 scores mentioned religious teachings that
applied to the DIT-2 story. Very few seemed to be deferring to these teachings or laws
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alone for their decision. Rather than deferring to the religious teaching alone, they
showed reflective thoughts regarding how to apply their chosen teaching that was
influencing their DIT-2 decision. The application of the differing doctrines appeared to
based on personal values, some of which happen to be religious, to the given macromoral
story.
In addition, DIT-2 decisions appeared to inform a theological weighting of
differing LDS doctrines to justify the DIT-2 decision. This weighting of differing LDS
doctrines was unexpected because these students all came from the same theological
ideologies yet they focused on differing LDS doctrines to justify their decisions—a
contrast from the previous research which suggested that the same LDS doctrines were
confounding student responses (Richards, 1988). This weighting of differing LDS
doctrines was illustrated as the qualitative data showed that the most RO and least RO in
the BYU sample appeared to be weighing differing doctrinal teachings and philosophies
of life as justifications for their MMR decision. As a more concrete example, recall that
those who endorsed the doctor-assisted overdose mentioned the God-given right to
choose or agency 10 and the doctrine of mercy considerably more than those who did not
endorse a doctor-assisted overdose. Contrastingly, those who did not endorse the doctor
assisted overdose mentioned God’s dominion over life (i.e., God has not given the locus
of control in life/death matters to man) and that there is a divine purpose/benefit in
suffering (see Chapter IV, Figures 4-7). Thus, the DIT-2 story decision appeared to be
informing a theological weighting of differing LDS doctrinal teachings as justifications to
10 Agency is an LDS doctrine that involves the right to individual choice. Agency was coded as a locus of
control issue in this story as participants indicated that God gives man control to decide for himself.
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support their macromorality.
Interestingly, the most RO and least RO within the BYU sample showed complex
and logical MMR rationales stemming from their chosen premises’ of which doctrine or
philosophy they weighted as important. For example, if providing for one’s family was
macromorally valued more than respecting other’s property then a person logically chose
for Mustaq to steal during the famine. Thus, illustrative statements of “allowing one’s
family to die is far worse than stealing” contrasted with “I believe in respecting other’s
property” and were seen throughout the famine story qualitative data.
Thus, I conclude that RO persons have much more complex and logical MMR
schema rather than a simple deferring to societal norms. In addition, these complex
patterns of weighting differing philosophies and theological doctrines appear to be a
viable reason why RO persons generally have higher MN-stage 4 scores, that is they
subscribe to macromoral responsibilities over macromoral rights. This unexpected
finding and mislabeling of MN-stage 4 will be elaborated later on as discussion point #3.
As final applicable evidence that RO persons have a more complex MMR schema
than the DIT-2 suggests, I cite the finding from the DIF analysis that two of the five
meaningless items were moderately easier for the reference group to endorse rather than
for the RO group. Endorsing these meaningless items shows whether a person
understands and is reasoning through each item or if they are merely marking an item as
important because it sounds complex. I raise this finding from the DIF study as ancillary
evidence that the RO group was more carefully reasoning through each item than the
reference group. However, this finding may have been due to cognitive abilities and
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verbal abilities rather than MMR abilities. Nonetheless, it is related as it shows that RO
students were less likely to endorse an irrelevant-to-MMR-item as important to their
overall MMR. The lack of endorsement of meaningless items adds to my conclusion that
RO persons are not simple deferrers to external laws, rules, and societal roles in their
MMR schema but come to their MMR conclusions from their own logical and complex
MMR schemas—schemas which the DIT-2 framework is deficient in measuring.
RO and PC-stages 5-6 and N2 scores neutral correlation. The post conventional
(PC-stages 5-6) and overall DIT-2 MMR score (N2) clearly diverged from Richards’
findings. The lack of any practically significant correlation with RO scores and PC-stage
5-6 and N2 scores suggests that the makers of the DIT-2 may have corrected a scoring
issue that existed on the DIT-1 in their new version, the DIT-2. This lack of correlation
of RO and PC-stages 5-6 scores was unexpected because in past studies, PC-stages 5-6
scores were significantly lower for RO persons. These scores indicate that one’s MMR is
built upon sharable, impartial, reciprocal, and debatable principles of justice. The only
finding that came close to verifying these earlier findings was that LDS returned
missionaries, a more RO subgroup, had a small negative correlation with stage 5 scores.
However, when stage 5-6 scores were combined into one score (as the DIT-2 current
framework for scoring does) or when correlations were analyzed by RO alone, there were
no significant differences or correlations.
In summary of discussion point #1, RO did correlate strongly with PI-stages 2-3
scores. The reasons why these scores were lesser for the RO group can be explained very
well by the DIT-2 framework—RO persons do not focus on direct advantages to
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themselves in the MMR. This finding was verified in the qualitative responses showing
very little PI-stages 2-3 reasoning among RO persons.
RO was confounding MN-stage 4 scores. The reasons why these scores were
greater for the RO group cannot be explained empirically by the quantified variables that
this study measured (e.g., mother’s education level, returned missionary, political
orientations, etc). In addition, the qualitative responses do not support that DIT-2
framework’s answer for why a person would score higher on MN-stage 4 MMR. That is,
RO person’s qualitative responses do not show a simple deferring to laws, customs, nor
societal norms as reasons for their MMR but rather a weighting of macromoral
responsibilities over macromoral rights and differing LDS doctrines as reasons for their
MMR.
There were no practically significant differences in PC-stages 5-6 scores or N2
scores for the RO group when compared with the reference group. This lack of
difference between the RO and reference group on PC-stages 5-6 scores adds evidence
that the DIT-2 is consistently measuring this schema of MMR for RO persons and others.
Discussion Point #2-How Previous Theories
of RO and MMR Correlations Were
Supported or not Supported
Historically, RO groups have scored lower on PC-stages 5-6 levels of macromoral
reasoning measured by DIT-1 outcomes. As mentioned, this study found that the DIT-2
measures this level of MMR consistently. In addition, historically, RO groups score
higher on maintaining norms scores (MN-stage 4) of moral reasoning. This second
pattern was consistently strong in this study. In past research studies, three main theories
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have been proposed for why stages 4, 5, and 6 levels of DIT-2 items perform differently
for RO persons: the developmental theory, the preemptive theory, and the bias theory.
Developmental theory. This study’s findings are consistent with others in
rejecting the developmental theory for why RO persons do not score well on the higher
stages of moral reasoning (Kay 1998; Richards, 1988; Richards & Davis, 1992). Recall
that the developmental theory suggests that RO ideology blocks moral development so
that RO persons are developmentally less able to morally reason at higher levels. Rest
claimed that some religious ideologies block developmental reasoning by casting a sinful
eye towards the questioner and those who wish to scrutinize a code of morality (Rest et
al., 1999b). In addition, Rest claimed that if an adolescent was caught up into a religious
ideology with a strong MN-stage 4 development phase of life, that this ideology could
block moral development in later life (Rest et al.).
However, several studies found evidence against this theory (see Chapter II). For
example, Kay (1998) found evidence against this theory as well as Lawrence (1979) by
showing that RO persons could reason at higher levels of moral reasoning but chose not
to based upon religious reasoning. Emler also simulated a study in which he told
conservative persons to answer like a radical libertarian and found that persons could
morally reason in different schemas, but chose to adhere to a particular one (Emler,
Palmer-Cantion, & St. James, 1995; see also Emler, Resnick, & Malone, 1983).
Quantitative evidence in this study showed that RO persons did understand the complex
moral issues and, therefore, were not developmentally disabled in their MMR.
Rest further claimed that RO persons had high MN-stage 4 scores because they
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simply deferred to external laws to solve complex moral problems (Rest et al., 1999a).
However, pilot study data using Pargament’s Religious Problem Solving Scale
(Pargament et al., 1988) gave evidence that a simple deferring is not the case (see
Chapter III). In fact, returned missionaries had very high self-directing scores on this
scale. Pargament suggests that strong self-directing scores are typical of persons that
“emphasize the freedom God gives people to direct their own lives. This approach
appears to be an active coping orientation which stresses personal agency” (Pargament et
al., p. 91). This style is not anti-religious but compatible with a self-directing approach to
life espoused by RO persons. This finding correlates with prominent LDS writings which
assert that the existence of God and absolute truth does not lead one to defer their moral
reasoning, but rather leads to a belief in freedom with accountability. For example:
It was Dostoyevsky’s character Ivan Karamazov who believed that if God is dead,
then everything is allowed. Well, both the premise and the conclusion are
misleading. Neither God, nor law, tell you what you must do. That is a fiction.
They tell you what the inevitable consequences will be of what you do do.
(Madsen, 2000)
From the pilot study finding and the comments made in qualitative responses, RO
persons are very much into a self-directing style of problem solving rather than a
deferring one. This finding contrasts with what Rest and colleagues have claimed by
suggesting that RO persons defer their moral judgment based upon a maintaining norms
schema (Rest et al., 1999b) and is also evidence against the developmental “moral
blocking” theory. In essence, Pargament’s RPSS outcome scores, the lack of contrast in
PC-stages 5-6 scores, and qualitative comments reflected that RO persons were not postconventionally deficient or superior in this schema of MMR skills—some other factor

105
was accounting for differences in DIT-2 scores. In addition, qualitative data showed that
MN-stage 4 scores were not high due to a RO person’s deferring their MMR.
Preemptive theory. The second theory to explain the DIT-2 scoring patterns of
RO persons is the Preemptive Theory. This theory suggests that RO persons purposely
impede processing needed for stage 5-6 levels of principled moral reasoning because it is
seen as less morally adequate than stage 4 conventional moral reasoning. The theory
proposes that most of these preemptive strategies are employed due to a belief that
transcendent beings who have access to privileged truths about morality are the ultimate
source of what is moral and RO persons seek to endorse this ideology (Kay, 1998). The
way this theory currently exists was not supported in this study.
Previous support for the Preemptive Theory has been that religious persons refer
to their religious ideology to provide at least some of the reasons for why they chose what
they did on the DIT-2 story (Kay, 1998; Richards, 1988). However, the mere existence
of religious content in a story does not logically support that this is the reason for preemptive thinking. In fact, a larger finding of this study is that persons from the same
religious organization applied religious doctrines differently or weighted religious
doctrines differently to justify their DIT-2 endorsement patterns. For example, 46% of
doctrinal comments of persons who endorsed a doctor-assisted overdose focused on the
doctrine of agency (i.e., the ability of the person to make personal life and death choices).
Those who did not endorse a doctor-assisted overdose mentioned the doctrine of agency
in only 8% of their comments. Similar inverse patterns were seen by the relative
percentage of persons who focused on God’s dominion over life. Both those that did and
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did not support a doctor-assisted overdose showed familiarity with these two doctrines
(agency and God’s dominion), but in their replies it was the application of the doctrine
that appeared to be contributing to their different responses. In so many words, different
religious teachings were emphasized according to the DIT-2 decisions made.
These findings led me to conjecture that if one is going to accept that pre-emptive
thinking stifles stage 5-6 moral reasoning then they must also accept that pre-emptive
thinking will stifle stage 4 moral reasoning. The theory has never been explained in this
multidimensional fashion. For example, RO persons who chose to focus on differing
doctrines may also pre-empt their thinking based on the application of religious doctrines
that stifle various levels of MMR schemas. In the past, it has only been proposed that the
preemptive theory stifles higher moral reasoning (stages 5-6). Perhaps it is even the case
that non-RO persons preempt stage 4 thinking based on their philosophies of life. In
essence, the mere existence of religious content in an item is not evidence to support the
existing Preemptive Theory and thus the way this current theory exists, was rejected.
Bias theory. The final major theory for why RO persons score lower on the DIT2 test is the bias theory. In the previous two theories, the explanation of the scoring
trends for RO persons is explained as part of the individual’s internal personalogical
variables. Contrastingly, the bias theory focuses on the content of the item. The overall
crux of Bias Theory is that the DIT-2 scores are actually being confounded by other
constructs rather than macromoral judgment that stem from the item content (Kay 1998;
Richards, 1988). This theory was weakly supported in this study, but not in the
traditional ways that previous studies have supported it.
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Traditionally, the confounding construct has been traced to the existence of
theological content 11 (Richards, 1988). However, this study concludes that the mere
existence of religious content in the items is not sufficient evidence to support a theory as
strong as Bias Theory. After all, non-RO persons may also claim there is religious
content in the stories. Also, RO persons who scored high and low on DIT-2 upper levels
of moral reasoning both mentioned that religious doctrines influenced their decisions but
not in the ways that Richards proposed. For example, Richards proposed that his RO
persons sample scored higher on the maintaining norms stages due to the LDS doctrinal
ideology of “honoring, obeying, and sustaining the law”—LDS Article of Faith #12
(Richards, 1988). While this tendency was sometimes mentioned as a theological reason,
it was extremely infrequent. In fact, for participants who made a decision on DIT-2
stories, none of them mentioned the law as influencing their decision in more than 8% of
the relative comments. For most of the stories, obeying, honoring, and sustaining the law
was mentioned in less than 2% of the comments.
Bias Theory has also been supported in the past by showing statistically
significant amounts of DIF levels. However, past studies have ignored practical
significance as evidenced by the DIF contrast statistic. This study found statistically
significant DIF for 30 of the 65 items. However, in this study, the DIF contrast
guidelines showed only two items were worth noting as large to heavy in practical
significance. In addition, the direction of the DIF (+ or -) was not uniform across items

11 Recall from Appendix G that theological content for MMR include doctrinal statements that are clearly
scriptural in nature (e.g., Thou shalt not steal, Agency is a Divine gift, Repentance) while philosophical
content for MMR includes all other statements that refer to a person’s moral code (e.g., two wrongs don’t
make a right, the ends don’t justify the means, anarchy is not an acceptable way to protest).
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and thus was not favoring or disfavoring any particular group (i.e., 13 were easier to
endorse for BYU students compared to 17 for UA students). Wright and Douglas (1976)
claim that when DIF is not consistently in one direction, when most DIF items are below
+/- 0.50, and when the test has more than 20 items, the impact of DIF on person
measurement is generally small. The lack of practical significance, lack of favoring a
particular group, and the fact that the DIT-2 has a large number of items on this test, does
not strongly support DIF item bias.
The final way in which bias theory was not supported comes from the .84 person
reliability statistic (similar to Cronbach’s alpha). In essence, if the persons are responding
to similar types of items in a consistent manner, then there is some evidence that the
items are not misperforming in a systematic manner. However, reliability is different
from validity, so a reliable score does not mean that the trait being consistently measured
is indeed macromoral reasoning.
Discussion Point #3—The Insufficiency of the DIT-2
MN-Stage 4 Schema for RO Persons: A Possible
Masking of the RO and MN-Stage 4 Relationship
So if the reason that RO persons score systematically higher on MN-stage 4
scores is not due to developmental deficiencies, preemptive thinking, nor item-bias, then
the question remains—is the DIT-2 MN-stage 4 framework’s explanation valid? Recall
that the DIT-2 framework indicated that persons with higher MN-stage 4 scores defer to
laws, customs, rules, and formal structures of society to define their MMR. In reviewing
the findings of this study, as well as additional literature, I have found three aspects of the
relationship between MMR and RO that do not support the DIT-2 MN-stage 4 schema’ s

109
framework and may be masking the relationship between RO and DIT-2 MN-stage 4
scores.
The three aspects I mention are, first, this study supports Turiel and Walker’s
findings that religion and macromorality are overlapping domains, even within the DIT-2
items. Thus, applicable religious thought on some of the DIT-2 stories is appropriate and
macromorality is masked by religious orthodoxy because the domains overlap.
Second, RO persons have an internal schema that involves ownership of thought
and values, some of which may align with existing laws and social structures. However,
the mere alignment of values with existing structures does not necessarily mean that RO
persons are deferring to external religious rules to justify MMR. Thus, the RO and DIT-2
score relationship may be masked due to personal reflective values that happen to align
with existing social structures.
Third, there is a much more complex overlapping of religion and macromoral
judgment on the DIT-2 items than has been suggested. The overlapping appears to be
influenced by a preference of macromoral shared responsibilities over macromoral
individual rights and a preference of religious doctrines used to justify a person
macromoral decisions. Overall these three points do not support the DIT-2 MN-stage 4
framework but show a possible masking of the relationship between RO and MN-stage 4
scores.
Religion and macromoral reasoning are overlapping domains. As discussed in
chapter 2, Turiel (1978) suggested that religion and macromoral judgment domains
overlap while Kohlberg and Rest claim they are separate domains on the DIT-2 (see

110
Figure 8). Walker’s findings (Walker & Pitts, 1998; Walker et al., 1995) supported
Turiel’s claims. This study supports Turiel and Walker’s claims for DIT-2 MN stage-4
levels of MMR and thus does not support the DIT-2 assumption that religion and MMR
are separate domains. Thus, if the domains overlap on DIT-2 items, then RO persons may
not be deferring to a religious domain for their MMR reason.
The most overt evidence of overlapping domains in this study was the existence
of correlations between MN-stage 4 scores and RO scores. These correlations remained
intact when partial correlation analyses’ removed potential quantified confounds. Thus,
there is an association between RO and MMR scores. However, qualitative data showed
that the relationship between RO and MMR scores may be masked by other unquantified
variables discovered in this study.
Second, the support of overlapping domains pertains to the application of the LDS
doctrine of agency on the DIT-2 stories, a prominent concept mentioned in the RO
student’s qualitative responses. In the LDS literature, the power to choose is one of four
concepts to explain the doctrine of agency and choice is seen as method to act morally
(Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001, p. 4; Oaks, 1992, 2001; Packer, 1995,
Turiel & Walker claims

Religion

Macro‐
moral
Judgment

Rest’s claim

Religion

Macro‐
moral
Judgment

Figure 8. This study supported Turiel and Walker’s claims of overlapping domains
within the DIT-2 stories and items.

111
2000). Agency pertains to the content of all the DIT-2 stories because they all ask one to
choose the most moral course of action. Because some macromoral choices support or
hinder one’s spiritual aspirations, the alignment or misalignment to a religiously orthodox
person’s own values leads to choices being viewed as moral or immoral. However, these
aspirations come from ownership and reflective values, not deferrals to religious ideology
or laws (shown by the lack of comments that simply defer to law as reasons for DIT-2
decisions). Moral choices are usually based upon what a person values (religious or
nonreligious). Alignment with existing social structures or even with religious laws is not
sufficient evidence to conclude a deferring to existing social structures.
Further, interviews and qualitative data reflected the concept that choice was used
as a method that supported one’s personal macromoral values. Consequently, the very
nature of the DIT-2 (i.e., make a moral choice or, in RO terms, use one’s agency)
overlaps with the domain of religion because choice is a method one uses to be moral and
a method one uses to be religious (Oaks, 1992, 2001).
A third point that supports overlapping domains pertains to the DIT-2 items
themselves. Recall that Rest (1999) claimed that the items measure MMR, not
transcendent truths from divine being. However, the content of some of the items violate
his claim. As a specific example of a DIT-2 item that has religious content in it, one of
the items asks if only God should decide if a person should live or die? This item clearly
is a crossing of domains. In other words, if Rest claims that religion and macromorality
are separate domains, then he ought not to cross those domains in his items by attempting
to predict religious orthodoxy by mentioning a Transcendent Being (i.e., God).
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A fourth point stems from the finding of general patterns—those who advocated
euthanizing a suffering cancer patient also tended to give low endorsements to MN-stage
4 items. Conversely, those who did not advocate euthanizing a suffering cancer patient
tended to give high endorsements to MN-stage 4 items. The DIT-2 story advocacy and
item endorsement patterns were consistent across all stories (e.g., those who advocated
stealing in a famine, reporting a story, etc., had lower stage 4 item scores than those who
did not advocate these actions). These patterns suggest that the actual content of the story
and initial story decision, not the DIT-2 items (which the test purports to derive its scores
from), may overlap with RO person’s MMR schema.
Ownership of thought versus deferral of thought. Much of Kohlberg and Rest’s
argument that religion and macromorality are separate domains relies on the assumption
that religious persons defer their MMR to the domain of religion rather than use their
own reflective thought. However, the existence of religious values that are used to make a
moral choice is not necessarily deferring to an external custom, but rather is most likely
an internal alignment with religious goals and values that one espouses. John Richard
Neuhaus, a prominent Catholic priest and opinion leader for many RO persons,
articulated this concept quite well:
In a democracy that is free and robust, an opinion is no more disqualified for
being “religious” than for being atheistic, or psychoanalytic, or Marxist, or just
plain dumb. There is no legal or constitutional question about the admission of
religion to the public square; there is only a question about the free and equal
participation of citizens in our public business. Religion is not a reified “thing”
that threatens to intrude upon our common life. Religion in public is but the
public opinion of those citizens who are religious. (Neuhaus, 1992, p. 13; see also
Neuhaus, 1997)
The decisions made on the DIT-2 by the majority of BYU students suggested
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similar thinking patterns (i.e., I can apply my personal religious views as I decide why a
macromoral decision is right/wrong and that they are just as valid as any other reason
because they are my own reflective views). The qualitative data as well as informal
discussions with the RO sample (after data was collected), both showed that respondents
clearly take ownership for their macromoral views and even find it offensive when
persons claim they are deferring, stifling, preempting, or nonreflective in their thinking.
They do not point to a steeple or the sky for their macromoral choices but would point
inward for their macromoral reasoning reflecting ownership of thought. Furthermore,
many RO persons consider it not only their right, but also their responsibility as citizens,
to use their values to influence macromoral political issues (Nelson, 2007; Public Issues,
2008).
Perhaps the reason that many in this sample take such deep ownership in their
macromoral thinking because they have been encouraged by their church leaders to not
follow them blindly (Lee, 1964, as cited in Lee, 1974), but to undergo serious reflective
inquiry about any teaching that claims to have come from God. Most of this argument (or
reasoning) can be summarized by referring to the Church’s General Handbook of
Instructions, a guide for church leaders:
An act is moral only if it expresses the character and disposition of the person,
that is, if it arises out of knowledge, faith, love, or religious intent. Fear and force
have no place in the kingdom because they do not produce moral actions, and are
contrary to God’s gift of free agency. (The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, 1963, p. ii)
This “figure-it-out-for-yourself” and “use-your-agency” philosophy leads to
ownership of thought on macromoral issues for RO persons (and I would add secularly
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orthodox persons too). This ownership of thought concept could explain why a subgroup
of extremely RO persons (LDS returned missionaries) score high on self-directing scores
in Pargament’s RPSS scales, yet score high on RO and MN-stage 4 DIT-2 scores.
In essence, a religiously orthodox person reasons with their personal values—
some of which happen to be religious—rather than defers to their religious values on
macromoral decisions. Similarly, many secular persons reason with their personal values
on a macromoral decision. Thus, if personal values about societal cooperation are a part
of a person’s religion, a pretty safe assumption, then religion may be seen as overlapping
with macromoral choices—it may be merely the existence of a personal value or
preference (which happens to be religious) that is used to facilitate a macromoral choice
on the DIT-2. This discussion of values leads to my third and final point that supports
overlapping domains of macromorality and religion and masking of the relationship
between RO and MN-stage 4 scores.
Associations of macromoral individual rights, macromoral shared
responsibilities, and doctrinal justifications mask the DIT-2 MN-stage 4 scores. A third
way that does not support the MN-stage 4 framework, and also add evidence of masking
variables, comes from an overlapping of several variables noticed by patterns in the
qualitative data. Specifically, an additional argument of overlapping domains was
supported was by a finding that the DIT-2 story decisions were related to differing
applications of LDS doctrines used to justify why one’s decision was the most moral
choice (i.e., if you decided it was moral to euthanize a suffering patient, you were more
likely to mention agency rather than God’s dominion over life). Thus, it appeared that
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students who endorsed a doctor-assisted overdose valued the doctrine of agency, in this
situation, more than the doctrine of God’s dominion over life. However, this assumption
of placing differing values on doctrines was not fully verified in this study—that is, this
study only asked which doctrine influenced their decision, not which doctrine they valued
more than another. However, as was shown in Figure 4, 46% of those who endorsed a
doctor assisted overdose focused on the right to avoid suffering via the doctrine of mercy.
Contrastingly, only 8% of those who did not endorse a doctor-assisted overdose
mentioned this concept as influencing their macromoral decision. The differing
application of LDS doctrines used to support DIT-2 story decisions was evidenced in
Chapter IV, Figures 4-7, by the relative percentage of type of comments based on the
DIT-2 story decision.
Further, when all the qualitative comments were sorted by DIT-2 choice, a larger
theme of macromoral individual rights versus macromoral shared responsibilities were
associated with which doctrinal teachings BYU students used to justify their DIT-2
decisions. For example, in the famine story, stealing from a rich man was justified by an
individual’s right to avoid starving. In contrast, those who said Mustaq should not steal
from the rich man mentioned a reciprocal principle of owning and allowing others to own
property much more than those who chose to steal the food (e.g., “The person who is rich
still has a right to his property regardless of what his intentions are”). Another concrete
example exemplifies that many students expressed that the suffering cancer patient’s
individual rights existed separate from other stakeholders affected by her decision: “She
should have the right to decide how she wants to live her life—she has free agency and
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should be able to exercise that right according to the dictates of her own conscious.”
Notice the focus on the individual rights, independence, and individualism rather than on
her collectivistic relationships with loved ones—relationships which could make her
macromorally responsible to others.
These juxtaposing moral issues of macromoral individual rights versus
macromoral shared responsibilities pervaded all the DIT-2 qualitative data. These
juxtaposing moral issues were also associated with which LDS doctrine was used to
justify the macromorality of the choice. However, the qualitative data were inconclusive
on whether one preference caused the other (i.e., whether the preference of a particular
LDS doctrine caused the preference of individual rights over shared responsibilities or
vice versa). In addition, the data was inconclusive on whether the actual doctrines were
weighted as being more valued than another is, whether they were viewed in isolation, or
whether they were even fully understood. Still, the collective data were conclusive that
there was an association between LDS doctrines used to justify the DIT-2 choice and a
preference of individual rights versus shared responsibilities.
This larger factor of choosing to focus on macromoral shared responsibilities over
macromoral individual rights also separated the most and the least RO in this study (i.e.,
the more RO, the more likely to focus on shared responsibilities). This finding, coupled
with the evidence that LDS doctrines were used to justify differing macromoral
decisions, supports Turiel and Walker’s claims of an overlapping domains of religion and
macromorality but also adds to the complexity of how religiously orthodox persons
macromorally reason (see Figure 9).
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Delimitations
The first delimitation of this study may have been due to differing verbal abilities
of students. Some students may not have been able to clearly articulate in writing their
reasons for the choices they made on the DIT-2 stories. This lack of expressive ability of
some students has been seen as one of the strengths of the DIT-2 when it is viewed as
aggregate data. The DIT-2 claims it reduces the error of this articulation confound by
creating a selected response items rather than relying on students differing abilities to

Preference of
religious doctrine
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macromoral choice.

Religious Values

Macromoral
Judgment

Preference of
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individual rights
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Figure 9. Religion and macromoral judgment domains may overlap in complex ways on
the DIT-2 items. The qualitative data supported Turiel and Walker’s findings of an
overlapping of religion and macromoral judgment domains but in a more complex
manner than a simple overlapping with religion.
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articulate their moral schemas as in Kohlberg’s MJI (Rest, 1999). While this may be true
when the DIT-2 scores are viewed as aggregate data, it may not be true for individual
data. However, the qualitative data was based on the assumption that BYU students were
able to accurately articulate in writing the reasons for their MMR choices.
A second delimitation of this study was that the reference group was made up of
persons from University of Alabama, a group whose mean scores of RO are comparable
to BYU in religiosity. However, as noted earlier, the students from Alabama vary much
more in measures of RO (BYU standard deviation on Brown and Lowe’s Religious
Inventory of Belief was 3.97, UA was 10.63). Although an estimated national norm was
used to filter those who adhere to a national level of religious orthodoxy, a more
religiously neutral reference group (other than the University of Alabama students) could
have strengthened this study’s findings.
A final delimitation pertains to the qualitative data. These data were based upon
written comments, which were assumed to be honest and accurate. It was assumed that all
relevant data expressed what student’s perceived as relevant issues that influenced their
MMR was freely available to the person’s consciousness. However, many reasons for a
person’s morality may be in underlying sub consciousness that may have been untapped
due to some psychological block that did not allow the students in this sample to explain
their macromoral reasoning. Although the presence of a subconsciousness confounding
variable sounds beyond the scope of measurement, we may not always tap into every
readily available resource that makes up our macromorality. Nevertheless, I assumed that
the sub conscious was not confounding scores or comments. In addition, because much
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of the data were aggregate data, I assumed these factors varied at random and thus did not
favor any particular group.
Suggestions for Further Research
There are four suggestions for further research that stemmed from the major and
ancillary findings of this study. The order of these suggestions for further research is
hierarchal, each one building upon each other and ruling out additional potential religious
confounds to macromoral reasoning (see Figure 10).
It is anticipated that each of these studies will add insight to build a more
appropriate framework for macromoral reasoning that captures the complex reasoning of
religiously orthodox as well as secularly orthodox persons. In these suggestions for

MMR
Suggestion 4MMR by analogies
devoid of confounds.
Suggestion 3-After confounds are
removed, does DIT-2 decision inform
theology or theology inform DIT-2
decision?
Suggestion 2-After Study new possible confounds
conjectured from this study.

Suggestion 1- Replication study with more diverse RO and reference
groups to verify this study’s findings.

Figure 10. Hierarchal order of further research. The four suggestions for further research
should build on each other’s findings to build a better framework for macromoral
reasoning (MMR).
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further research references are provided as helpful starting points for a review of
literature. However, none of the suggestions for further research have been conducted.
The first suggestion for further research involves a replication study. Recall that
this study ruled out several potential confounds that could affect MMR of a religiously
orthodox person. A replication study could discover how generalizable the findings of
this study are with other religiously orthodox groups. In addition, this study could seek to
replicate these analyses’ with a more diverse reference group than those from UA as well
as a different religiously orthodox group than the LDS students at BYU. Thus, the
potential confounds that this study concluded were not affecting MMR could be
verifiably said to not affect other religiously orthodox groups as well.
The second suggestion pertains to other potential confounds that were ancillary
findings of this study. For example, in reviewing the qualitative data, several themes that
did not pertain to my research questions emerged. There were findings in this study and
anecdotal evidence in religiously orthodox literature that the following five factors may
influence DIT-2 story choices: (a) an understanding, interpretation, and application of the
doctrine of agency to macromoral issues (Lee, 1950; Oaks, 1992, 2001; Packer, 1971,
1995, 2000; Petersen 1972; Romney, 1942), (b) a schism between modernism and
postmodern ontological views of truth (Greer, 2003; Hare & McLaughlin, 1998; Madsen,
2000; Mertens, 2005), (c) a preference of macromoral individual rights versus shared
responsibilities (Christofferson, 2005; Hindeman, 1997; Kimball, Tanner, & Romney,
1980; Tabor & Adask, 2008), (d) RO persons concepts of a just society (Lloyd, 2008;
Tabor & Adask), and (e) God versus man’s locus of control on DIT-2 MMR issues
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(Gabbard, Howard, & Tageson, 1986; Gorsuch, 1983; Hill & Hood, 1999; Ritzema &
Young, 1983). These five aspects surfaced in reviewing responses among the most and
least RO persons in this study. Confirmatory studies could seek to validate the five
elements as reasons for a systematic test bias. Specifically, studies could correlate the
doctrinal influence of one’s understanding of agency, one’s ontological views of
modernism and postmodernism, one’s views on macromoral rights being inherently
attached to macromoral responsibilities, one’s concepts of a just society, and a God
versus man’s locus of control, all with DIT-2 endorsement patterns. Multiple regression
studies could view the interrelationship of these proposed variables to further confirm the
existence of these potential confounds to MMR for a religiously orthodox person.
After these potential external confounds were verified or ruled out as confounds
to religiously orthodox person’s MMR, they could be controlled for so a further causal
study could be performed. This second study could lead to a third suggestion for further
study which also stems from the qualitative and quantitative data, which showed two
distinct groups within the BYU sample, a majority and minority group. By studying and
contrasting majority and minority patterns of RO person’s responses on the DIT-2 along
with qualitative responses that corresponded with these groups, some key findings
emerged. For example, the relative amount of which doctrinal teaching was emphasized
between these two groups from the same religion on the same moral dilemma was
interesting (see Chapter IV, Figures 4-7). These key findings raised the question, did
theology inform the DIT-2 macromoral decision or did the DIT-2 decision inform
theology? Further, did a person’s preference of macromoral individual rights over shared
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responsibilities cause the focus on the divine gift of agency or did their interpretation of
the divine gift of agency cause them to focus on a rights-based macromoral schema?
This study was not designed to fully answer these questions, although preliminary
findings showed an association between these variables.
Once internal relationships between DIT-2 macromoral decisions and theology
are understood, a fourth study could seek to control for all theological and religiously
orthodox content from the DIT-2 items. This suggestion was conjectured due to the
findings from the fourth DIT-2 story—the school board story. Perhaps the variance in
these responses is due to the lack of religious content in the story (i.e., God’s word does
not speak much on the morality of holding unruly public school board meetings). RO
persons responded in a more diverse way with this story than they did with the others as
shown in the balanced proportion of respondents to each extreme (102 comments “should
call off the next open meeting” and 114 comments “should not call of the next open
meeting”). If relationships between how RO and DIT-2 scores were fully understood, an
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) may be a method to control for the RO variable.
The finding of a more spread out response pattern along with the lack of religious
commentary suggests that the school board story performs quite well for the most and
least religiously orthodox persons in this sample. It led me to question, if the same issues
in the other DIT-2 stories were presented to religiously orthodox persons in an unfamiliar
context, devoid of any external and internal confounds to a religiously orthodox person’s
MMR (studies 1-3), would the religiously orthodox and secularly orthodox respond in
similar ways? Besides seeking to control via ANCOVA, another way the question of
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whether religious content influences DIT-2 scores could be researched is to present
similar moral dilemmas via analogies—“the repetition of the same fundamental pattern in
two different contexts” (Emmet, 1945, p. 6). These analogies could be pilot tested with
RO persons to see if they have religious content in them. This analogical method is
common in moral discourse (Post & Leisey, 1995).
A study of the analogical moral reasoning of RO persons could also focus on an
alterability of macromoral rules. Alterability refers to whether or not there are rules that
are fixed or if those rules could or should be altered (Rest et al., 1999b). While very few
RO persons will contradict the scriptures and church teachings, some may show more
alterability when the stories are devoid of religious content via analogy (see Glausiusz,
2007; Hauser, 2007; Thomson, 1986 for a good starting point for such a study).
These four suggestions for further research would build upon this study’s
findings. In addition, they would add to building a more robust framework for measuring
religiously orthodox person’s macromoral reasoning and thus strengthen the field.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to determine whether there were items in the DIT-2
that perform differently for a group of religiously orthodox college students than for other
American college students. Using new differential item functioning methods,
correlational statistical analysis, the DIT-2 test, and examining unexplored demographic
variables, this study shed light on the appropriateness of using the DIT-2 as a measure of
moral judgment for religiously orthodox persons. This study is important to the field of
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instructional technology because many instructional models for character education and
moral education use the DIT-2 to measure the differences between treatment and control
groups based upon an instructional treatment (Rest et al., 1999b). In addition, studying
the construct validity of the test is important because of the way it and its derivative tests
have been and are being proposed to be used (see Chapter II).
A benefit of this study is that it illuminated how a new generation of students at
BYU responds to moral judgment measures (some of these students could even be the
children of the previous study performed by Richards 20 years ago). This study differed
from previous studies by involving a demographic and qualitative questionnaire along
with the DIT-2 and quantitative methods of analysis. The rich amount of data allowed
me to examine patterns of responses within the BYU sample that illustrated how the DIT2 performs differently for different subgroups of students—something the previous DIT
studies have not explored. In addition, the qualitative data helped to explain what life
experiences, doctrinal teachings, philosophies, or other relevant issues contributed to the
decisions made on the DIT-2 scenarios and items. Examining these data yielded
information that will aid moral judgment researchers’ understanding of elements that
contribute to a religiously orthodox person’s macromoral reasoning schema and are a step
in understanding the macromoral reasoning of religiously orthodox persons.
Findings from this study indicate that items in this and previous studies exhibit
differential item functioning in statistically significant but not practically significant ways
when a religiously orthodox sample is compared with a norm-reference sample.
However, quantitative data and open-ended survey responses showed general patterns
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that religiously orthodox persons have a much more complex schema of macromoral
reasoning than the DIT-2 schemas assert. For example, Rest and colleague’s (1999b)
assertion that religiously orthodox persons score higher on MN-stage 4 scores due to
deferring to religious ideology does not explain why returned missionaries score very
high on the self-directing items of Pargament’s Religious Problem Solving Style and
lower on the deferring items. In contrast, these scores suggest a belief in personal agency
to direct one’s life and suggest a high internal locus of control. The qualitative comments
in this study also suggest that something other than deferring to religious laws appeared
to be creating the MN-stage 4 differences. As explained earlier, an alternative to Rest
and colleague’s explanation of MN-stage 4 scores is that the MN-stage 4 items actually
measure a philosophical difference based on a weighting of macromoral responsibilities
and macromoral rights and RO persons gravitate towards valuing macromoral
responsibilities as more important to their macromorality.
In addition, suggestions for further study invite the further validation of these
findings to determine the magnitude that several facets of religiously orthodox ideology
and philosophy contribute to DIT-2 scores. A further invitation that this study begs for an
explanation is to study the proposed reasons of why religiously orthodox persons score
higher on the DIT-2 maintaining norms (stage 4) scores. One of the challenges that the
Neo-Kohlbergians must deal with are this study’s finding of a far too simplistic defining
of religious reasoning as deferring to societal norms. How the macromoral reasoning of a
religiously orthodox person fits into their framework based on the findings of this study
suggest that religiously orthodox person’s MMR schema is far more complex than Rest
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suggests.
An important concluding point of this study is to indicate that the findings do not
debunk the DIT-2 test for religiously orthodox persons but embark on the beginning of a
conversation. This conversation begins with a defining philosophical question of what
the relationship is between a religious person’s view of MMR and the method of how and
why they use religious doctrines to justify their MMR on macromoral issues within the
DIT-2 test. The further this conversation continues the more it will lend itself to the
measurement of this relationship. The conversation naturally will expand beyond the
circle of RO persons to study the generalizability of the measured relationship and
whether it exists for all persons. The discussion should continue to the point where one
can conclude whether the items of the DIT-2 tap into the measurement of this conjectured
relationship between the degree of one’s RO views and their MMR. Finally, the exchange
of ideas in the field of macromorality that results from this dialogue may develop a
stronger framework for MMR and hence a stronger test of the construct.
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The History of the DIT
The Defining Issues Test (DIT) has been used as a measure for moral reasoning for nearly 30
years. It was designed based upon Lawrence Kohlberg’s stages of moral development
framework. Briefly, Kohlberg’s theory of moral development included three levels and six
hierarchal stages of moral reasoning. His stages are described as:
Level One: Preconventional
7. The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action
determine its goodness or badness…
8. The instrumental-relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which
instrumentally satisfies one’s own needs and occasionally the needs of others…
Level Two: Conventional
9. The interpersonal concordance or “good boy-nice girl” orientation. Good behavior is
that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them…
10. The “law and order” orientation. Right behavior consists of doing one’s duty,
showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own
sake…
Level Three: Postconventional
11. The social-contract legalistic orientation. Right actions tend to be defined in terms of
individual rights and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon
by society…
12. The universal-ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of
conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical
comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency… (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 631-632).
For Kohlberg, the process of determining a person’s moral reasoning stage was derived by
lengthy interviews where the subjects discussed hypothetical vignettes in a role-playing type of
interview called the Moral Justice Interview (MJI). Responses were then coded and classified
using the six stages on the MJI based on Kohlberg’s 1958 dissertation (Kohlberg, 1958).
In response to critics over the years, Kohlberg progressively narrowed his theory and framework
for scoring from “the study of morality to the study of moral development, to restricting it to the
study of moral judgment (and its correspondence with action), to restricting it to the form or
cognitive-structural stage of moral judgment as embodied in judgments of justice” (Rest 1999 p.
9). Kohlberg eventually came to view the stages of moral reasoning analogously to cognitive
development in that he proposed that a person of lower moral development would not have the
necessary skills to function at a higher stage of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1984). Due to his
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pioneering work on the measurement of moral reasoning and its wide use, Kohlberg has been
classified in the “top 20” of the most eminent psychologists of the 20th century (Haggbloom et al,
2002).
The move towards cognitive moral reasoning has led Kohlberg’s followers to develop a NeoKohlbergian framework that posits that there are moral reasoning schemas (as opposed to stages
of development) that are tapped into by presenting the hypothetical ethical scenarios (Rest,
Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). In addition, his followers focus on macromorality (societal
justice concepts such as fairness for all concerned and human rights) over micromorality (the
interpersonal aspects of relationships such as loyalty in relationships; Rest, 1999).
As the framework for moral reasoning shifted from developmental stages to moral schemas, the
measure of moral reasoning also changed in significant ways which were motivated due to some
limitations of Kohlberg’s MJI such as: (a) the 800 + page scoring guide for scoring interviewees,
(b) concerns over confounding variables due to production tasks (articulating verbally one’s
moral judgments), (c) variability of scorer interpretations, and (d) lack of convenience for
administration.
In answer to these concerns, James Rest and colleagues developed the Defining Issues Test
(DIT; Rest et al., 1999b). Similar to Kohlberg’s MJI, the DIT is a test of moral reasoning based
upon hypothetical moral vignettes. However, in the DIT, each vignette is followed by twelve
“item category” items rather than open-ended responses and is scored electronically, thus
removing some of the previously mentioned concerns. Thus, the main difference from the MJI
and the DIT was that the MJI used a production procedure (meaning that the respondent was
required to produce the answers), while the DIT uses a recognition procedure (meaning that the
respondent sees and chooses an appropriate measure; Elm & Weber, 1994; Shank, 2005).
During the initial 25 years of research with the first DIT (the DIT-1) Kohlberg’s theory and
framework were adapted to a Neo-Kohlbergian framework. Neo-Kohlbergians attribute
Kohlberg’s theories as a starting point that emphasized a person’s internal cognitive social
construction of a cooperative social system based upon moral judgment (Rest et al., 1999b).
Neo-Kohlbergians are more explicit in pointing out that moral judgment is only one component
of moral development and that their theories refer to macromorality issues (societal justice
concepts such as fairness for all concerned and human rights) rather than micromorality (the
interpersonal aspects of relationships such as loyalty in relationships). In addition, they reject the
notion of hard, clearly defined stages that each have specific justice operations—
operationalization of specific justice operations that define specific stages (Kohlberg, 1969)—
and view the stages more broadly (or loosely) than did Kohlberg—they are seen analogously like
epochs in history such as the stone age, the bronze age, the industrialization age, etc. This
modified position has led to an adoption of moral schemas in which as higher moral schemas
gain use, the lower ones diminish in use. However, in this shift from stages to schemas,
Kohlberg’s stages are not entirely abandoned. To help with the transition from stages to
schematic language, Bebeau and Thoma (2003) provided the following official CSED
clarification:
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Personal Interest Schema Score represents the proportion of items selected that appeal
to Stage 2 and Stage 3 considerations (due to the lack of stage 1 responses for persons
that the DIT is recommended for, the first stages were collapsed into one category). Stage
2 considerations focus on the direct advantages to the actor and on the fairness of simple
exchanges of favor for favor. Stage 3 considerations focus on the good or evil intentions
of the parties, on the party’s concern for maintaining friendships and good relationships,
and maintaining approval.
Maintaining Norms Schema Score represents the proportion of items selected that
appeal to Stage 4 considerations. Stage 4 considerations focus on maintaining the existing
legal system, maintaining existing roles and formal organizations structure.
Postconventional Schema Score represents the proportion of items selected that appeal
to Stage 5 and 6 considerations…[These stages] focus on organizing a society by
appealing to consensus-producing procedures (such as abiding by majority vote),
insisting on due process (giving everyone his day in court), and safeguarding minimal
basic rights, …organizing social arrangements and relationships in terms of intuitively
appealing ideals. (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003, p. 18-19)
In this shift from stages to schemas, Kohlberg’s stages are not entirely abandoned, and the
schema’s are still listed hierarchally as far as their adequacy of moral judgment. The final
difference in the Neo-Kohlbergian and the Kohlbergian approach is methodological in that the
Neo-Kohlbergians use a recognition task (the DIT dilemmas and Likert-scored questionnaire) as
compared with the previous verbal production task (the MJI).
The validity of the DIT scores is based upon several validity criteria (Rest, 1997). Rest,
Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma (1999) cite over 400 published articles and include the following
criteria to establish validity of the DIT scores:
1. Differentiation of various age/education groups—studies show that 30-50% of the
variance of DIT scores correlate to level of education.
2. Upward movement of scores in a 10 year longitudinal study. Effect sizes of .80 were
reported for freshmen to senior college students.
3. Correlations with moral comprehension—the DIT scores are significantly related to
cognitive capacity measures of moral comprehension (r .60’s), the ability to recall and
reconstruct postconventional arguments and fill in the missing gaps of the arguments
based upon one’s moral schemas, the MJI scores (r .70 to .80), and other cognitive
developmental measures.
4. Differentiation of experts in moral judgment (PhD’s in moral philosophy and political
science) from non-experts.
5. Sensitivity to moral educational interventions—effect sizes from over 50 intervention
studies were: .41 (moderate gains) compared to .09 for control groups (little gain).
6. Predictability to positions on controversial public policy issues—typical correlations in
this realm range from .40 to .65 (Narvaez, Getz, Rest, & Thoma, 1999).
7. The DIT is significantly linked to many pro-social behaviors and desired professional
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decision making—37 out of 47 correlations in these realms were statistically significant.
8. Predictability to various measures of “moral behavior” (Rest, 1999, pp. 46, 59-97;
Bebeau & Thoma, 2003).
In addition to the validity evidence for DIT scores, Cronbach’s reliability coefficients range from
the upper .70s to the lower .80s. Test-retest reliability is about the same. The DIT-2 scores show
similar correlations, but with fewer items and higher levels of reliability coefficients than the
DIT-1 scores. The correlation of DIT-1 scores with DIT-2 scores is .79, nearly the same as the
test-retest reliability of the DIT-1 scores with itself (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003). In addition, Rest
claims that the DIT-2 uses less culturally sensitive language (Rest, 1999).
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Three Pilot Studies and Qualitative Interview Notes
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Three Pilot Studies
I completed three unpublished pilot studies in 2007 with a 30-person sample, a qualitative
sample of 9 BYU students, and 135 BYU student sample. The first study looked at the
correlations between styles of religious problem solving and DIT-2 scores among BYU students.
The second study was a think-aloud interview as students took the DIT-2. The third study looked
at religious orthodoxy measures of current BYU students.
Pilot Study #1
In the first study I used Pargament’s Religious Problem Solving Scale (RPSS; Pargament et al.,
1988), which measures “several religiosity-based problem-solving styles or orientations”
(Pargament et al., 1988, 1999, p. 347). This connection to problem solving seemed like a
plausible explanation that a person’s styles of using religion to problem-solve would predict
DIT-2 scores. After all, the DIT-2 poses moral dilemmas and asks a person to problem-solve
using their moral judgment.
The RPSS scale measures how a person uses their religion to problem-solve and cope with life
by viewing two key elements underlying an individual’s relationship with God: (a) the locus of
responsibility for the problem-solving responsibility, and (b) the level of activity in the problemsolving process (Pargament et al., 1988). This test returns three scores: 1) Self-directing—a
score that reflects a person who takes an active problem-solving stance, 2) Collaborative—a
score that reflects how the person works with God to solve problems, and 3) Deferring—a score
that reflects how the person passively defers life’s problems to God to solve for them.
Rest claimed that higher stage 4 scoring persons (a finding of returned missionaries) means that
persons are deferring their moral judgment. Therefore, I originally hypothesized that scores on
the RPSS would correlate highly with DIT-2 scores. For example, if one has a high stage four
score on the DIT-2 (a score that reflects a deferring to religious or societal norms) that they
would have a high deferring score on the RPSS reflecting that they are deferring to God in the
moral dilemmas.
The findings give evidence that those with the highest stage four scores as a group (returned LDS
missionaries) were not deferring in their problem-solving. In fact, this pilot study showed that
LDS returned missionaries (those with the highest stage 4 scores in this study) were considerably
more self-directing in their views towards solving life’s problems than nonreturned missionaries
(5 points difference on a 15-75 point scale, p < .05). In addition, returned missionaries had
significantly lower “deferring” scores (scores that show that one defers to God for problemsolving) than non-returned missionaries. Pargament suggests that strong self-directing scores are
typical of persons that “emphasize the freedom God gives people to direct their own lives. This
approach appears to be an active coping orientation which stresses personal agency” (Pargament
et al., 1988, p. 91). This style is not antireligious but compatible with a self-directing approach
to life espoused by these religious conservatives.
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From this finding and the comments made in qualitative responses, a very religious conservative
subgroup, LDS returned missionaries, are very much into a self-directing style of problem
solving rather than a deferring to duty, deferring to law-abiding schemata, deferring to Deity, or
deferring to a societal norms style of problem solving. This finding contrasts with what Rest and
colleagues have claimed by suggesting that religious conservatives defer their moral judgment
based upon a maintaining norms schema (Rest et al., 1999b) and is also evidence against the
developmental “moral blocking” theory. However, the pilot study found no significant
correlations between the three styles of religious problem-solving (self-directive, collaboration
with God, deferring to God) and DIT-2 outcome scores for BYU students. However, this first
pilot study also had some other surprise findings.
Richards and Davison’s studies reported that BYU undergraduate students were scoring below
national averages on their overall DIT-1 scores. However, in the pilot study, the DIT-2 scores
for a group of 30 BYU undergraduate students were higher than the national average (the pilot
study shows a mixed sample of freshmen, sophomore, junior, and senior BYU undergraduate
students average a 41.40 overall score of moral reasoning when the national average score for
college seniors is 38.94).
Another interesting finding was that BYU undergraduate’s scores of religious and political
conservatism were higher than the national average but their moral judgment scores were also
higher than the national average. Therefore, if the current BYU undergraduate students are still
scoring high on measures of religious and political conservatism (a similar finding in Richards
1988 DIT-1 study) while their moral judgment scores are above average on the DIT-2 (an
opposite finding from the 1988 study), then there is evidence that the DIT-2 items may have
been improved and may not be performing differently for BYU undergraduate students.
However, the full research to validate that the DIT-2 items are or are not performing better for
religious conservatives has not been conducted via a DIF study which requires a much larger
sample than 30 persons.
One theory that attempts to explain these differences away from an instrumental improvement in
measuring moral judgment is that BYU has become more selective in their admissions to their
university. The inference here is that the discriminant validity of the DIT is suspect due to
correlations with cognitive abilities. However, according to Thoma, Navarez, and Rest who
reviewed the literature from 1977-1997, studies have not shown significant correlations between
GPA and DIT scores (Rest et al., 1999b). According to their findings “no variable (verbal ability,
IQ, general cognitive ability, or GPA) accounts for the trends in the validity criteria better than”
the DIT outcome scores themselves (Rest, 1999, p. 108). Based upon these claims, there may be
evidence against a tightening of the selection process for incoming freshman (as based upon
cognitive measures such as higher GPA’s) as an explanation for why student’s DIT-2 scores
increased. However, this study did not fully explore this issue nor seek to validate Thoma,
Navarez, and Rest’s claim. In other words, based upon past research, I assume that something
other than cognitive abilities is the reason for higher BYU DIT scores. This led to the second
pilot study.
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Pilot Study #2
A second pilot study involved a qualitative think-aloud protocol as BYU students took the DIT-2
test. This led to asking about life experiences, purposes in suffering, doctrinal influences,
philosophies of life, and other relevant issues on the DIT-2 moral dilemmas. It also led to a
clarification of DIT-2 instructions (see Appendix E). I have included these pilot study qualitative
interview notes at the end of this Appendix. These first two pilot studies were the basis for my
online survey (see Appendix E).
The final finding of the first pilot study found that BYU focal group-mean religious orthodox
scores were 6.23. The University of Alabama reference group scores were 6.64. These scores
were normally distributed. Independent samples t tests led me to conclude that these differences
were not statistically significant (see Table B-1). Therefore, the UA and BYU samples did not
differ in matters of religious orthodoxy on the DIT-2 RO scale and possibly in other matters of
religious conservatism. This led to the third pilot study.
The third pilot study further validated the assumption that BYU and UA students did not differ
much in religious orthodoxy. I compared scores from Brown and Lowe’s Religious Inventory of
Religious Belief (Brown & Lowe, 1951) and found similar trends when two items were removed
from both samples. The UA Brown and Lowe Religious Inventory sample was provided by Dr.
Steve Thoma. The BYU sample came from 135 BYU students enrolled in Religion C 333. In the
analysis, two items were removed from Brown and Lowe’s inventory. The first item that was
removed was item 7: “God exists as: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.” The reason this item was
removed was because while discussing this item ex-post facto with the BYU students they
mentioned that they had interpreted this question as meaning that God was three individuals in
one and consequently strongly disagreed with this statement. However, BYU students did report
believing in The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost as three separate individuals. This item also did
not correlate with the BYU student’s item-total correlations either indicating that it did not fit
with the overall construct being measured for BYU students.
In addition, for the BYU students, item 8 did not correlate with the 14 other items from BYU
students, nor with their item total correlations, yet it did for UA students. Item 8, a question
about the whether there are mistakes and errors in the Bible and was intended to measure a belief
in the inerrancy of the Bible, a trait common to religious conservatives (Smidt, 1989). In
Table B-1
A Comparison of DIT Internal Measures of Religious Orthodoxy by School
School
UA
BYU

N

Mean

SD

Std. error mean

423

6.6430

2.42377

.11785

30

6.2333

2.52823

.46159

Sig. (2-tailed)
.373
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conversing with the BYU students, item 8 was interpreted by BYU students to refer to Biblical
translations rather than the doctrinal content of the Bible that the item was intended to be
measuring, so this item was removed from both samples. As noted in Table 4, there were no
other significant differences on this overall measure of religious orthodoxy when these two items
were removed (see Table B-2).
As both of these measures of religious orthodoxy were not statistically significant, it was
therefore determined that as a group, BYU and UA students did not significantly differ in
measures of religious orthodoxy. This finding posed a problem in my original data collection
plan because I was seeking to compare a group that was very religious orthodox to a group that
was closer to a national average of religious orthodoxy. A bright spot in this comparison sample
was that the variance in the UA sample was much greater and the size was much larger than in
the BYU sample. This led to the filtered sampling approach from the UA sample based upon
national averages of religious orthodoxy described in chapter IV of my study. It also was the
basis of using ANCOVA in the dissertation study.
Pilot Study #3 & Qualitative Interview Notes
Notes from students who took the DIT-2.
Research Goal #1: To identify any portion of the instructions, words, or phrases that are
confusing to a BYU student. The DIT-2 scoring guide states that using a sheet with definitions
and clarifications does not compromise the results.
Research Goal #2: To identify what kind of life experiences, doctrinal teachings, or philosophies
a student uses to morally judge in the DIT-2 scenarios. This will aid in forming the qualitative
aspects of my study (e.g., an essay portion, open-ended question portion).
Comments about the instructions on the DIT-2:
The “No” option. Two students pointed out that it would be better if this was explained as
referring to “Not important at all.” They even suggested that it be changed on the answer sheet
to “NOT” or just to remind students that the “Great, much, some, little, and no” options should
Table B-2
A Comparison of a Measure of Religious Conservatism by School (Brown and Low Inventory)
School

N

Mean

SD

Std. error mean

UA

423

58.8180

10.20605

.49624

BYU

135

59.3481

3.96688

.34141

Sig. (2-tailed)
0.379
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be followed by the word importance. Otherwise, a student may think that the item is a “yes” or
“no” question and select the “No” option when they really do not mean that.
For each item it helped when I restated in my head this question “Is this important to me or not.”
Also, it was helpful to ask, “Does this pertain to why I decided what I did about this scenario?”
This [the presidential election example in the DIT-2 instructions] is a difficult example. It’s hard
to understand because it’s not a story but the test is all stories.
This [which issue is the most important to you in making up your mind about…] is not stressed
enough. It’s hard to realize that you are rating them [the following 12 items] as to how important
they are in terms of making your decision. Perhaps underline this phrase on the instructions.
In the instructions it says to read the story and then go to the 12 issues and rate then rank them
but the first step is to answer “what should he do?” not go straight to the 12 issues. That’s kind
of confusing.
I would re-word the instructions with a simple example that is more similar to the actual
problems. The presidential example isn’t very easy to understand.
Terms that need more clarification:
Story #1 (Famine)
Item 7: “Social cooperation”
Item 8: “epitome”, “reconcilable”, “culpability”
Item 2: I was a little unclear that he is a father. I thought he was a kid.
Story #2 (Reporter)
Item 9: “habeas corpus”
Story #4 (Cancer)
Item 5: “active heliotropic drug”
Life Experiences, Doctrinal Teachings, Philosophies:
Story #1 (Famine)
Life Experiences:
One participant served an LDS two-year mission in the Bahamas where there is a great
separation of rich and poor. He was bothered by how the poor viewed the rich and felt that they
could take what they wanted from them regardless of a need and mostly out of a want. He saw
that as “not okay” to do ever and was bothered by it.
Another participant has lived his whole life in North America (Vancoover and the US). He
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mentioned that there is always some way to provide or some other alternative to stealing.
Another participant said his feelings would probably change if he were married: “I’m not
married with children but if I was this might pull a little harder on my heartstrings.”
Doctrinal Teachings:
The Ten Commandments were mentioned as a source by several participants. For example,
“Thou shalt not steal” was a common phrase. Several other scriptural teachings were mentioned
or paraphrased.
One participant mentioned a concept found in the Book of Mormon in regards to the Famine
story:“It’s like what you see in 1 Nephi 3:7:’...for I know that the Lord giveth no commandments
unto the children of men save he shall prepare a way for them that they may accomplish the thing
which he commandeth them.’” This statement was followed up by: “When God gives a
commandment, He provides a way to obey it. Therefore, there must be some sort of alternative
other than stealing—there is a way.”
Another person brought up one of the ten commandments in modern language: “The
commandment do not steal.”
Another concept mentioned was D&C 134:11: “‘We believe that men should appeal to the civil
law for redress of all wrongs and grievances, where personal abuse is inflicted or the right of
property or character infringed, where such laws exist as will protect the same; but we believe
that all men are justified in defending themselves, their friends, and property, and the
government, from the unlawful assaults and encroachments of all persons in times of exigency,
where immediate appeal cannot be made to the laws, and relief afforded.’ [Therefore],you can
fight against injustice.”
Another concept was that of an “eternal perspective”—that this life is only a small part of a
greater eternal plan: “Mortality is but a small moment, therefore, death is not the worst thing that
could happen to you.”
Some used scriptural stories to justify stealing the food: “David ate the temple bread [when he
was desperate for food] (this is in reference to David in the Old Testament eating something that
was forbidden to eat but in desperate circumstances the priests gave him this sacred bread to
eat—see 1 Samuel 21:6; Matthew 12:4; Mark 2:26; Luke 6:4).
Another mentioned a story in the Book of Mormon where a prophet is commanded to slay a
wicked man to save the sacred records: “The Lord told Nephi [a prophet in the Book of
Mormon] “it is better that one man should perish than that a nation should dwindle and perish in
unbelief” (1 Ne. 4:13). The inference from these scriptural stories of David and Nephi was that
sometimes it’s better to break one commandment to keep another.
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Philosophies:
Several students mentioned philosophies of life that they live by or have studied. Three of the
following comments were typical in several of the DIT-2 stories:
“I am a firm believer in property rights. I have studied a lot of Economics and am a proponent of
ownership concepts.”
“I believe more can be done by governments.”
“Two wrongs don’t make a right.”
Story #2 (Reporter)
Life Experiences:
The college students had rich life experiences that they drew on to justify their choice for
theDIT-2 stories. Several of the following comments were typical:
“I have often thought that the moral character of a candidate is important to me in an election.”
“I know I have lived wrong and I don’t want the world to know about it.”
“My brother has shady past and he came to mind right away as I was reading this.”
“In High School, the media published a report about the security of government installations
[places that should be secure] in the name of knowledge. I thought it was silly that they [the
media] would jeopardize national security.”
Doctrinal Teachings:
These comments were not as prevelant in this story but still surfaced:
“These [doctrinal teachings] did not affect me as much on this [story].”
“I thought of the principles of repentance and forgiveness, particularly that of restitution.” “It
seems that he has made restitution but it doesn’t necessarily say that.”
“I don’t think this is related to Mormon belief. It’s more of a political question about the role of
media.”
Philosophies
Only one person mentioned a philosophy that influenced them in this story: “I have studied
media ethics in my journalism classes and we go over things like this all the time. The answer I
have decided is that it all comes down to how it is reported and the motives of the reporter.”
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Story #3 (School Board)
Life Experiences:
A couple of persons mentioned that their life experiences influenced them in the following ways:
“There were two high schools in my town and we had a very controversial topic that pertained to
both of them. However, we handled it very civilly in our meetings. People acted responsibly, so
I know that that can be done.”
“The people are acting irresponsibly [in a citizen type of way]. My parents often took away
rights when I was not acting responsibly. However, they also sometimes let me learn from my
mistakes. It depended upon the consequence of letting me go my own way.”
Doctrinal Teachings:
The students responded in the following ways when they were asked, “Were there any doctrinal
teachings that influenced your decision?”
“Honesty—he gave his word and he should keep his word. I’m sure there is a way he can initiate
rules or regulations for the debate that will still encourage open discussion.”
“He gave his word and he tried to keep it but it didn’t work. So he tried to keep it so he’s really
not accountable for going back on it—it’s for the greater good.”
“The doctrine I see relates to keeping promises.”
“Don’t fear man, just fear God.”
Philosophies
The students responded in the following ways when they were asked, “Were there any
philosophies of life that influenced your decision?”“In this case the people are acting like babies
so they should be treated like babies.”
“There has got to be a way of diplomacy that will work in this situation.”
“The reason we have leaders is to make decisions. If the leader can’t make decisions, why even
have one?”
Story #4 (Cancer)
Life experiences:
Two students mentioned that they had gone through cancer treatment but interestingly chose to
use their experience to support different DIT-2 decisions about whether to euthanizea suffering
cancer patient.
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“I had testicular cancer at age 19. I’ve gone through cancer treatment and been close to people
with cancer and seen their suffering. Going through chemo[therapy] you are still alive but not
living life. When there is no hope of improving and they [the patient] can make a conscious
decision, they should be allowed to make that decision. This is a regular concept of life and
living life.
“I have been through bone cancer as a child, six years old. Fortunately it was caught early. I
don’t recall the radiation because I was a child and just figured that was what I was to go
through. My grandma died of a brain tumor and we tried to make her comfortable but we let
things take their course.”
When students were asked if this story had anything to do with euthanizing animals, students all
nodded as one participant voiced the following: “I’ve had pets euthanized but having pets
euthanized has nothing to do with this.”
Doctrinal Teachings:
The students responded in the following ways when they were asked, “Were there any doctrinal
teachings that influenced your decision?”
“Agency—how far do you let someone go? If she wants to go through with it then she should. If
not, she may find a different way to end it (suicide).”
“I know the church has probably taught something about this but I really don’t know the doctrine
of the church on this issue.”
“The reason pets are not really an issue here is that God has given man dominion over animals
but not [over] other men. Man does not have dominion over another man.”
“[Understanding] the purpose of life and the doctrine of life after death play into effect here.”
“In the scriptures, the Anti-Nephi-Lehis allowed their brethren to perish without exercising their
abilities to preserve their lives. Was that allowing them to be killed? [this was a parenthetical
question—the Anti-Nephi-Lehi’s were a group of people in The Book of Mormon who refused
to go to war against an invading people because they had made sacred promises not to fight or
kill their fellow men. A large number of them were killed when the invading army came in].
Philosophies:
The students responded in the following ways when they were asked, “Were there any
philosophies of life that influenced your decision?”
“Assisted suicide—are you responsible?”
“It’s not my call. There are lots of things in life I would like to control but I can’t.”
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“The doctor has a duty to warn and inform her of the consequences but it is her choice.”
“I think it is completely different than euthanizing an animal.”
Story 5 (Demonstration)
Life experiences:
The students responded in the following ways when they were asked, “Were there any life
experiences that influenced your decision?”
“I can relate because I am in college but I think there are better ways to protest something than
conflict.”
“This seems to be a lot like the Iraq conflict but the protest is the issue not the conflict.”
Doctrinal teachings:
The students responded in the following ways when they were asked, “Were there any doctrinal
teachings that influenced your decision?”
Several mentioned article of faith # 12–“We believe in being subject to kings, presidents, rulers,
and magistrates, in obeying, honoring, and sustaining the law.” Many of the students agreed or
quoted the part about honoring and sustaining the law. Others mentioned scriptural stories that
might justify such a protest: “Some people in the book of Mosiah broke laws and did ‘bad
things’ to the Lamanite soldiers because they didn’t like oppressive taxes [they referred to a
rebellion against a King who had high taxes to support his luxurious and impious lifestyle].”
“The [Latter-day] Saints endured persecution and went through the proper channels to effect
change” [This is a reference to early Mormons who were driven from the State of Missouri,
some at gunpoint. An extermination order was signed by Governer Boggs in 1838 that allowed a
person to shoot a Mormon on site].
Philosophies:
The students responded in the following ways when they were asked, “Were there any
philosophies of life that influenced your decision?” This kind of pragmatic argument was found
in several comments.
“Whether they have a right is not as much an issue as whether it is an effective use of time.”
“Productive use of time is what I thought of. It seems like they are wasting time.”
“There’s no order here.”
“Do two wrongs make a right?”
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Demographic & Survey Questions
1) Religious Affilitation__________________________________________________________
2) Returned Missionary (Yes or No)
If “Yes” when and where did you serve? _______________________________________
3) Married, Single, Widowed, Divorced, Separated, Other _______________________________
4) Mother’s formal education level (Please check one—if your answer needs some explaining
you may write any comments below).
o Junior High
o Some High School
o High School diploma
o Post High School Technical training (e.g., Dental Hygenist training). Please indicate
o Some College
o Associates Degree
o Four Year Degree—bachelor degree
o Some Graduate School
o Masters Degree
o Some Beyond Masters Degree
o Doctoral Degree (PhD, MD, EdD, JD, etc.)
o Post Doctoral Work
1. Has anyone very close to you ever been convicted of shoplifting?
2. Has anyone very close to you ever served Jail Time for a crime they committed? Yes
or No.
3. Do you feel that there is a purpose in human suffering? Yes or No. Please explain.
4. As you made your decisions and answered the items on the DIT-2, please briefly
describe if you thought of any life experiences, doctrinal teachings, philosophies of
life, or other relevant issues. See the attached example for further explanation
(Appendix E).
Story #1 Famine
a. Please describe any of your life experiences that influenced the
decisions you made in regards to this story.
b. Please describe any doctrinal teachings that influenced the decisions
you made in regards to this story.
c. Please describe any philosophies of life that influenced the decisions
you made in regards to this story.
d. Please describe any other relevant issues that may not be mentioned in
this story but that influenced the decisions you made in regards to this
story.
These same a-d questions were repeated for stories 2-5 also.
5. I give permission for the principal investigator, Daniel R. Winder, to contact me to ask
additional questions to clarify my replies on this survey. Yes or No.
6. If “yes” I can be reached at:
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Consent to be a Research Subject
Introduction
This research is being conducted by Daniel R. Winder at Brigham Young
University to determine whether there are items in the Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2)
that perform differently for BYU undergraduate students and if so, whether those items
exhibit a test bias among all BYU undergraduate students or only among certain
subgroups of BYU undergraduate students.
Procedures
You will be given the DIT-2 and a short answer survey form with some
demographic questions about yourself. These surveys consist of moral dilemmas
followed by questions about the dilemma and questions about how a person uses their
religion to problem-solve. Both surveys are to be completed individually within two
weeks of receiving them and returned to the religion department secretary, Cheryl
Snelgrove (370 JSB) or the principal investigator, Daniel Winder (215 JSB). The total
amount of time needed to take these surveys is about 60 minutes.
Risks/Discomforts
There are minimal risks for participation in this study. However, there is religious
content in the demographic and qualitative survey that asks questions about one’s
personal beliefs.
Benefits
There are no direct benefits to the subjects. However, it is hoped that through
your participation researchers will learn more about the field of moral judgment for
religious persons and be able to design more effective instruments to measure moral
reasoning for such persons.
Confidentiality
All information will remain confidential and will only be reported as group data
with no identifying information. All information will be kept in a locked fire-safe and
only be accessed by the principal investigator. Once the individual has been
compensated for completing the surveys and non-identifying data has been entered into a
computer program for analysis, any identifying information will be deleted.
Compensation
Participants will receive a $5 gift certificate to the BYU bookstore or 25 points of
extra credit in a course taught by the principal investigator. For those students of the
principal investigator who do not wish to participate in the research, the same amount of
extra credit can be earned by writing a 5 paragraph essay on at talk from a living prophet
from the October 2007 General Conference.
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Participation
Participation in this research study is voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at
anytime or refuse to participate entirely without the jeopardy to your standing at BYU,
your class status, or grade.
Questions about the Research
If you have any questions regarding this study, you may contact Daniel Winder at
422-2330, winderdr@gmail.com, or 215 JSB during office hours or the IRB Chair Renea
Beckstrand at 422-3841, irb@byu.edu, A-285 ASB.
Questions about your Rights as Research Participants
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, you may
contact Daniel Winder at 422-2330, winderdr@gmail.com, or 215 JSB during office
hours or the IRB Chair Renea Beckstrand at 422-3841, irb@byu.edu, A-285 ASB.
I have read, understood, and received a copy of the above consent and desire of my own
free will to participate in this study.
Signature:__________________________________________ Date:________________
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Clarifying the DIT-2 Instructions
This questionnaire is concerned with how you define the issues in a social
problem or dilemma. Several stories about social problems will be described. After each
story, you will be asked to do the following:
1. Indicate whether you agree, disagree, or cannot decide your stance regarding the
action in question.
2. There will be 12 issues or questions that an individual might ask when
considering the situation. You are to rate these 12 issues on how important they
are to you as you consider the situation or story.
3. Decide which four issues were the most important in your considerations.
Here is a short example of the task:
________________________________________________________________________
Chinese Army – (Story # 0)
Fa Zhou is an old man in central China, and because of previous war injuries, he must
now walk with a cane. Because China has been attacked by the Huns, the draft requires
that the family of Zhou must send a man to be a soldier. Zhou is the only male in his
family and must join the army, despite his injuries and age. His daughter Mulan is a
capable young woman, and is considering cutting her hair and taking her father’s armor
and sword to join the army in his stead, even though women are not allowed to be in the
army.
Chinese Army – (Story # 0)
Do you think that Mulan should take her father’s place in the army? (Mark one.)
1 . Should join the army. 2 Can’t decide 3 . Should not join the army
Great

Much

Some

Little

No

□
□
□
□
□ 1. Is it improper for Mulan to disobey her parents?
□
□
□
□
□ 2. Shouldn’t the government make exceptions for the elderly?
□
□
□
□
□ 3. Is Zhou’s honor more important than his life and comfort?
Rank which issue is most important (from the issues raised above).
Most important item:
1
2
3 .
Second most important:
1
2
3.
______________________________________________________________________________
Note that some items may be irrelevant to you or not make sense—in that case, rate the item as
“no.” Also, note that there will be 12 items to rate for each story, rather than 3.

When you are finished with the DIT-2 answer sheet, please fill out the
“Demographic and Short Answer Questions” sheet. The demographic section is pretty
self-explanatory.
The short answer portion will ask you to think back as you made your decisions
for the five stories and the items following each of the five stories. It asks you to briefly
describe if you thought of any life experiences, doctrinal teachings, philosophies of life,
or other relevant issues as you filled out the DIT-2. For example, using the Chinese Army
Story #0 previously described:
Story #0 Chinese Army
a. Please describe any of your life experiences that influenced the
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decisions you made in regards to this story.
My father is suffering from a hip replacement and I thought of him and
how I would do anything to keep him out of a war in his weakened
condition because I care so much for him.
OR
I served a mission in China and I understand family honor and
dishonor in this culture. In this case it would be so inappropriate to
risk getting caught and disgracing the family name, that her good
desires in no way could overshadow the potential dishonor. For
example, I had a 65 year old man refuse to be baptized because his
grandmother said “no”.
b. Please describe any doctrinal teachings that influenced the decisions
you made in regards to this story.
As I was thinking about this item I thought of the commandment to
honor thy father and mother. In this case it would be dishonorable to
serve in a father’s place so that doctrinal teaching influenced my
decisions on these items.
c. Please describe any philosophies of life that influenced the decisions
you made in regards to this story.
I have always asked myself “do two wrongs make a right?” It’s wrong
for the military to ask an old man to serve and it’s wrong for a woman
to serve in the military in this story.
OR
Like the patriots in the Boston tea-party, I have a philosophy that I live
by: “if the rule is wrong, then don’t let it rule you.” In this case, I see
the rule of not letting women serve as wrong.
d. Please describe any other relevant issues that may not be mentioned in
this story but that influenced the decisions you made in regards to this
story.
As I read the story I thought that a more relevant moral issue in this
case is whether or not a country can force its citizens to fight. That is
what would most influence my decision in this case but it was not
asked on any of the items.
The following definitions may be helpful when taking the DIT-2.
Story #1 (Famine) Item 7:“social cooperation”—refers to human society & joint
organization.
Story #1 (Famine) Item 8:“epitome”—a strong example.
“reconcilable”—made compatible or consistent.
“culpability”-- blameworthiness: a state of guilt.
Story #2 (Reporter) Item 9:“habeas corpus”-- A writ commanding that a person be
brought before a judge.
Story #4 (Cancer) Item 5:“active heliotropic drug”—a drug that actively produces
effects in humans [I think that you have to include your part about plants that follow the
sun]
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DIT-2 Story Moral Dilemmas
Famine (Story #1)
The small village in northern India has experienced shortages of food before, but this
year’s famine is worse than ever. Some families are even trying to feed themselves by
making soup from tree bark. Mustaq Singh’s family is near starvation. He has heard that
a rich man in his village has supplies of food stored away and is hoarding food while its
price goes higher so that he can sell the food later at a huge profit. Mustaq is desperate
and thinks about stealing some food from the rich man’s warehouse. The small amount of
food that he needs for his family probably wouldn’t even be missed.
Reporter (Story #2)
Molly Dayton has been a news reporter for the Gazette newspaper for over a decade.
Almost by accident, she learned that one of the candidates for Lieutenant Governor for
her state, Grover Thompson, had been arrested for shoplifting 20 years earlier. Reporter
Dayton found out that early in his life, Candidate Thompson had undergone a confused
period and done things he later regretted, actions which would be very out-of-character
now. His shoplifting had been a minor offense and charges had been dropped by the
department store. Thompson has not only straightened himself out since then, but built a
distinguished record in helping many people and in leading constructive community
projects. Now, Reporter Dayton regards Thompson as the best candidate in the field and
likely to go on to important leadership positions in the state. Reporter Dayton wonders
whether or not she should write the story about Thompson’s earlier troubles because in
the upcoming close and heated election, she fears that such a news story could wreck
Thompson’s chance to win.
School Board (Story #3)
Mr. Grant has been elected to the School Board District 190 and was chosen to be
Chairman. The district is bitterly divided over the closing of one of the high schools. One
of the high schools has to be closed for financial reasons, but there is no agreement over
which school to close. During his election to the school board, Mr Grant had proposed a
series of "Open Meetings" in which members of the community could voice their
opinions. He hoped that dialogue would make the community realize the necessity of
closing one high school. Also he hoped that through open discussion, the difficulty of the
decision would be appreciated, and that the community would ultimately support the
school board decisions. The first Open Meeting was a disaster. Passionate speeches
dominated the microphones and threatened violence. The meeting barely closed without
fistfights. Later in the week, school board members received threatening phone calls. Mr.
Grant wonders if he ought to call off the next Open Meeting.
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Cancer (Story #4)
Mrs. Bennett is 62 years old, and in the last phases of colon cancer. She is in terrible pain
and asks the doctor to give her more painkiller medicine. The doctor has given her the
maximum safe dose already and is reluctant to increase the dosage because it would
probably hasten her death. In a clear and rational mental state, Mrs. Bennett says that she
realizes this; but she wants to end her suffering even if it means ending her life. Should
the doctor give her an increased dosage?
Demonstration (Story #5)
Political and economic instability in a South American country prompted the President of
the United States to send troops to "police" the area. Students at many campuses in the
U.S.A. have protested that the United States is using its military might for economic
advantage. There is widespread suspicion that big oil multinational companies are
pressuring the President to safeguard a cheap oil supply even if it means loss of life.
Students at one campus took to the streets, in demonstrations, tying up traffic and
stopping regular business in town. The president of the university demanded that the
students stop their illegal demonstrations. Students then took over the college’s
administration building, completely paralyzing the college. Are the students right to
demonstrate in these ways?
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Qualitative Data Analysis and Tables
Qualitative responses were first coded and then separated into a table of codes (see Table G1). Data was then sorted into comments by categorical responses based upon one of the three
decisions a person can make in each of the DIT-2 moral dilemmas (see Table 2). For
example, notice in Table 2 that the responses are sorted by the categories “should give,”
“can’t decide,” and “should not give.” This pertains to whether a doctor should give an
overdose to end a suffering cancer patient’s life.
The comments were also sorted in the table by the survey question that brought forth the
comment: “life experiences,” “doctrinal teachings,” “philosophies of life,” and “other
relevant issues” (see Table G-2).
Life experiences included academic training, work-related experience, social experiences,
and family experiences. The difference between theological and philosophical was based on
whether the MMR was based on doctrinal teachings or another moral code. Much of the
content for MMR include statements that are clearly scriptural in nature (i.e., Thou shalt not
steal, Agency is a divine gift, Repentance) while philosophical content for MMR includes
statements that refer to a person’s moral code (i.e., two wrongs don’t make a right, the ends
don’t justify the means, anarchy is not an acceptable way to protest). In qualitative thinkaloud protocols, BYU students would frequently refer to what they thought was a more
relevant issue when making a decision for what should be done on the DIT-2. For example,
in story #5, college students take over the administration building in a protest and halt
university operations. Most students mentioned that demonstrating the way these students
were was “a waste of time.” So time-management was more of an issue to them than to
protest in this manner.
Because the qualitative questions were open-ended, some participant’s responses contained
multiple thoughts. Notice on the relative totals column in Table 2 that when the percent of
comments dropped below 3% that the relative total was not computed. Most of these
comments did not add any information in the comparison of responses because they were
specific comments pertaining to an uncommon category.
Once comments were coded and categorized, the relative percent of the comments pertaining
to that category were computed. These relative percentages of coded categorical comments
were compared by the decision made in the story. After these relative percentages were
computed for the cancer story, a summary table was written up summarizing the relative
percent of comments and the general feel of the comments from the specific category (see
Table G-3). Table G-3 was a little redundant because Table G-1 and G-2 already contained
this information so this table was not repeated for the other DIT-2 stories. However, the rest
of the process was repeated for four of the five DIT-2 stories (see Tables G-4 to G-9). The
demonstration story comments were not computed because of the lack of variance and
because most students thought that this story was not a moral dilemma at all—it was actually
viewed in terms of cost-benefit use of time, effort, and effectiveness or saliency of making a
point. There were only a handful of comments besides the ones that discounted it a true
moral dilemma.
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Table G-1
Cancer Story Codes for Qualitative Data
Code

Collapsed
categories

A

Avoid suffering

Avoid suffering for the person and their loved ones, no chance to live anyway, not same
person if they are living in pain, hate to see them suffer, I wanted a (relative or close
friend) to die for them, their quality of life is hindered by their suffering, why should one
prolong life just to prolong it if someone is suffering--there seems to be no purpose.

AG

Anti-God

God doesn’t pertain to this question.

AM

Mercy

The doctor is extending her mercy, her dying wish ought to be realized as a merciful gift
to her.

B

Beneficial

It would be very beneficial to have or allow doctor assisted suicide.

C

Choose

God gave a person agency to act for themselves and take control of situations. He wants
us to decide.

Capt

Capital
punishment

Capital punishment has man taking man’s life into their dominion/hands.

D

Doctor

The doctor has a responsibility here. There is liability, lawsuit, and legal issues. A
doctors role is to sustain life--that is their duty.

DP

Defer

I have my opinions because my parents taught me this or friends taught me this.

Duty

Duty

The doctor has a duty to do it.

E

Euthanize

I have euthanized animals. My opinions of euthanasia affected me.

F

Family

A family member, relative, loved one, or self went through a similar ordeal. Life support
is similar. I or a loved one have experienced similar pain and suffering.

FM

Frame of mind

Her frame of mind may prevent her from making the best decision because she is
suffering so much. She is in the wrong mind frame to make this decision.

G

God

God, doctrine, religious leadership helps me understand this dilemma. A belief in God’s
doctrine of life after death. A doctrine that God has given man dominion over animals
and plant life but not over their fellow men’s lives. Faith to endure pain comes from God.

GR

Golden rule

Do unto others as you would have others do to you.

H

Helping God

This is actually helping God. He has already called her home. He is in control.

I

Individual

The individual is ready to go

K

K & OD

The doctor would be killing her and this is wrong. It is murder or suicide and one should
not end life prematurely. Overdosing is wrong in any situation.

L

Life

One should fight for life. Not an option to not fight for life. Life is sacred and therefore
this is serious.

LDS

LDS

Is she a member? Is she converted? Does she know?

LL

Law & Govt

The laws of the land make one accountable for this choice, the laws have defined what is
legal and right in this case. The government and society rule in this matter.

M

Myself

It’s her life, her body, her choice, her responsibility or my life, my choice, my body, my
responsibility.

Med

Medicine

Anti-medication, had a negative experience with meds.

General descriptions

(Table continues)
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Code

Collapsed
categories

New

New

Make a new law.

O

Old age

The issue is easier if she is old rather than young.

P

Peaceful
endurance

One should peacefully endure suffering until a natural death occurs. There may be a
blessing for her or others if she endures it patiently. There is a purpose in her suffering.
Endure faithfully to the end.

Pol

Political

This is a political issue and should be voted on.

R

Rights

A defining of who has the right to make this decision. Family and close friends are
affected also so they should have a right.

Rel

Relative

There is no right or wrong answer in every situation like this. It is all relative.

RIP

Death

Death is painful for her loved ones.

S

Surgery

Surgery ends life prematurely at times. We take people off life support. We allow triage
in certain situations.

Self

Self & suicide

The woman in this example is very selfish to ask what she is asking of the doctor. The
problem is hers, not the doctors and she is deferring the responsibility for her life to him.
If she wants to end her pain she should do it herself, not make someone else do it.

Time

Time

How long has she been on pain medication, meds?

Try

Try

Has she tried everything else or anything else for her pain treatment?

TV

Media

I have media exposure to similar circumstances that help me understand this dilemma.

W

Work & school

I have studied or have work experience related to this moral dilemma. (Table Continues)

Weak

Weak

Weak moral dilemma because it contradicts itself.

Z

Exception

This is an exception to God’s rules for life and death.

General descriptions
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Table G-2
Relative Percent Counts of Coded Comments by DIT-2 Cancer Story Decision
Cancer Story

Should give

Can’t Decide

Should not give

# of
completed
cells

118No Comment, 94
Completed comment
fields

187No Comment, 117
Completed comment fields

284No Comment, 260
Completed comment fields

Relative
Totals of
completed
comments

46%A
31%C
20%F
19%G
17%R
14%K,
11% R
11% AM
7%D
6% I
6% H
5%W
4%L
3%TV

30% G
20% K
20% F
17% D
17% C
17% L
16% A
9% R
8% P
8% LL
6% FM
4% AM
4% W
4% SELF
3% TV
3% I

38%G
32%K
24%P
20%L
16%F
14%D
8%A
8% LL
7%R
5%Self
5% W
4%C
3%FM
2%DP
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Table G-3
Coded Comments and Category Examples/Descriptions
Category

Description

Life experiences

Of those who wrote about life experiences, 64% of the comments were about family
or a close personal friend’s experience with cancer. 29% mentioned something
about an experience where they wanted themselves or close associate to avoid
suffering. Seventeen percent mentioned work related experiences. Fourteen percent
mentioned an experience of thinking about a doctor’s liability or responsibility.
Fourteen percent mentioned experiences of a peaceful endurance of suffering and
the benefits of it. Twelve percent of the comments referred to the sacredness of life
and that it therefore should be fought for. Ten percent mentioned that a family or
close friends are affected by this decision so that they should have a say in it, 6%
mentioned that she was not in the right frame of mind to make such an important
decision, 6% also mentioned that this would be considered killing and that killing is
wrong, 6% mentioned the individual’s readiness to die, and 4% mentioned that the
media influenced some of their decision.

Doctrinal
teachings

Of those who wrote about doctrinal teachings, 54% of the comments mentioned a
doctrine of God’s dominion over life and His purposes in suffering. 40% mentioned
that killing or murder is wrong and that the doctor is killing in this situation.
Eighteen percent mentioned that one should seek to patiently endure suffering and
learn from it, 16% mentioned the sacredness of life and that life should be fought
for, 13% mentioned that God gave man agency to chose for themselves, 4%
mentioned the avoidance of suffering and mercy to the woman, 3.5% mentioned that
the laws of the land ought to be kept, the doctors liability, that one may be assisting
God by euthanasia, and that one needs to define the rights in this situation. Two
percent mentioned the teaching of mercy and 2% deferred to their parents teachings.

Philosophies of
life

Of those who wrote about philosophies of life, 24% of the comments mentioned that
because of their belief in God they had a philosophy of life that included a purpose
in suffering, 22% mentioned that man has a right and ability to chose for himself,
20% mentioned a doctor’s liability here, 19% mentioned that life is sacred and
should be viewed as a gift, 16% mentioned the avoidance of suffering, 14%
mentioned the sacredness of life and that life should be fought for, 8% mentioned
that one should follow the laws of the land,, 7% mentioned the selfishness of the
woman for asking the doctor to do that, 4% mentioned that she is not in the frame of
mind to make the decision.

Other relevant
issues

Of those who wrote about other relevant issues, 18% of the comments mentioned
the avoidance of suffering, 16% mentioned the doctor’s responsibility and liability,
13% mentioned that the doctor would be killing or murdering, 13% mentioned that
one ought to follow the laws of the land, 9% mentioned that the woman was selfish
for asking the doctor to end her life, 8% saw flaws in the dilemma that weakened it
or brought up media and a definition of rights for individual and family and friends,
6% brought up whether she has tried different things and the sacredness of life, 5%
brought up surgery or other medical methods of reducing pain, 3% brought up the
woman’s frame of mind.

(Table continues)

174
Category

Description

Should give her
an overdose

Of those who responded in the 1 category, 46% of the comments mentioned that the
avoidance of suffering was important to their decision, 31% of the comments
mentioned that God gave man agency or the ability to chose for themselves, 20%
mentioned that a family member or close associate when through a similar ordeal
and this influenced their response, 19% mentioned God’s doctrine on life and his
teachings, 17% of the comments mentioned a defining of rights for the individual
and the loved ones, 14% mentioned that the doctor would be killing, 11% mentioned
that it would be a last merciful gift to the patient, 7% mentioned the doctor’s
liability, 6% mentioned helping God by euthanasia and whether or not the individual
was ready to die, 5% mentioned work related experiences that influenced their
decisions, 4% mentioned the sacredness of life and that it should be fought for, and
3% mentioned the role of the media in influencing their decision.

Can’t decide

Of those who responded in the 2 category, 30% of the comments mentioned a belief
in God’s word affected their views of life/death, 20% mentioned that the doctor
would be killing, 20% mentioned that a family or close associate went through a
similar experience that this influenced their decision, 17% mentioned the doctor’s
liability, 17% mentioned that God gave man the ability to chose for themselves,
17% mentioned the sacredness of life and that it should be fought for, 16%
mentioned the avoidance of suffering for the individual, 9% mentioned a definition
of the rights of the individual and of the loved ones affected, 8% mentioned the laws
of the land should be followed, 8% mentioned a peaceful endurance and the benefits
of such, 6% mentioned that the woman is not in the right frame of mind to make the
decision, 4% mentioned that the woman is selfish for asking the doctor to make this
decision, 4% mentioned that it would be a last merciful gift to the woman, 4%
mentioned work experience, and 3% mentioned the media’s influence on them and
whether the individual was ready to die.

Should not give
her an overdose

Of those who responded in the 3 category, 38% of the comments mentioned a belief
in God’s word affected their views of life/death and His teachings, 32% mentioned
that the doctor would be killing, 24% mentioned a peaceful endurance of pain and
the benefits of such, 20% mentioned the sacredness of life and that it should be
fought for, 16% mentioned that a family or close associate went through a similar
experience that this influenced their decision, 14% mentioned the doctor’s liability,
8% mentioned the laws of the land, 8% mentioned the avoidance of suffering, 7%
mentioned a definition of the rights of the individual and the loved ones affected,
5% mentioned that the woman is selfish for asking the doctor to make the decision,
5% mentioned work experience, 4% mentioned that God gave man agency or the
ability to chose for themselves 3% mentioned that the woman is not in the right
frame of mind to make this decision, and 2% deferred to their parent’s teachings.
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Table G-4
Description of Coded Comments in DIT-2 Famine Story Qualitative Comments
Code
J

Collapsed
Categories
GG R TS

PF

Lv

TA
L

General Descriptions
Justified. Life is greater than law. Greater good. Life was more precious than
stealing. There was a greater good worth breaking laws to achieve. Everyone has a
right to life and the right to protect that life, even if it means stealing. if stealing is
done as last resource, only to survive, than it is okay.
Provide for family. Comments generally agreed that if the motive was purely to
provide for your family than stealing would be justified. Also, the idea that fathers
have a duty to provide for their families and that commandment/duty is weightier
than that of not stealing. If love is the intent, love is the motive than it is okay.
It’s okay to take from someone who has abundance.

DS

Law and obedience to laws is paramount. This most often was in reference to
heavenly laws or commandments to not steal (“thou shalt not steal”), etc.
Comments focused on how laws must be respected inorder to maintain order in
society. Laws are not to be broken--ever. Persons have a responsibility to uphold
the public laws. Comments were very black and white, no one should steal (don’t
steal) no matter what!

CTR

Choose the right and God will bless you. Things will work out for your good-somehow God will support you and if he doesn’t than you will be blessed in
heaven for keeping His commandments. These comments tended to lean toward
orthodox mentalities.

Wk

Work for it rather than steal. This code was also used if comments suggested that
there could be another way for obtaining the food besides stealing. Look for more
options.
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Table G-5
Relative Percent Counts of Coded Comments by DIT-2 Famine Story Decision
Should steal n = 143
───────────────────

Can’t Decide n = 59
───────────────────

Should not steal n = 74
────────────────

200 coded
responses

296 total
cells

Relative
%

99 coded
responses

236 total
cells

Relative
%

267
coded
responses

573
total
cells

Relative
%

47

J

23.5%

29

L

29.3%

113

L

42.3%

46

PF

23.0%

21

J

21.2%

69

CT
R

25.8%

20

TA

10.0%

9

WK

9.1%

32

WK

12.0%

10

L

5.0%

8

PF

8.1%

4

PF

1.5%

3

CTR

1.5%

7

TA

7.1%

2

TA

0.7%

0

WK

0

6

CTR

6.1%

0

J

0
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Table 6
Reporter Story Decision Coded Comments and Category Examples/Descriptions
Code
PRI

Collapsed
Categories
Life (P),
Doctrine (R,
P, 2nd, A),
Philosophies
(I, R, 2nd,
P, NoP),
Other

General Descriptions
Repentance, forgiveness, forsaken, length of time shows a change, changed,
prophet’s teachings or examples about repentance, the past is irrelevant
because of the present (he has changed for the better), everyone deserves a
second chance (chance to change), grace, atonement, God forgets so we should
too, No mortal is perfect/all need repentance, crime is not agaisnt me so who
am I not to forgive.

T

Life (T),
Doctrine (T,
H, D),
Philosophies
(T, H)

Truth exposed, truth will set you free/help you be free, it is right,
honesty/dishonest, dishonest to not to report.

PD

PD, F

Public duty to report, report unbiasedly, Fairness, as long as she reports good
and bad on both candidates, consistency with reporting on candidates, take a
less offensive stand or be neutral in your reporting

B

B, C, Bene,
Benefit, O,
+

It will benefit him, chance for him to correct himself to public for a crime
against public, optimism-it will work out, this is a positive thing and can be
reported in a positive way, it’s good that a supporter rather than an enemy of
his is doing this.

JE

Life (J)

I have studied Journalism’s code of ethics, I have educational experiences or
have discussed this in my classes at school, I am a reporter.

TV

TV, S, O

That’s the way it is with media, when you are in the spotlight this comes with
it, the community does decide on a public figure’s morality, opinions of public
figures are made by the people after they have information on them.

N

N

Negative impression of the press

NB

NB, PR,
Res, E

Not the public’s business, he has a right to privacy, journalists should respect
their subjects, this is an ecclesiastical issue not a public issue, this is between
him and the store owner.
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Table G-7
Relative Percent Counts of Coded Comments by DIT-2 Reporter Story Decision and
Category Examples/Descriptions

Should Report
47
comment
cells

n=29

Amount
18
15
13
11
5
4
0
0

Can’t Decide

69 na cells

42
comment
cells

n=29

40.5%
comment

Category
T
PRI
PD
TV
JE
B
N
NB

Relative
% totals
38.3%
31.9%
27.7%
23.4%
10.6%
8.5%
0
0

Amount
33
11
9
4
4
2
1
1

Should Not Report

74 na cells

36.2%
comment

425
comment
cells

n=211
419 na cells

50.4%
comment

Category
PRI
T
PD
JE
TV
N
B
NB

Relative
% totals
78.6%
26.2%
21.4%
9.5%
9.5%
4.8%
2.4%
2.4%

Amount
362
32
31
18
13
12
11
5

Category
PRI
N
NB
T
B
TV
PD
JE

Relative
% totals
85.2%
7.5%
7.3%
4.2%
3.1%
2.8%
2.6%
1.2%
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Table G-8
Coded Comments from Story #3 with Category Examples/Descriptions
Code
L

Collapsed
categories
Leadership
(L) &
Results (R)

Descriptions
Elected leaders should decide, people elect leaders for a
purpose, the concept of a republic, There will be no results
if everyone is fighting, this meeting does more harm than
good anyway, this meeting is inefficient use of time.

C

Contention
(C) & Take
out (T)

Contention of people, Leader needs to deal with the few
contentious, I have dealt with similar angry people, anger is
wrong, contention of individuals is wrong.

F

Fair/Free

Fair to community, should give people a say if it effects
them, rights, free speech, in the end this is better, if he is
unfair he will lose their trust, the public has a right to know,
democracy.

S

Safety

Safety should come first, the well-being of the members
involved, the public’s safety, leaders are liable for the
safety of those they lead.

P

Promises

M

Moderator

Promises should be kept, he should stick to his word,
honesty.
The moderator and the way they are dealing with this mob
mentality is the problem, the group dynamics are such that
there is no responsibility in large #s, the problem is that this
moderator does not know how to compromise, there is no
order.
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Table G-9
Relative Percent of Coded Comments by Story #3 Decision and Category
Examples/Descriptions
Should call off next open
meeting
n=102
Relative %
Category
totals
L
32.4%
C
32.4%
F
19.9%
S
16.2%
P
6.6%
M
5.1%

Can’t decide
n=47
Category
L
F
S
M
P
C

Relative
% totals
37.8%
35.1%
27.0%
24.3%
24.3%
21.6%

Should have the next
open meeting
n=114
Relative
Category
% totals
F
43.3%
P
20.0%
M
16.7%
C
15.0%
L
12.8%
S
0
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Table G-10
Illustrative Examples of Themes in the Cancer Story Comments
Rights-based macromoral reasoning themes

Responsibility-based macromoral reasoning themes

Theme 1. An individual and a society has a right or
duty to avoid suffering when possible. Illustrative
examples:

Theme 1. Individual’s responsibility to endure suffering for
their own or others benefit. Illustrative examples:

The patient has every right to declare the comfort
of her death before it actually happens in practical
means.

My friend’s father had a brain tumor that caused him pain and
suffering, however, he suffered with it until the end so he could
spend more time with her.

No one should have to suffer more than they can
handle.

Some suffering can serve as a motivating factor for overall
good.

If we can help others avoid suffering we should do
that.

Both of my parents had cancer so the idea of a loved one in
pain is very sensitive to me. However, the idea of rushing the
death of a loved one is nearly unbearable. I could never put a
doctor in those circumstances because there are more people
involved than the victim.

Life should be relatively sting free.

If you are still alive, there is a reason behind it. Discover your
purpose and make the most of the remaining time on earth.
Maybe you need to befriend someone, make amends, or have
some other experiences before you are called to depart this life.

Life is precious but also the ability to enjoy life is
so important. If you want to live then you should
live. But if you are in pain and everything else has
been taken from you, shouldn’t you have the right
to decide when and how you die?

I believe Victor Frankl was right when he said that if there is
any meaning in life there must be meaning in suffering.

Theme 2. Individual rights trump the rights of
those affected. Illustrative examples:

Theme 2. Responsibility for individuals to fight for their life.
Illustrative examples:

My grandpa was sick and suffered for a couple
years until finally passing away. I don’t know if he
ever considered pulling the plug on himself, but as
a family we were strictly against it. All I can say is
that it is a very difficult decision, but the individual
doing the suffering, if anyone, is probably the only
one who could make such a life or death call.

Life is precious. Although suffering is hard and leaving this
earth seems wonderful compared to the pain-our mortal life is a
gift, we must always treat it like one.
My older sister fought leukemia for 7 months and then passed
away. Sometimes it was so hard for her to get through the
days. I know that I would not have wanted her to give up and
just settle for “comfort” instead of fighting for her life. And
that’s what she did.
Theme 3. The responsibility that the doctors have to society—to
heal life, not take it. Illustrative examples:

Theme 3. The right to make their own choice.
Illustrative examples:

Doctors are meant to help and sustain life, not end it faster than
should naturally happen.

In the end, this is her life to choose what she wants
to do with it.

I think doctors should continue to fight for their patients.

God has given us agency. Agency is so important
to Heavenly Father that…although the doctor may
not agree with the lady’s wishes, he does not have
authority to take away her agency.

The situation above is tough one, however, my thoughts on it is
that we shouldn’t help others destroy their life.

Doctors take an oath to help and protect those they care for.

(Table continues)
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Rights-based macromoral reasoning themes

Responsibility-based macromoral reasoning themes
Theme 4. A responsibility or accountability for one’s actions
when they involve another person. Illustrative summaries:
The doctor is accountable to: society for not considering what
is best for more than the one individual, to God for taking life,
to the living loved ones of the family, to the laws of the land
(least freuqent comment). The woman is accountable because
the doctor is accountable to internal and external consequences
for her wish (e.g., guilt and possible allegations/prosecutions).

Table G-11
Illustrative Examples from the Reporter Story Comments
Rights-based comments

Responsibility-based comments

Theme 1. The public has a right to know.
The reason that I approved of the reporters right to go
ahead and publish the story is because I have seen time
and time in my life that even no matter how small the
issue, the public must know the facts. If not, then we all
just become subject to the one-sidedness of some man’s
opinion.

Theme 1. Responsibility to subject.
I learned one time of President Truman falling down one
time and a young reporter tried taking a picture of him and
another reporter hit his camera out of his hand and broke it
because of the ideal that reporters then had of respecting
their subjects.

It is important for people to know the truth and to be able
to make informed decisions based off of the knowledge
that they have. The WHOLE truth is that Thompson went
through some hard times in his life, but he overcame
them. If the whole truth is presented it shouldn’t affect his
chance of losing if he was the most likely candidate.

It would not be dishonest for Molly to write the story, but
it would be mean and disrespectful.

In the recent presidential primaries that [are] occurring I
believe that the public has the right to know everything
about the future candidates, even their past lives. We
should just know that they have changed.

Theme 2. Responsibility to forgive and move on.
Once people have repented of their sins, they are forgiven
and God remembers them [their sins] no more. We should
also forgive.

Her job is to report the news to the public…. She gives
the community the information/story and they decide for
themselves.

You can’t spend your life looking in the rear view mirror.
There is a reason that it is smaller than the windshield. It
is more important to focus on what lies ahead.

We should treat our neighbors kindly and not expose bad
things about people.

Theme 3. Ends don’t justify the means.
Don’t hurt someone for your own gain.
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